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ABSTRACT 
 
Research into cybersecurity risks and various methods of evaluating those threats has 
become an increasingly important area of academic and practitioner investigations. Of particular 
interest in this field is enhancing the designs and informing capabilities of cybersecurity risk 
management solutions for users who desire to understand how organizations are impacted when 
such risks are exploited. Many of the cybersecurity risk management solutions are extremely 
technical and require their users to have a commensurate level of technical acumen. In the 
situation evaluated during this research project, the founders of the company being researched 
had created a highly technical risk management solution composed of sophisticated networking 
and cryptography components. The company’s management team, on the other hand, had very 
little cybersecurity industry background but needed to effectively communicate the specialized 
capabilities of the solution to potential customers and business partners in an understandable 
way. In this case, improving the company’s solution design to better convey its technical 
foundation both inside and outside the company was required. Design Science Research (DSR) 
offers a methodology that was created to help analyze, create, and evaluate design artifacts that 
can identify useful ways to work through technical challenges such as those faced by the 
company. The Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) methodology can be used to further 
improve design artifacts through an iterative process that is easily understood by practitioners 
and academics and grounded in theory. When DSR and eADR methodologies are used together, 
the result is the creation and demonstration of informing artifacts which will address technical 
 vi 
 
cybersecurity risk evaluation and communication issues. This research project contains a case 
study, an accompanying technical note, and two research papers which will address research 
questions informed by the DSR methodology process in response to related communication and 
compliance issues noted in the cybersecurity risk management problem space. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This research project is motivated by the need for better informing capabilities in current 
cybersecurity risk management solutions. Cybersecurity practitioners have faced challenges in 
finding effective ways to communicate the impacts of technology risks for years. The rapid 
growth in the numbers and types of cyber risks have made these challenges even more 
formidable. Designing cybersecurity solutions that can bridge the knowledge and information 
gaps between industry practitioners and stakeholders who need to understand and act on these 
risks is now a high priority for many organizations, including nation-states. Exacerbating this 
issue is the increasing business and contractual requirement for such solutions to comply with 
cybersecurity standards such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF). 
The research approach and design for this dissertation project will incorporate several 
different qualitative methods including case study, Design Science Research (DSR) and 
Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR). Four research papers have been written during this 
project that show the iterative nature of analyzing the design of a cybersecurity solution, building 
design artifacts to increase the solution’s informing capabilities related to cybersecurity risks, 
and evaluating the utility of those artifacts with cybersecurity practitioners to determine how the 
artifacts affect the ability to better understand the impacts of cybersecurity risks.  
 2 
 
The primary goal of this research project is to describe or explain the internal and 
external effects that cybersecurity risks have on organizations. This will be accomplished by 
creating a conceptual model that can assist IT security practitioners to successfully communicate 
cybersecurity control interactions in their organizations, based on the NIST CSF framework and 
findings from this study. To accomplish these goals, the research activities will focus on 
answering the following questions:  
 What is a conceptual model that can be constructed to identify key IT security risks that a 
company must address? – Explanatory Question 
 What are cybersecurity risk management evaluation mechanisms that can be utilized to 
inform a company of the effective implementation of its cybersecurity controls? – 
Explanatory Question 
This conceptual model and control evaluation mechanisms are then assessed to determine 
their utility as used to design a maturity measurement framework for organizations. They can 
demonstrate how they manage and communicate the company’s ability to mitigate IT security 
risks as part of their overall risk management processes. 
The motivation for this research project is discussed in the third and fourth papers in a 
separate section that considers related academic literature that either articulated prior work on the 
research problem or provided a detailed depiction of cybersecurity problem spaces and relevant 
evidence supporting the investigation. These sections covered findings in the current research 
and gaps in academic literature that inform the research problem. Following the research 
motivation, the initial design artifact requirements are analyzed. The requirements are used to 
build the artifact based on the DSR methodology. Each artifact was iteratively documented and 
then discussed by internal participants and cybersecurity Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to 
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determine its ability to inform those contributors. The research goal of the DSR methodology is 
to design an artifact that exhibits utility in practice, addresses the research question being 
studied, and uses a methodology that demonstrates rigorous research principles. The final section 
of the dissertation project addresses the evaluation of the DSR artifacts through the lens of a 
fitness-utility model proposed for use by both academics and practitioners (Gill & Hevner, 
2011).  
The first paper, titled “Implementing a Cybersecurity Community of Trust: Reprivata 
Seeks an “Early Adopter,”” utilized the case study methodology (Gill, 2011) to inform on 
specific design gaps identified in the launch of a cybersecurity risk management solution. The 
second paper, a technical note (Gill, 2011) on cybersecurity problem spaces titled “A Note on the 
Cybersecurity Problem Spaces in 2018,” performed a review of current literature on the 
cybersecurity challenges facing businesses, governments, and other entities. The third paper, 
titled “Evaluating and Enhancing the Risk Informing Capabilities of a Cybersecurity Risk 
Management Solution Using Action Design Research,” detailed the interactions with the 
cybersecurity risk management solutions company to analyze and build design artifacts in an 
iterative fashion that would close the gaps noted in the case study (Hevner, 2014).  
After the motivation, build, and review of the DSR artifacts were studied within the 
context of the cybersecurity risk management solution being assessed, an eADR methodology 
(Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018) was used to progress and improve the artifacts. The fourth paper, 
titled “Using a Fitness-Utility Model to Elaborate the Impacts of Artifacts Created to Enhance 
the Risk Informing Capabilities of a Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution,” discusses how 
the design artifacts created in the second paper were evaluated using a fitness-utility model (Gill 
& Hevner, 2011). Cybersecurity practitioners, the management team of the cybersecurity risk 
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management company, and the company’s business partners were included in these discussions 
and provided informed estimates of the artifacts’ utility in relation to the cybersecurity risk 
management solution. The eADR approach documented in the fourth paper demonstrates that the 
artifacts show real-world utility and introduce design values and principles that are both rigorous 
and informing to practice. 
References 
Gill, T. G. (2011). Informing with the case method. Santa Rosa: Informing Science Press. 
  Google Scholar. 
 
Gill, T. G., & Hevner, A. R. (2011). A Fitness-Utility Model for Design Science  
 Research. DESRIST. 
 
Hevner, A. R. (2014). Design Science Research. In A. R. Hevner, & H. Topi (Ed.), Computing 
  Handbook: Information Systems and Information Technology, Third Edition (pp. 22-1 
  - 22-21). Boca Raton, Florida, United States of America: CRC Press. 
 
Mullarkey, M., & Hevner, A. (2018). An Elaborated Action Design Research Process Model. 
 European Journal of Information Systems. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
EVALUATING AND ENHANCING THE RISK INFORMING CAPABILITIES OF A  
CYBERSECURITY SOLUTION USING ACTION DESIGN RESEARCH 
 
Abstract 
This research project is focused on assisting a startup cybersecurity company in 
increasing its clients’ understanding of cybersecurity risks as identified by the company’s 
technology risk management solution. Several artifacts have been created for the solution, 
including compliance matrices, a solution architecture, a conceptual model for the solution, and 
recommendations on enhancing the legal agreement between users of the Reprivata Community 
of Trust (CoT) cybersecurity risk management solution, and other supporting documentation 
while acting as a researcher embedded within the firm. Discussions with the company’s 
management and potential clients confirmed that the inclusion of the new artifacts in strategic 
and technical presentations have increased their understanding of the cybersecurity risks 
identified by the solution and how those risks are now more meaningful to their clients.  
Introduction 
The numbers and types of cybersecurity risks that governments, companies, and 
individuals face are becoming overwhelming and nearly incomprehensible to many of those 
parties. In current academic literature, researchers investigate ways to foster better understanding 
of such risks when few cybersecurity risk management applications are available that could help 
parties manage and comprehend the majority of those risks (Contreras, DeNardis, & Teplinsky, 
2012). The emerging types of technology risk management measurements and supporting risk 
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management methodologies can inform these entities by helping them better understand 
cybersecurity risks to their particular technology environments while increasing their abilities to 
comply with cybersecurity program standards and maturity measures (Epstein & Brown, 2008). 
In January 2018, the researcher was introduced to the senior executives of a startup 
cybersecurity risk management company named Reprivata. During a discussion with the 
company’s management team, the researcher found that while the Reprivata team had a great 
deal of experience implementing the large interconnected networks that comprised the 
commercial Internet, they had limited experience in cybersecurity and software development. In 
fact, the cybersecurity application they had developed was designed originally to set up virtual 
private networks.  
After some review, the researcher determined the Reprivata CoT solution possessed three 
advantages over other cybersecurity solutions. First, the Reprivata solution created a secure 
Community of Trust (CoT), where entities communicated securely and exchanged sensitive data 
inside the closed private network using embedded collaboration and data sharing applications. 
Second, the Reprivata solution required the entities using the closed private network to sign 
Master Agreements that committed them to implementing the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) as their organizational cybersecurity model. 
As part of its design, the NIST CSF drives the consistent application of business practices for 
maturing cybersecurity programs and collaborating on mutual cybersecurity issues, which no 
other cybersecurity standards require. Third, the solution had a Global Threat Intelligence (GTI) 
component that, in real time and with a technology agnostic stance, monitors and mitigates 
security threats to the entities’ private networks as well as potential cybersecurity risks inside the 
CoT network.  
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During additional discussion with the Reprivata senior management team, the researcher 
learned they did not understand how to map their solution to the NIST CSF key controls in order 
to assess its compliance with those standards. Additionally, they did not understand how to 
effectively demonstrate to potential clients that the solution’s encryption and threat management 
capabilities could help those clients better understand, respond to, and mitigate their 
cybersecurity risks.  
At the request of Reprivata management, the researcher began to investigate ways to 
create compliance testing artifacts for the solution and a NISF CSF mapping of the solution in 
order to illustrate how each component met the NIST CSF requirements for cybersecurity 
behavior management, risk management, and collaboration between all interconnected parties 
doing business together over the Internet. 
Motivation 
As a cybersecurity practitioner and executive for over 25 years, I have found that one of 
the most challenging things to do is effectively and accurately communicate cybersecurity 
information to those parties who are not well-versed in the field. In particular, cybersecurity risks 
and impacts are very difficult to communicate because those issues can be very technical or 
theoretical and need to be “translated” into a vocabulary that can be better understood by people 
with non-cyber backgrounds. 
This communication problem came into sharp focus when I began assisting Reprivata, a 
startup cybersecurity risk management solution company, with their go-to-market strategy. This 
required me to re-think how to communicate what is a very technical and complex technology 
solution into more conceptual terms that could show how the solution actually worked without 
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confusing them by utilizing some of the potentially arcane and confusing language used by 
cybersecurity practitioners.  
To accomplish this, I began to appraise how to inform the Reprivata stakeholders and 
potential customers by creating a design artifact in the form of a conceptual model, which 
showed the solution in pictorial format. This artifact was created to show stakeholders how the 
solution could work across an organization to improve its security controls posture.  
Once the conceptual model was created and its initial assessment had been performed, I began 
working on a compliance matrix, which broke the solution down into its primary security 
controls, to identify how well the solution complied with the NIST CSF. The matrix also gave an 
overview of how the solution could help mature the security control posture. 
This research article is based on the Elaborated Action Design Research (eADR) process 
model developed or descripted by Mullarkey and Hevner (2018).  The diagnosis phase of this 
research project included exploratory personnel interviews and problem analyses performed with 
the Reprivata management team.  Then, the findings on the design and product strategy of 
Reprivata’s cybersecurity solution were detailed.  
The findings resulted in several artifacts in the form of a business case discussing 
Reprivata’s current business issues and pending decisions as well as technical overviews of 
Reprivata’s cybersecurity collaboration solution software. Additionally, further analyses of the 
cybersecurity problem spaces affecting Reprivata’s product strategy were performed to learn 
how well the Reprivata CoT solution addressed some of the more prevalent issues around 
understanding cybersecurity risks in the context of an organization’s technology risk posture.   
Once created, the first set of artifacts that were created during the writing of the Reprivata 
case study was evaluated by the Reprivata management team, updated based on their comments 
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and recommendations, and incorporated into the overall cybersecurity solution design, 
architecture, and productization strategy presentations. Then, these artifacts were used as the 
basis for the next ADR phase.   
Reprivata and its clients cited the informing aspects of applying a more cybersecurity-
focused vocabulary and taxonomy to the company’s product strategy as a key enhancement that 
would enable a better understanding of the cyber risks identified and reported by the Reprivata 
cybersecurity solution, which is consistent with findings in the academic literature reviewed for 
this article (Elnagdy, Qiu, & Gai, 2016).  
The motivation for these research activities is to develop additional suitable artifacts to 
further improve the solution’s cybersecurity risk management capabilities. After additional 
conversations and further documentation reviews with Reprivata’s management team, the next 
artifacts to be created would include a conceptual model that illustrated the interrelationships of 
the solution’s software components, its operational processes, and the technical cybersecurity 
standards applied to the solution. Also, to demonstrate to clients how the solution, at the modular 
level, complied with the NIST CSF standard that Reprivata had adopted when developing the 
solution, a mapping of the Reprivata CoT solution architecture to provide a visual representation 
of its components and how they work together was required. These artifacts will be evaluated by 
Reprivata management, technical Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the cybersecurity field, and 
Reprivata’s potential clients to determine further product design and strategy enhancement 
opportunities for the Reprivata cybersecurity solution. The results of the interventions with the 
cybersecurity SMEs and potential clients will be documented in the next paper of this research 
project. 
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The literature review was performed in two phases. The first phase was a survey of the 
types of research methodologies used in the study of cybersecurity and related risk management 
topics (see Table 1). These articles also included an overview of legal and ethical issues that 
have arisen in prior research that, if not handled appropriately, could impact current and future 
cybersecurity research projects. From this literature review, it was determined that Action Design 
Research (ADR) has been used in previous cybersecurity research in the area of how to 
effectively communicate information about cybersecurity risks to stakeholders. The Design 
Science Research (DSR) approach helped guide the development of informing artifacts and other 
documentation on cyber risks to provide more assistance to cybersecurity risk practitioners and 
those entities that interact with them to better understand cyber risks as well as their potential 
impacts on the organization.  
Table 1 – Literature on Research Design Applicable to Cybersecurity Risks 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Findings 
Burstein, A. J. (2008). 
Conducting Cybersecurity 
Research Legally and  
Ethically. LEET, 8, 1-8 
 
 A variety of federal and state statutes either prohibit 
activities that would provide cybersecurity researchers with data 
about real systems and real attackers, or cast such doubt on 
research activities that investigators modify their programs or 
conduct them with a sense of uncertainty as to their legality. 
(Page 1). 
 Though U.S. law does not permit everything that 
cybersecurity researchers would like to do, relatively few research 
activities are flatly prohibited. (Page 2). 
 Researchers should consider whether the papers or 
datasets that they publish could reveal information that could help 
adversaries attack the researcher's own network (or other friendly 
networks). (Page 12). 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Muegge, S., & Craigen, D. (2015). 
A design science approach to 
constructing critical infrastructure 
and communicating cybersecurity 
risks. Technology Innovation 
Management Review, 5(6), 6. 
 Owners and operators of critical infrastructures, as well as 
governments, do not disclose reliable information related to 
cybersecurity risks. (Page 6). 
 Cybersecurity specialists can manipulate cognitive 
limitations to overdramatize and oversimplify cybersecurity risks 
to critical infrastructures. (Page 6). 
 The proposed design science process is a “learning 
machine,” in which design principles provide a focal point for 
collaboration between infrastructures, codify specialized 
knowledge in a teachable form that can be more easily 
communicated to others, elevate attention from point solutions to 
higher-impact problems, enable knowledge sharing between 
different infrastructures, and increase both the rate of learning and 
the frequency of opportunities for learning. (Page 7). 
 Open source software projects are a high-potential setting 
for collaboration where critical infrastructure providers can tap 
into the benefits of high-quality software, and other developers 
and users benefit from the critical infrastructure providers’ high 
demands for security and testing. (Page 12). 
Da Veiga, A. (2016, July). A 
cybersecurity culture research 
philosophy and approach to 
develop a valid and reliable 
measuring instrument. In SAI 
Computing Conference (SAI), 
2016 (pp. 1006-1015). IEEE. 
 
 To mitigate cyber risks and minimize cybercrime, 
cybersecurity is aimed at protecting information resources 
connected in cyberspace, the information available via 
cyberspace, and the individual who could fall prey to cyber-
attacks. (Page 1007). 
 An information security culture has been defined as the 
attitudes, assumptions, beliefs, values, and knowledge that 
employees/stakeholders use to interact with the organization’s 
systems and procedures at any point in time. (Page 1008). 
 The assessment of the cybersecurity culture level in an 
organization can be incorporated in existing information security 
risk management and incident management frameworks to 
understand the risk from a human perspective. (Page 1014). 
Kolini, F., & Janczewski, L. 
(2017). Clustering and Topic 
Modelling: A New Approach for 
Analysis of National Cyber 
security Strategies. PACIS 2017  
 Understanding the multifaceted nature of cybersecurity is 
a key enabler for national governments and to adjust themselves 
to rapidly changing nature and complexity of cybersecurity 
ecosystems. (Page 1). 
 A common set of performance indicators or metrics that  
can be used as a gold standard for systematically evaluating the 
effectiveness of national cybersecurity strategies is yet to be 
developed. (Page 2). 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic modeling was an 
effective method for identifying a number of key topics and 
corresponding words relevant to prior knowledge and extent 
experiences in cybersecurity and public policy studies. (Page 8). 
 Globally accepted best practices that can be compared 
with the result of topic modelling and topic labels for 
cybersecurity are not available at this time. (Page 10). 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Mullarkey, M. T., & Hevner, A. 
R. (2018). An elaborated action 
design research process 
model. European Journal of 
Information Systems, 1-15. 
 Action Design Research (ADR) is used effectively in 
many research projects and, because of its ever-expanding 
applications, the ADR concepts and process model continue to 
grow and evolve to meet the demands of new and challenging 
environments. (Page 1). 
 A key addition to the activities in the ADR intervention 
cycle is the inclusion of the Artifact Creation activity. This 
activity highlights the essential artifact build activities that are 
central to the Design Science Research (DSR) process. (Page 15). 
 Practitioners from multiple application areas (such as 
healthcare, education, government, and others) can be brought 
together in common ADR projects by use of a shared process 
model and produce innovative artifacts of value across 
disciplines. (Page 16).  
Vishik, C., & Balduccini, M. 
(2015). Making Sense of Future 
Cybersecurity Technologies: 
Using Ontologies for 
Multidisciplinary Domain 
Analysis. In ISSE 2015 (pp. 135-
145). Springer Vieweg, 
Wiesbaden. 
 The effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation 
strategies depends on an accurate understanding of the 
relationships among the components of systems that need to be 
protected, their functional requirements, and of the trade-off 
between security protection and core functionality. (Page 1). 
 Ontologies and the associated inference mechanisms 
permit us to reason about connections between diverse domains 
and contexts that are pertinent for the general threat picture, and 
to highlight the effects and ramifications of the mitigation 
strategies considered. (Page 1). 
 Ontologies are crucial tools for understanding the threat 
space for new technology space, for increasing security experts’ 
situational awareness, and, ultimately, as decision-support tools 
for rapid development of mitigation strategies. (Page 1). 
 
In the literature review on the types of cybersecurity research methods, databases such as 
ABI-Informs, Google Scholar and JSTOR.org were used for those searches. These databases 
were selected as excellent starting points for the first phase of the literature review, based on the 
recommendations of the USF librarians and the DBA dissertation committee professors. The 
search queries concentrated on cybersecurity research methods to find the articles that were 
ultimately reviewed and cited here.  
The queries to these databases found a body of literature on these subjects by both 
academics and practitioners dating from the 2000s. These are the selected results of the database 
queries. Further review and summarization of the referenced articles and books are planned to 
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refine future queries as part of the ongoing research. Theses searches were completed between 
June 28, 2018 and June 30, 2018. 
The second phase of the literature review was focused on surveying selected articles that 
provided insights on the ways cybersecurity risks were measured and how those measurements 
were evaluated and understood by stakeholders (see Table 2). From these articles, consistent 
findings were identified indicating the cybersecurity field has challenges informing internal 
stakeholders, external stakeholders, and cybersecurity practitioners on the types of cyber risks 
being faced. As the numbers and types of cyber threats and risks continue to increase, the ability 
to measure their impacts accurately will lag, which will limit the ability to inform cybersecurity 
practitioners. There are significant opportunities abound for cybersecurity researchers to help 
create better risk informing measurement and evaluation solutions for this problem. 
Table 2 – Literature on Understanding and Measuring Cybersecurity Risks 
 
 
 
 
Source Findings 
Butler, A. (2012). When cyber 
weapons end up on private 
networks: third amendment 
implications for cybersecurity 
policy. Am. UL Rev., 62, 1203. 
 
 Regardless of the sources of many cyber-attacks, the 
sophisticated malware programs utilized reveal the capacities to 
capture credentials, communications, audio, video, and a wide 
range of other sensitive data from a broad range of devices and 
networks. (Page 1214). 
 The Third Amendment to the Constitution has 
prohibitions that govern any military intrusions onto private 
property, such as situations where military cyber operations can 
affect private computers and networks, including innocent third-
party systems. (Page 1227). 
 When framed as a right to exclude the military from 
private property, it is clear that computers, networks, and other 
systems fall within the scope of the Third Amendment. (Page 
1230). 
So far, no United States government policy efforts have 
adequately addressed the civil liberties impact of cyber 
operations. (Page 1234). 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Epstein, R. A., & Brown, T. P. 
(2008). Cybersecurity in the 
Payment Card Industry. The 
University of Chicago Law 
Review, 75(1), 203-223. 
 The object of choosing the right rules for risk allocation 
was to minimize the net costs of theft, as measured by the losses 
from the theft, less the costs of prevention, including the costs of 
running the system. (Page 207). 
 When a third party is the source of the stolen 
information, consumers are unlikely to know the precise source 
of a breach. (Page 213). 
 Breaches have occurred most often, almost 50 percent 
of the time, in the government and education sectors, but the 
most records have been stolen from retailers and processors of 
financial data. (Page 213). 
 
  
Contreras, J. L., DeNardis, L., & 
Teplinsky, M. (2012). Mapping 
today's cybersecurity 
landscape. Am. UL Rev., 62, 1113. 
 Cyber threats overtook terrorism as the number one 
global threat to America, according to the 2013 global threat 
assessment performed by the United States intelligence 
community. (Page 1114). 
 Interoperability is critical in communications and 
national infrastructure, including the national power grid and the 
medical and financial establishments. The result of the tens of 
thousands of technology standards in use is a world that is 
massively interconnected. (Page 1117). 
 The security and stability of the Internet depend on the 
preservation of three Internet characteristics:  
- Permissionless innovation 
- Open access 
- Collaboration (Page 1121). 
 Several practical steps that firms can take to protect 
themselves include:  
- Implement best practices in cybersecurity risk management 
- Engage senior leadership 
- Encourage a culture of cybersecurity through education and 
implementation of policies to control cyber risk 
- Harden networks by implementing effective 
 - Formulate crisis response plans. (Page 1128). 
Elnagdy, S. A., Qiu, M., & Gai, K. 
(2016, June). Understanding 
taxonomy of cyber risks for 
cybersecurity insurance of financial 
industry in cloud computing. 
In Cyber Security and Cloud 
Computing (CSCloud), 2016 
IEEE3rd International Conference 
on (pp. 295-300). IEEE. 
 Understanding cyber risks taxonomy is a challenging 
task due to the high complexity of the entity-entity relations and 
the broad crossed disciplines. (Page 295). 
 The cause effect relationships between cyber incidents 
and cyber risks are hard to be accurately defined, because most 
situations represent a multi-to-multi relation and very rarely do 
one-to-one relations exist. (Page 297). 
 The vital issue is finding out the methods of creating 
taxonomy of cybersecurity, which is the fundamental of 
organizing cyber incidents and relevant technical issues in a 
group-based manner. (Page 298). 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
Greitzer, F. L., Moore, A. P., 
Cappelli, D. M., Andrews, D. H., 
Carroll, L. A., & Hull, T. D. (2008). 
Combating the insider cyber 
threat. IEEE Security & 
Privacy, 6(1). 
 Current or former employees and contractors are the 
second greatest cybersecurity threat, exceeded only by hackers, 
and that the number of security incidents has increased 
geometrically in recent years. (Page 61). 
 Research in both government and commercial sectors 
reveal that although the proportion of insider events is declining, 
the financial impact and operating losses due to insider 
intrusions are increasing. (Page 61). 
 A complete and effective insider threat mitigation 
strategy must take into account human motivations and 
behaviors along with organizational factors such as policies, 
hiring, and training practices, and the technical vulnerabilities 
and best practices for prevention or early detection of 
unauthorized insider activity or access. (Page 63). 
Jones, W., & Gallo, A. (2007). A 
Process-Based Approach to 
Handling Risks. IT 
Professional, 9(2). 
 The risk management process begins with the 
development of a policy, including a clear definition of an 
acceptable risk tolerance. (Page 11). 
 A comprehensive risk management approach to 
cybersecurity requires the early identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities most likely to occur, the ability to qualify and 
quantify the potential harm to the agency, and the development 
and implementation of appropriate mitigation steps to achieve 
an acceptable risk level. (Page 13). 
 The process model for continuously managing risk is 
essentially equivalent, whether considering a program or project 
with discrete start and end dates and well-defined deliverables 
or for an ongoing service or infrastructure support activity. 
(Page 64). 
Loukaka, A., & Rahman, S. (2017). 
Discovering new cyber protection 
approaches from a security 
professional prospective. Int. J. 
Comput. Netw. 
Commun.(IJCNC), 9(4). 
 In order to detect attacks more accurately and to build 
on a robust detection system, it is imperative to apply other 
areas that include new technologies, big data, attacker 
philosophies and the normal user activities. (Page 14).  
Today’s network infrastructures are so complex that it is 
categorically impossible to adequately distinguish plausible 
valid alerts. (Page 16). 
Current research in cyber protection shows that economic 
impact can be very serious after a cyber-attack or data breach 
but it also underlines that most organizations reluctance to 
change, adaptation, and collaboration in addressing potentially 
serious cybersecurity issues. (Page 21). 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Merrell, S. A., Moore, A. P., & 
Stevens, J. F. (2010, November). 
Goal-based assessment for the 
cybersecurity of critical 
infrastructure. In Technologies for 
Homeland Security (HST), 2010 
IEEE International Conference 
on (pp. 84-88). IEEE. 
 A challenge in critical infrastructure assessments is the 
difficulty in examining evidence that an organization may 
present to demonstrate cybersecurity activities and appropriately 
evaluating that evidence within the context of national security 
objectives. (Page 84). 
 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has 
developed an assessment methodology called the Cyber 
Resilience Review (CRR) which helps organizations better 
understand their role in critical infrastructure protection and 
provides a lightweight review of how they are managing the 
capabilities that are crucial for ensuring the cybersecurity and 
continuity of high-value services during times of stress, when 
effective management is needed most. (Page 85). 
 Goals in the assurance review are refined into specific 
goals and sub-goals which are eventually turned into the 
assessment questions that are asked of organizations under 
review to determine the extent to which the goals are satisfied. 
(Page 87). 
Myron, W., & Muita, K. (2014). 
Cybersecurity capability maturity 
models for providers of critical 
infrastructure. Technology 
Innovation Management 
Review, 4(10). 
 To help cope with the security risks associated with the 
complexity and interdependencies within various critical 
infrastructure systems, standards bodies and federal agencies in 
at least twelve countries or regions of the world have defined 
criteria for security standards as well as implementation 
methods. (Page 34). 
 These modern cybersecurity capability maturity models 
provide the stages for an evolutionary path to developing 
policies and processes for the security and reporting of 
cybersecurity readiness of critical infrastructure. (Page 36). 
 The review of the current cybersecurity capability 
maturity models highlighted that, although many models exist, 
none are specifically crafted to address the scenario of an 
operator of multiple interdependent systems and are instead 
focused on federal infrastructures or specific industry sub-
sectors, and are all at a high level. (Page 38). 
Nurse, J. R., Creese, S., Goldsmith, 
M., & Lamberts, K. (2011, 
September). Trustworthy and 
effective communication of 
cybersecurity risks: A review. 
In Socio-Technical Aspects in 
Security and Trust (STAST), 2011  
 An understanding of what aspects influence perceived 
information trustworthiness is central to the goal of trustworthy 
and effective risk communication. (Page 60). 
 The presentation and format, relevance and specificity 
of information also become key factors in increasing a user’s 
trust in a security risk message displayed. (Page 66). 
 Keeping communications about cybersecurity risk  
1st Workshop on (pp. 60-68). IEEE. simple and minimalistic, assisting users in seeing the potential 
consequences of security-related decisions, and engaging in 
some level of customization of the context and content of 
cybersecurity risk information to specific target audiences are all 
important factors to ensure effective and informing risk 
communications to stakeholders and other affected parties. 
(Page 66). 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Shane, P. M., & Hunker, J. A. 
(Eds.). (2013). Cybersecurity: 
Shared risks, shared 
responsibilities. Carolina Academic 
Press. 
 While the proposed United States cybersecurity 
framework may well be a reasonable approach to security from 
the perspective of stakeholders (including citizens) whose 
security may be breached, we should also note that our 
government may itself be an active agent in some breaches and 
attacks. (Page 1). 
 Many of our public laws and legal institutions are under 
stress because they have not kept pace with technological 
developments. (Page 2). 
 The pace of events in cyber space moves so quickly that 
policy enhancements and requirements cannot keep up. (Page 
2). 
Shields, K. (2015). Cybersecurity: 
Recognizing the risk and protecting 
against attacks. NC Banking 
Inst., 19, 345. 
 Despite regulatory pressure and financial institutions' 
efforts to protect against security threats, sophisticated 
cyberattacks against financial institutions occur every day, and 
the resulting costs have become an increasingly significant part 
of the business. (Page 348). 
 Even if cybercriminals cannot directly breach a 
financial institution's network, they may still gain access to the 
institution's network through the network of a third-party vendor 
because some of these third parties' security practices are remiss 
or even nonexistent. (Page 350). 
 Educating employees and consumers on how to 
distinguish legitimate entities from fraudulent ones is key to 
protecting against cybersecurity attacks. (Page 366). 
Shackelford, S. J., Proia, A. A., 
Martell, B., & Craig, A. N. (2015). 
Toward a global cybersecurity 
standard of care: Exploring the 
implications of the 2014 NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework on 
shaping reasonable national and 
international cybersecurity 
practices. Tex. Int'l LJ, 50, 305. 
 From its inception, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
has been developed with an aim toward creating a cost-effective 
method of addressing critical infrastructure cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities without enacting binding (and potentially 
cumbersome and inflexible) regulatory security standards and 
requirements. (Page 309). 
  Currently, no baselines or comprehensive cybersecurity 
obligations are imposed across the United Sates critical 
infrastructure, but regulations do exist for certain sectors, 
leaving the status quo a complex patchwork of oftentimes 
ambiguous state and federal regulations overlaying applicable 
common law doctrines. (Page 310). 
 Despite gaps in the legal framework and the ever-
changing cyber threat, courts are increasingly willing to hold 
both organizations and firms liable for not protecting sensitive 
information. (Page 312). 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Sommer, P., & Brown, I. (2011). 
Reducing systemic cybersecurity 
risk. 
 Analysis of cybersecurity issues has been weakened by 
the lack of agreement on terminology and the use of exaggerated 
language. (Page 7). 
 The cyber infrastructure, as well as providing a potential 
vector for propagating and magnifying an original triggering 
event, may also be the means of mitigating the effects of cyber-
attacks and data breaches. (Page 8). 
 One important characteristic of a global shock from 
cybersecurity events is that responses limited to the level of the 
nation state are likely to be inadequate; coordinated international 
activity, with all the associated problems of nation states 
reaching collaborative agreements and then acting in concert, is 
what is required to deal with these types of cybersecurity issues. 
(Page 11). 
Teen, O. (2014). A new Harm 
Matrix for cybersecurity 
surveillance. Colo. Tech. LJ, 12, 
391. 
 Emerging cybersecurity threats may require 
increasingly comprehensive programs for scanning mass 
quantities of information; yet such programs strain existing 
constitutional and legal frameworks. (Page 398). 
 Automated processing of bulk data should be viewed 
differently than individualized surveillance because the 
distinction between content and metadata needs to be linked to 
the purpose of monitoring; and the surveillance requirements, 
particularly on a large scale, must be buttressed by measures of 
privacy by design. (Page 401). 
 Cybersecurity threats in particular can be embedded into 
all layers of a communication, regardless of the distinction 
between content and metadata. (Page 412). 
 In addition to mechanisms of legal oversight, 
cybersecurity monitoring programs require the creation of 
operational accountability processes within intelligence and 
national security agencies. (Page 424). 
Trope, R. L. (2012). "There's No 
App for That": Calibrating 
Cybersecurity Safeguards and 
Disclosures. The Business Lawyer, 
183-195. 
 For years, the risks cyber threats remained obscure 
because companies preferred not to disclose that they had been 
breached and damaged. (Page 183). 
  Cybersecurity can longer be focused exclusively on 
protecting the enterprise and its assets and reputation, but, in 
light of several highly publicized data breaches, cybersecurity 
measures need to be broadened if an enterprise is to be in a 
position to defend its response cyber-attack. (Page 194). 
 The longer it takes an enterprise to detect an attack that 
results in damage to a customer or a third party with whom the 
enterprise has a formal commercial or corporate relationship, 
and the longer it takes the enterprise such circumstances to 
interdict and remediate the attack, the harder pressed the 
enterprise and its counsel will be to demonstrate to a court that 
an enterprise's actions did not fall short of reasonably 
commercial standards of fair dealing. (Page 194). 
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In the literature review on the communication of cybersecurity risks and impacts to 
stakeholders, databases such as ABI-Informs, Google Scholar and JSTOR.org were used for 
those searches. These databases were selected as excellent starting points for the second phase of 
the literature review, based on the recommendations of the USF librarians and the DBA 
dissertation committee professors. The search queries concentrated on communicating, 
understanding, and measuring cybersecurity risks and impacts to find the articles that were 
ultimately reviewed and cited here.  
The queries to these databases found a body of literature on these subjects by both 
academics and practitioners dating from the 2000s. These are the selected results of the database 
queries. Further review and summarization of the referenced articles and books are planned to 
refine future queries as part of the ongoing research. Theses searches were completed between 
July 1, 2018 and July 3, 2018. 
Both phases of the research provided significant insights into the challenges of 
performing cybersecurity research and the manner in which details on cyber risk are 
communicated to inform stakeholders effectively. A number of constraints and other challenges 
can impact an organization’s ability to identify, analyze, and understand cyber risks (see Table 
3).  
 
Table 3 – Issues Identified that Impact the Better Understanding of Cybersecurity Risks 
 
Identified Issue  Impact on Informing of Cybersecurity Risks 
Legal or Regulatory Restrictions  In Federal and state law, regulations are in 
place that prevent or severely limit the ability of entities 
to legally share information about cyber risks. 
 Legal contracts often limit the disclosure of 
information between entities. This non-disclosure 
language restricts sharing of information on cyber risks 
to specific situations (such as a data breach). 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Ethical Constraints  While cybersecurity practitioners have ethical 
obligations on the sharing of cyber risk information 
with other entities with “need to know” requirements, 
no similar obligations are present between business and 
their third-party interconnections, such as suppliers or 
service providers. 
Limited Collaboration between Parties    Many cybersecurity frameworks and standards do 
not require the collaboration between businesses or 
other entities on the identification, analysis, and 
understanding of cyber risks. 
 The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 
requires collaboration as part of its maturity model, but 
the NIST CSF is not widely adopted in the United 
States at this time. 
 Because the NIST CSF is primarily a United 
States cybersecurity standard, it is unlikely to be widely 
embraced outside of the United States. 
Lack of Common Cybersecurity Risk 
Vocabulary and Taxonomy 
 Industries with their own cybersecurity 
standards (such as the Payment Card and Energy 
industries) have subtle, and sometimes significant, 
differences in definitions and usages of cybersecurity 
terms, which can make the understanding of cyber risks 
more difficult when risk information is shared. 
Limited Mechanisms for Securely Share 
Cybersecurity Risk Information  
 Very few cyber risk collaboration and sharing 
solutions are in wide use that enable entities 
(particularly those in different organizations) to security 
share cybersecurity risk information that impacts all the 
related entities. 
 
As shown in Table 3, cybersecurity risk management issues clearly require further 
research and evaluation in order to determine long term pragmatic ways to address them so that 
cybersecurity research can be performed with fewer obstacles to such assessments. Continued 
studies are necessary so researchers can effectively communicate opportunities for advancing 
cybersecurity risk management processes and procedure. As cyber risk management 
requirements on businesses and government agencies become more regulated and stringent, the 
needs of stakeholders to share risk information and assist each other in understanding the 
implications of those risks on the ways the stakeholders do business together become a necessity.  
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The researcher compared the capabilities of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management 
solution to some of the risk-informing challenges as noted in Table 3. In three areas, the 
Reprivata CoT solution provides users with ways to meet several issues noted. The Reprivata 
CoT solution has secure voice, video, and texting capabilities to facilitate collaboration and 
information sharing on cyber risks between organizations. These functions were developed using 
encryption algorithms used by the United States.  
The Reprivata solution was designed to meet the NIST CSF standards. These standards 
require external participation and collaboration in order for organizations that use the standard to 
comply with its requirements. This design intent is further elaborated in the artifact created to 
assess the solution’s compliance with the NIST CSF guideline (see Artifact 2 in Appendix A). 
The Reprivata solution has legal contracts (in the form of Master Agreements) that define 
the rules of engagement and collaboration obligations for the entities that use the solution. This 
enables the entities to have a well-defined process for helping all the stakeholders to learn more 
about cyber risks through interactions and exchanges with other organizations with which they 
do business. Over time, these collaborations will raise the cyber threat awareness for all entities 
in addition to strengthening and maturing their cyber risk programs from the informing process. 
Recommendations on ways to improve the Master Agreements to include additional and more 
compliance-oriented language for the CoT users are provided in Artifact 3 in Appendix A. 
This literature review has demonstrated that research on effective methods for informing 
on cybersecurity risks is an emerging area with many opportunities for investigation. The 
numbers and types of cybersecurity threats are rapidly expanding; therefore, the need for better 
cyber risk-informing solutions for all types of stakeholders is of paramount importance. 
Additional research is required to identify ways to minimize the differences that exist in the 
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current approaches to cybersecurity risk management (Contreras, 2012). As mentioned above, a 
trend was found showing that cybersecurity and risk management solutions are lagging in their 
abilities to help stakeholders identify, analyze, and understand cyber risks (Trope, 2012).  
A compelling area of research referenced in the current literature on cyber security risk 
involves the use of data analytics to help measure key cyber risk performance measurements and 
indicators (Tene, 2014). This approach could bring a common data-drive language to the field, 
where cyber risks to organizations could be quantified as financial and operational impacts 
(Sommer & Brown, 2011). Additional investigation, through the use of statistical techniques, 
could better evaluate when, where, and how these cyber risks are found and more effectively 
communicate this information to all affected stakeholders (Loukaka & Rahman, 2017). Such 
communication and collaboration, governed by the appropriate legal language, will create more 
risk-informed cybersecurity programs for many entities that are currently less prepared or mature 
now and cannot effectively address the expanding challenges from cyber risks and threats (Shane 
& Hunker, 2013). 
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Research Method
 
Figure 1 – Action Design Research Methodology for Reprivata Community of Trust 
 
The Action Design Research (ADR) methodology was chosen for this research project 
for several reasons. First, ADR had been used successfully in other cybersecurity research efforts 
(Muegge & Craigen, 2015). Similar academic articles reviewed drew on design science research 
done by Dr. Alan Hevner, a leading international expert on ADR methods who is a professor at 
the University of South Florida. Second, the work relationship between the researcher and the 
target company (Reprivata) provided a unique opportunity for the analysis, design, creation, and 
evaluation of specific ADR artifacts that could assist Reprivata’s management team to better 
articulate the informing capabilities of Reprivata’s cybersecurity risk management solution, 
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especially in relationship to cybersecurity risks identified by the application. Third, the proximity 
of the Florida Center for Cybersecurity (Cyber Florida) on the University of South Florida 
campus gave the researcher the ability to have cybersecurity Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
independently evaluate and comment on the ADR artifacts to determine how those items might 
inform a broader audience in the cybersecurity field. Fourth, the ADR approach enabled the 
researcher to engage with Reprivata’s partners and potential customers and gauge how effective 
the ADR artifacts were in helping them understand the cybersecurity risks identified by 
Reprivata’s security control mechanisms. Finally, the ADR approach facilitated an in-depth 
evaluation of Reprivata’s security controls in relationship the NIST CSF standards, which 
identified how the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution met that standard or 
enabled other security controls external to the solution (such as policies, procedures, and security 
software) to become compliant with the NIST CSF. 
The ADR approach utilized in this research project was drawn from a 2018 article by Dr. 
Matthew Mullarkey and Dr. Alan Hevner (Mullarkey & Hevner, 2018). ADR concepts and 
process modelling are growing in various research areas and have been found as very effective 
ways of describing a variety of technology environments. The addition of artifact creation 
activities as part of ADR intervention activities highlights the essential artifact build and 
evaluation activities that are key to Design Science Research (DSR). Researchers and 
practitioners from multiple application areas, such as healthcare, education, government, and 
others, can be brought together in common ADR projects by use of a shared process model and 
then produce inventive and original artifacts of value across research disciplines. (Mullarkey & 
Hevner, 2018). 
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The researcher first engaged with Reprivata in January 2018. After discussions with the 
Reprivata management team, the researcher executed a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) 
which included language that allowed the researcher to perform an ADR project on the company 
and its cybersecurity solution. The researcher then interviewed the Reprivata team to learn more 
about the company and its go-to-market strategy. They then provided access to the company’s 
technical documentation of its software, its current productization strategy, customer 
presentations, and the security certification assessment report on the software solution from the 
Underwriters’ Laboratory (UL), and the company’s Master Agreements used to set up the 
responsibilities and rules of engagement for users of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk 
management solution. 
The Reprivata management requested a review the company’s cybersecurity risk 
management solution against the NIST CSF standards to determine the solution’s level of 
compliance with that security framework. Based on the documentation reviewed, the researcher 
determined there were gaps in the way Reprivata had implemented the key security controls in 
the solution. In particular, the researcher found that no current design documentation or model of 
the solution could be mapped directly against the NIST CSF standard. Using action design 
research principles, an artifact was designed, evaluated, and enhanced. This item was a 
conceptual model of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution (see Figure 4). 
Once the artifact was created, it was shared with Reprivata’s management team. Overall, 
they agreed that the artifact more clearly articulated the key security controls of the solution and 
its compliance with the NIST CSF. The artifact was then incorporated to the Reprivata product 
presentations that were given to potential customers. From the types of comments received 
during the customer meetings, the customers stated that, while the recently developed artifact 
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was very helpful in communicating how the Reprivata CoT solution mapped to the NIST CSF 
key controls, it did not discuss which of the NIST CSF security controls were not implemented 
in the solution, which of those controls were covered by external processes or parties, and how 
that information could be communicated to help potential customers and business partners 
understand cyber risks related to those controls. These comments were captured for inclusion in 
the next iteration of artifacts about the Reprivata CoT solution. The conversations were captured 
using unstructured interviews and the themes were coded using open and axial coding 
techniques. As outlined in Figure 1, the design artifact requirements and evaluation criteria were 
created using the Action Design Research methodology for each iteration of the design artifacts. 
In the discussions that followed, the team asked if the artifacts could be assessed by 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the cybersecurity field so the team could get more feedback on 
the solution to see if it could be enhanced to accelerate its productization and go-to-market 
strategies. The researcher contacted the Cyber Florida team and asked for a meeting between the 
Cyber Florida senior staff and the Reprivata management team. The intervention session was 
scheduled for March 2018. During the meeting, the Reprivata and Cyber Florida teams discussed 
the details of the cybersecurity risk management solution in addition to a product strategy 
presentation. The Cyber Florida team members asked for clarification on how the Reprivata CoT 
solution would be deployed. The Cyber Florida team provided recommendations on how to more 
clearly articulate the capabilities of the solution and also suggested several potential use cases. 
At the close of the meeting, the two organizations agreed to a second meeting to review the 
enhanced solution and its informing capabilities to enable better understanding of cyber risks. 
From Cyber Florida’s recommendations, the researcher began to create a more detailed 
control mapping of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution to the NIST CSF. This 
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change was necessary to review and map all the new key security controls that were included in 
version 1.1 of the framework that was published in April 2018. The Cyber Florida suggestions 
also required a review of Reprivata’s Master Agreements to ensure that any appropriate key 
security control language was added to the agreements and provide better compliance with the 
updated NIST CSF. 
The researcher then created an expanded NIST CSF version 1.1 assessment matrix. This 
new matrix mapped the key security controls that were included in the design of the Reprivata 
CoT solution, and also identified those that were not integral to the solution’s design but could 
be enabled by controls already integrated into the solution. Additionally, the Master Agreements 
were assessed in more detail to identify opportunities for improvement and to make 
recommendations regarding the proposed changes to the legal language in the documents so they 
align to the newest version of the NIST CSF. 
After the newest artifacts were developed, they were shared with Reprivata’s 
management team. In their comments, the Reprivata team agreed the artifacts would help them 
more clearly inform their customers on the NIST CSF compliance of the solution as well as 
improve the definition of user responsibilities and rules of engagement in the Master 
Agreements.  
Before sharing these new artifacts with potential customers, the Reprivata team then 
requested another meeting with Cyber Florida senior staff to get more of their insights on how to 
better position the solution so it had broader appeal in the cybersecurity risk management 
market. That intervention with Cyber Florida was held in August 2018 and documented in the 
detailed interventions article that is the third part of this research project. 
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Description of First Artifact Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution 
Reprivata Solution Conceptual Model 
The first key artifacts discussed below were part of the initial design phase of this 
research project.  Each artifact addresses an aspect of the cyber risk informing capabilities of the 
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution.  
The Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) Conceptual Model (see Figure 2) was 
developed to articulate the interactions of elements that influence successful cybersecurity CoT 
implementations using the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. These elements 
help determine and, in some cases, manage the resources within these projects as the part of the 
overarching corporate business strategy which determines the cyber risk posture, and how that 
posture can be managed and measured. These are two distinct groups of elements: one that is 
composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and legal documents that provide structure to the 
CoT, and one that constitutes the Internal and External Stakeholders of the CoT.  
 
Figure 2 – Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model 
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Reprivata selected the NIST CSF as part of their design strategy for two reasons. First, it 
is a comprehensive set of cybersecurity control requirements based on 23 control categories 
across 5 cybersecurity functional areas (see Table 4).  
Table 4 – NIST CSF Security Functions and Control Categories [from NIST CSF v1.1, 2018] 
 
 
As such, the CSF offers a comprehensive framework on which companies can build their 
cybersecurity programs. Second, the CSF includes a maturity model (see Table 5) that gives 
companies ways to determine how they are performing as they implement the CSF security 
controls. 
 
Functions Categories 
  Asset Management (AM) 
  Business Environment (BE) 
Identify (ID) Governance (GV) 
  Risk Assessment (RA) 
  Risk Management Strategy (RM) 
 Supply Chain Risk Management (SC) 
  Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (AC) 
  Awareness and Training (AT) 
Protect (PR) Data Security (DS) 
  Information Protection Processes and Procedures (IP) 
  Maintenance (MA) 
  Protection Technologies (PT) 
  Anomalies and Events (AE) 
Detect (DT) Security Continuous Monitoring (CM) 
  Detection Processes 
  Response Planning (RP) 
 Communications (CO) 
Respond (RS) Analysis (AN) 
  Mitigation (MI) 
  Improvements (IM) 
  Recovery Planning (RP) 
Recover (RC) Improvements (IM) 
  Communications (CO) 
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Table 5 – NIST CSF Maturity Tiers [from NIST CSF v1.1, 2018] 
 
Maturity Tier Definition and Characteristics 
1. Partial  Risk Management Process – Organizational cybersecurity risk 
management practices are not formalized, and risk is managed in an ad hoc 
and sometimes reactive manner. Prioritization of cybersecurity activities may 
not be directly informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat 
environment, or business/mission requirements.  
 Integrated Risk Management Program – Limited awareness of 
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level is exists. The organization 
 implements cybersecurity risk management on an irregular, case-by-case 
basis due to varied experience or information gained from outside sources. 
The organization may not have processes that enable cybersecurity 
information to be shared within the organization.  
 External Participation – The organization does not understand its 
role in the larger ecosystem with respect to either its dependencies or 
dependents. The organization does not collaborate with or receive 
information (e.g., threat intelligence, best practices, technologies) from other 
entities (e.g., buyers, suppliers, dependencies, dependents, ISAOs, 
researchers, governments), nor does it share information. The organization is 
generally unaware of the cyber supply chain risks of the products and 
services it provides and that it uses. 
2. Risk 
Informed 
 Risk Management Process – Risk management practices are 
approved by management but may not be established as organizational-wide 
policy. Prioritization of cybersecurity activities and protection needs is 
directly informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat environment, 
or business/mission requirements.  
 Integrated Risk Management Program – An awareness of 
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level is acknowledged, but an 
organization-wide approach to managing cybersecurity risk has not been 
established. Cybersecurity information is shared within the organization on 
an informal basis. Consideration of cybersecurity in organizational objectives 
and programs may occur at some but not all levels of the organization. Cyber 
risk assessment of organizational and external assets occur, but is not 
typically repeatable or reoccurring.  
 External Participation – Generally, the organization understands its 
role in the larger ecosystem with respect to either its own dependencies or 
dependents, but not both. The organization collaborates with and receives 
some information from other entities and generates some of its own 
information, but may not share information with others. Additionally, the 
organization is aware of the cyber supply chain risks associated with the 
products and services it provides and uses, but does not act consistently or 
formally upon those risks.  
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Table 5 (Continued) 
3. Repeatable  Risk Management Process – The organization’s risk management 
practices are formally approved and expressed as policy. Organizational 
cybersecurity practices are regularly updated based on the application of risk  
management processes to changes in business/mission requirements and a 
changing threat and technology landscape.  
Integrated Risk Management Program – An organization-wide approach to 
manage cybersecurity risk is in place. Risk-informed policies, processes, and 
procedures are defined, implemented as intended, and reviewed. Consistent 
methods are in place to respond effectively to changes in risk. Personnel 
possess the knowledge and skills to perform their appointed roles and 
responsibilities. The organization consistently and accurately monitors 
cybersecurity risk of organizational assets. Senior cybersecurity and non-
cybersecurity executives communicate regularly regarding cybersecurity risk. 
Senior executives ensure consideration of cybersecurity through all lines of 
operation in the organization. 
 External Participation – The organization understands its role, 
dependencies, and dependents in the larger ecosystem and may contribute to 
the community’s broader understanding of risks. It collaborates with and 
receives information from other entities regularly that complements 
internally generated information, and shares information with other entities. 
The organization is aware of the cyber supply chain risks associated with the 
products and services it provides and that it uses. Additionally, it usually acts 
formally upon those risks, including mechanisms such as written agreements 
to communicate baseline requirements, governance structures (e.g., risk 
councils), and policy implementation and monitoring. 
4. Adaptive  Risk Management Process – The organization adapts its 
cybersecurity practices based on previous and current cybersecurity 
activities, including lessons learned and predictive indicators. Through a 
process of continuous improvement incorporating advanced cybersecurity 
technologies and practices, the organization actively adapts to a changing 
threat and technology landscape and responds in a timely and effective 
manner to evolving, sophisticated threats.  
 Integrated Risk Management Program – An organization-wide 
approach to managing cybersecurity risk exists that uses risk-informed 
policies, processes, and procedures to address potential cybersecurity events. 
The relationship between cybersecurity risk and organizational objectives is 
clearly understood and considered when making decisions. Senior executives 
monitor cybersecurity risk in the same context as financial risk and other 
organizational risks. The organizational budget is based on an understanding 
of the current and predicted risk environment and risk tolerance. Business 
units implement executive vision and analyze system-level risks in the 
context of the organizational risk tolerances. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Adaptive 
(continued) 
 Integrated Risk Management Program Cybersecurity risk 
management is part of the organizational culture and evolves from an 
awareness of previous activities and continuous awareness of activities on 
their systems and networks. The organization can quickly and efficiently 
account for changes to business/mission objectives in how risk is approached 
and communicated 
 External Participation - The organization understands its role, 
dependencies, and dependents in the larger ecosystem and contributes to the 
community’s broader understanding of risks. It receives, generates, and 
reviews prioritized information that informs continuous analysis of its risks 
as the threat and technology landscapes evolve. The organization shares that 
information internally and externally with other collaborators. The 
organization uses real-time or near real-time information to understand and 
consistently act upon cyber supply chain risks associated with the products 
and services it provides and that it uses. Additionally, it communicates 
proactively, using formal (e.g. agreements) and informal mechanisms to 
develop and maintain strong supply chain relationships 
 
As part of the creation of the Conceptual Model, the Reprivata solution design documents 
were reviewed and compared against the NIST CSF version 1.0, which was released in 2014. 
The initial Conceptual Model was designed to demonstrate how the Reprivata cybersecurity risk 
management solution’s overall design and component integration showed its linkage to NISF 
CSF. The Conceptual Model was evaluated by the Reprivata senior management team and 
provided the researcher with a number of comments and recommendations, especially of the 
security controls implemented in the solution regarding interconnected third parties. As part of 
this effort, the researcher reviewed articles focused on the adoption of the NIST CSF framework 
to support the updates to the Conceptual Model (Dedeke, 2017).  
When the NIST CSF version 1.1 was released in April 2018, the Conceptual Model was 
reviewed again to ensure that any new and enhanced security control elements were included. 
Additional literature was surveyed on the integration of the updated and enhanced security 
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controls (Chaput, 2017). This comparison of the initial and revised standards sought to ensure 
that the Conceptual Model accurately conveyed how those security controls complemented the 
initial design and presentation.   
In the Conceptual Model, the CoT Risk Management Strategy element maps directly to 
the Reprivata solution. This element defines the cybersecurity control requirements that the CoT 
members follow. In the case of Reprivata, the company selected the NIST CSF framework in 
2014 as they began development on their cybersecurity risk management solution. When the 
NIST CSF was updated in 2018 to version 1.1, Reprivata used that event as rationale to 
reevaluate the solution’s compliance with the new and enhanced standards.  
For a more comprehensive description of the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) 
Conceptual Model, please refer to Artifact 1 in Appendix A.  
Evaluation of the First Artifact Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution 
Due to reiterative design and evaluation process that is inherent to ADR, the artifact was 
assessed multiple times by the Reprivata management team prior to the artifact’s adoption. This 
process provided the team with a number of opportunities ask questions about cybersecurity 
control risks, learn more about the vocabulary and taxonomy used by cybersecurity professionals 
like the researcher, and begin to have a better understanding of how to better communicate the 
Reprivata CoT solution’s cyber risk management capabilities. Because the Reprivata 
management team was actively involved in the artifact design and evaluation sessions, they 
accepted them more readily and were better able to communicate the benefits of the artifacts.   
During the evaluation of the Conceptual Model for the Reprivata cybersecurity risk 
management solution, one of the techniques utilized in this process was to compare documented 
security controls with the NIST CSF version 1.0 standards. This comparison was done by 
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creating a matrix of the design elements that make up the Conceptual Model of the solution with 
the NIST CSF Security Functions and Control Categories from version 1.0 of the standards. This 
matrix was one of the key informing activities in the minds of Repriviata’s management team 
because, for the first time, they could better understand that their original security control design 
intent was actually integrated in the solution. As part of the next ADR design phase, Reprivata’s 
management asked for a complete NIST CSF controls assessment for version 1.1, which had 
recently been released. This request led to the creation of the full NIST CSF version 1.1 
compliance assessment (see Artifact 2 in Appendix A), which was completed in August 2018. 
An example of the informing abilities of the Conceptual came in a meeting with the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS security team had been seeking a secure 
communication solution to enable collaboration with other Federal agencies like the Department 
of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Reprivata team used the conceptual 
model artifact to show how the security control functions in the cybersecurity risk management 
solution were consistent to the DHS risk management strategy and mapped to its primary goals 
and objectives. This meeting led to the creation of a use case for that collaborative 
communication closed network so the DHS team could assess how the Reprivata solution could 
meet those operational and security requirements for such inter-agency cooperation initiatives. 
Description of Second Set of Artifacts Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution 
The following description of the second key artifacts are part of the second design phase 
of this research project.  Each one was created in response to the Reprivata management team’s 
request to better articulate the solution’s mapping to the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards so this 
information could be used to inform potential customers on the solution’s level of compliance to 
that standard.  
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Reprivata Solution NIST CSF Assessment  
The evaluation of the Reprivata solution’s technical controls was important for the 
Reprivata team and potential customers. While the solution had been certified under the UL 2900 
cybersecurity standards in 2016, it had not been assessed for compliance with the NIST CSF 
criteria or any other cybersecurity control frameworks. Two separate NIST CSF compliance 
assessments were performed during this research project: first, using NIST CSF version 1.0 and 
then with NIST CSF version 1.1. The artifact presented in this article is the results of the NIST 
CSF version 1.1 assessment of the Reprivata solution.  
Table 6 – NIST CSF Assessment and Findings for the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) 
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution 
NIST CSF  
Functional Area 
Reprivata CoT 
Solution 
Compliant with 
Key Controls 
Technology 
Controls 
Enabling  
Controls 
Master 
Agreement 
Controls 
Identify 15 out of 29 key 
controls 
5 14 10 
Protect 18 out of 39 key 
controls 
12 21 6 
Detect 15 out of 18 key 
controls 
11 3 4 
Respond 13 out of 15 key 
controls 
3 2 10 
Recover 4 out of 6 key  
controls 
0 2 4 
Total 65 out of 107 key 
controls 
31 42 34 
 
As part of the original design intent, the capabilities of the Reprivata Community of Trust 
(CoT) cybersecurity risk management solution controls were based on and implemented to 
comply with the initial version of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) version 1.0, which was published in 2014. This control 
mapping analysis reviews the Reprivata solution’s compliance to the NIST CSF version 1.1, 
which was released in April 2018. 
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As stated in Section 6, the NIST CSF version 1.1 controls assessment matrix (see Table 
6) was created at the request of Reprivata’s management team to determine how many of the key 
security controls were integrated into the cybersecurity risk management solution. The matrix is 
the summary of the assessment of the 107 key security controls across the 5 functional areas that 
are included in the NIST CSF standard. The complete assessment provided guidance to the 
Reprivata team on what types of control mechanism (such as policies, process, procedures, tools, 
etc.) that would be required for the specific security control in the Reprivata CoT solution to be 
deemed compliant with the key security control. The assessment also determined which of the 
NIST CSF key security controls were either not applicable or not integral to the security 
capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solution. 
The technology security controls in the Reprivata solution were found to directly map to 
31 of the NIST CSF key controls, with 22 of those controls covering compliance requirements 
for the Protect functional area (which includes Identity Management, Remote Access, and 
Encryption controls) and the Detect functional area (which includes Threat Monitoring and 
Mitigation controls). This control coverage was important to note because the collaborative 
capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solution heavily leverage the implementation of those Protect 
and Detect security controls. The nine NIST CSF key controls that the solution did not map to 
were related to the implementation of policies and procedures, such as Physical Security, 
Awareness and Training, and Maintenance. While the Reprivata solution’s technology and 
cybersecurity controls do not directly implement those policies and procedures, use of the 
solution for collaborating on how to develop and implement such controls can enable their 
deployment throughout the organization. 
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Enabling controls, which are ones that can support or assist in the implementation of 
other related controls (such as Access Controls, Physical Security, etc.) were also evaluated. In 
this part of the assessment, the 42 such controls (like policies, practices, procedures, and 
processes) that are external to the Reprivata technology controls were evaluated to determine 
what potential use cases would facilitate implementation of the enabling controls. This appraisal 
helped determine that Reprivata’s technology controls could support those controls that are more 
process-oriented. The findings indicated that the collaboration, encryption, and threat 
management capabilities of the solution could provide positive effects that could assist in 
enabling these types of policies and procedures. 
The review of the 34 key controls that map the Reprivata’s Master Agreements was 
performed and specific recommendations were made for enhancing those agreements. With the 
recent update of the NIST CSF standard to version 1.1, it is necessary to ensure the legal 
language is consistent with the security and compliance requirements for the CoT users to ensure 
accountability to and fulfilment of their contractual obligations 
As part of future design and enhancement of artifacts, the software control mapping will 
be included in a comprehensive Encrypted Collaboration Software Architecture. This will 
include more details on the NIST CSF key controls and the specific security mechanisms that are 
implemented in the Encrypted Collaboration Software. 
Reprivata Solution Recommendations for Enhancing Master Agreements  
Similar types of assessments were performed to determine which of the NIST CSF 
controls might be included as legal language in the Reprivata Master Agreements. The specific 
recommendations on the verbiage to be included in the Master Agreements were documented as 
a way for Reprivata’s management team to determine where NIST CSF security-related verbiage 
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could more effectively communicate CoT compliance and collaboration requirements when the 
agreement was executed by users. This language is particularly critical because it establishes the 
rules of engagement on how CoT users work together and share critical security and business 
information when using the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. 
Table 7 – Recommendations for Enhancement of Reprivata Master Agreements for Implementing 
Community of Trust (CoT) Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution  
 
 ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities are coordinated and aligned 
with internal roles and external partners. 
 Documentation of cybersecurity roles for all 
internal and external stakeholders should be 
documented and mutual collaboration and data sharing 
responsibilities outlined in writing for all CoT users. 
 ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory 
requirements regarding cybersecurity, 
including privacy and civil liberties 
obligations, are understood and managed. 
 Legal and regulatory compliance cybersecurity 
requirements should be clearly documented for all CoT 
users. 
 ID.RA-6: Risk responses are 
identified and prioritized. 
 Risk management collaboration requirements 
for all CoT users should be clearly defined and 
stakeholder obligations for risk review are 
documented. 
 ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third-party 
partners of information systems, components, 
and services are identified, prioritized, and 
assessed using a cyber supply chain risk 
assessment process. 
 Risk management and review obligations for 
third parties should be legally binding when 
collaborating in the CoT. 
 
 
 
NIST CSF Key Control - Identity (ID) Rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements 
 ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities for the entire workforce and 
third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, 
customers, partners) are established. 
 Documenting the cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities of internal stakeholders and third 
parties such as suppliers and business partners enables 
the CoT owner establish access control, incident 
response reporting, user collaboration, and data sharing 
processes to meet the needs of the CoT as a whole. 
 ID.BE-1: The organization’s role in 
the supply chain is identified and 
communicated. 
 The cybersecurity roles for event identification 
for the organization and its third parties like suppliers 
and partners that are CoT users should be legally 
defined in writing to ensure all obligations are 
understood. 
 ID.GV-1: Organizational 
cybersecurity policy is established and 
communicated. 
 Compliance to cybersecurity policies by 
stakeholders should be specific and with assessment 
and reporting requirements for all CoT users.  
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers 
and third-party partners are used to 
implement appropriate measures designed to 
meet the objectives of an organization’s 
cybersecurity program and Cyber Supply 
Chain Risk Management Plan. 
 Third party contracts should include provisions 
for measuring and managing cybersecurity risks and 
implementing cybersecurity controls for controlling 
related risks.  
 ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party 
partners are routinely assessed using audits, 
test results, or other forms of evaluations to 
confirm they are meeting their contractual 
obligations. 
 Cybersecurity audit and assessment provisions 
should be clearly documented and assessment 
reporting requirements specified. 
 ID.SC-5: Response and recovery 
planning and testing are conducted with 
suppliers and third-party providers. 
 Cybersecurity recovery and response plans 
should be required of all CoT users. 
 
The complete NIST CSF Compliance Assessment and Findings for the Reprivata 
Community of Trust (CoT) cybersecurity risk management solution can be found in Artifact 2 in 
Appendix A.  
NIST CSF Functional Area – Identify (ID) Controls Language to Include: 
The report on recommendations for enhancement of the Reprivata Master Agreements 
was requested by Reprivata’s management team as a result of the NIST CSF assessment report 
as shown in Table 7. Recommendations were made for all of the five functional areas that are 
included in the NIST CSF standard. Only the recommendations for the Identify functional area 
are shown here. 
With the update of the NIST CSF to version 1.1 in April 2018, Reprivata’s management 
team wanted to ensure that the Master Agreements included appropriate verbiage for new key 
security control areas such as Supply Chain Risk Management. Because one of the purposes of 
Reprivata’s Master Agreements is to provide guidelines for interconnections with third party 
business partners, determining and adding any required supply chain language to the agreements 
is important. 
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Of particular interest were the process improvement-related security controls. These 
controls were aimed at helping those organizations that adopted the NIST CSF guidelines to 
demonstrate their cybersecurity programs. As such, incorporating process improvement language 
in the Master Agreements would commit all CoT users to maturing their cybersecurity programs.  
The NIST CSF assessment noted that, of the 34 key control specific to the Master 
Agreements, over 20 of them were related to security policy, process, or procedural 
requirements. As such, the Reprivata team decided to engage with their external legal counsel to 
determine which key controls should be covered in the Master Agreements and which one could 
be addressed in the security language in the contracts prepared by CoT users to manage how they 
work with their business partners and other third parties. 
The complete documentation of Recommendations for Enhancement of Reprivata Master 
Agreements for Implementing Community of Trust (CoT) risk management solution can be 
found in Artifact 3 in Appendix A.  
Evaluation of the Second Set of Artifacts Created for the Reprivata CoT Solution 
During the creation of the second set of artifacts, the evaluation process differed slightly 
from the one used for the first artifacts. While the first set of artifacts were primarily used for 
informing external parties on the cybersecurity risk management capabilities of the Reprivata 
CoT solution, these artifacts were created for informing the Reprivata organization on the CoT 
solution’s mapping to the NIST CSF.  The Reprivata management team, who are not 
cybersecurity practitioners by training or experience, needed assistance on understanding more 
about the implementation of cybersecurity controls in organizations.  
The initial artifact created was a NIST CSF version 1.0 compliance assessment of the 
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. This creation was done prior to the release of 
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NIST CSF version 1.1 in April 2018. The focus of this review was to determine how many of the 
security controls were integrated into the Reprivata solution. This exercise was performed as a 
result of recommendation from the Cyber Florida staff at an intervention meeting in March 2018. 
When this assessment was completed, it was discussed with Reprivata’s management team as 
well as several potential clients. One of the comments on the initial assessment was that it did not 
provide sufficient information on how the security controls could potentially enable other 
controls because of the collaboration and data sharing capabilities of the solution. 
In April 2018, just after the meeting with Cyber Florida, the NIST CSF version 1.1 was 
released for implementation by government agencies. At that time, a second cycle of assessments 
were performed. Since the primary change in the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards from the 
initial one was the inclusion of cybersecurity controls related to Supply Chain Management, it 
was straightforward to add the evaluations of these controls to the first assessment artifact. When 
Reprivata’s management reviewed the new report, the team asked how they could better inform 
potential clients on how the Reprivata solution could support the legal language with its 
functional collaboration and encryption capabilities. This additional information was added to 
the final legal recommendation artifact. 
As with the evaluation of the first artifacts on the Reprivata solution’s technology 
controls, both of the new ones on legal recommendations for the Master Agreements were 
assessed several times by the Reprivata management team prior to the artifacts’ formal 
acceptance. As before, the Reprivata team were able to both question and comment on the 
process of assessing cybersecurity compliance across an organization. As they began to 
understand the compliance process, they determined that the messaging was being shared with 
potential customers on the Reprivata CoT solution’s cyber risk management capabilities. They 
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also realized that the messaging needed to be enhanced to include these new insights. As a result, 
additional artifacts, including product strategy presentations and new marketing collateral, were 
scheduled for development.  
Again, because the Reprivata management team was actively involved in the artifact 
design and evaluation sessions, they were able to communicate the benefits of the artifacts very 
clearly internally, with plans to create similar informing messages for potential customers and 
other external parties. Additionally, the Reprivata team reported an increased understanding of 
the challenges of complying with cybersecurity standards. In particular, the team stated that 
Reprivata’s messaging regarding facilitating compliance with cybersecurity standards had 
become better at describing how well the Reprivata CoT solution met those compliance 
requirements. 
Discussion 
Cybersecurity researchers clearly need to continue exploring ways to create informing 
artifacts that help explain the impacts of cyber risks to cybersecurity practitioners and other 
stakeholders (Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith, & Lamberts, 2011). Research centers, such as Cyber 
Florida, are working to create broad collaborative networks of researchers to facilitate this 
research. Even so, the security of these collaboration networks is often limited by lack of 
funding, the scarcity of trained personnel, or both. Continuously managing risk requires a 
process that has specific dates for implementing capabilities, defined deliverables, and ongoing 
service and support activities, so organizations must strive to overcome these resource issues 
soon. (Jones & Gallo, 2007).  
This issue is one reason that research based on ADR is important in cybersecurity 
research in particular. By embedding cyber-trained researchers with organizations’ cybersecurity 
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programs, the research is being conducted closer to the actual cyber risks. The outcomes and 
artifacts from these research initiatives can help foster collaboration both inside and between 
organizations as the reach of cyber risks is better understood and more affected parties. Such 
mutually beneficial arrangements can provide a knowledge exchange on the understanding of 
cyber risks and enable organizations to mature their cybersecurity programs by implementing 
some of the practice-based artifacts that the organization helped develop to meet their 
cybersecurity program needs. This approach was a success at Reprivata because of the 
company’s desire to become more cyber aware about the security capabilities of its own solution, 
as well as learning about the broader challenges, constraints, and opportunities of implementing 
and maturing a new cybersecurity company in what has become an increasingly complex field. 
As shown in Table 3 in the Literature Review section, two of the most significant 
challenges that limit the abilities of organizations to understand cyber risks are legal and 
regulatory restrictions and the lack of collaboration between parties dealing with shared cyber 
risks (Shane & Hunker, 2013). While this research project did not face these particular problems, 
the researcher has addressed these types of constraints as a cybersecurity executive and 
practitioner working on cyber breach events. The inability to effectively and securely share 
cybersecurity risk and threat information has been shown to decrease the opportunities to analyze 
and understand cyber risks on a timely basis (Loukaka & Rahman, 2017). This limitation also 
impacts the ability of any first responders to mitigate cyber risks discovered due to the lack of 
actionable data about the technical vulnerabilities that have been exploited during an event 
(Greitzer, Moore, Cappelli, Andrews, Carroll, & Hull, 2008). 
The ethical commitments required of cybersecurity professionals is very significant, 
especially as the need for practitioners to collaborate and share cyber risk information (Burstein, 
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2008). Cybersecurity practitioners must meet the ethical requirements set forth by their 
professional credentialing agencies in order for those credentials to remain in good standing. 
Appropriate disclosure of information is one of those requirements. These ethical and legal 
limitations impede the collaboration between cybersecurity practitioners in the same way the 
NDAs and Federal and state laws restrict such disclosure. This issue comes into direct conflict 
when companies have business relationships with their third-party interconnections, such as 
suppliers or service providers. Often, no such ethical obligations exist. 
While the cybersecurity field started initiatively for businesses to establish collective 
security or defense relationships, many of the cybersecurity standards do not require such 
collaboration by companies that implement those control frameworks. Except for the NIST CSF 
framework, the majority of other cybersecurity frameworks and standards are silent on requiring 
entities to share information on the identification, analysis, and understanding of cyber risks. By 
encouraging a broader adoption of the NISF CSF, such collaboration would be required because 
it affects how a company can mature its cybersecurity programs and comply with the standard 
(Shackelford, Proia, Martell, & Craig, 2015). However, because the NIST CSF is primarily a 
United States cybersecurity standard, it is unlikely to be embraced widely outside of the United 
States, though it can be mapped to other widely accepted security frameworks, such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001 security standard and the Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) guidelines. 
A number of industry governing bodies, such as Energy and Payment Cards, have created 
their own cybersecurity standards. Such industry standards, though similar to the NIST CSF, 
have differences in the number and types of cybersecurity controls that are required in definitions 
and usages of cybersecurity terms. Many cases exist where companies may be required to 
 47 
 
implement more than one of these cybersecurity standards. In such cases, the determination of 
which standard will take precedence can be obscured by a number of factors, such as industry 
auditors, internal compliance managers, and Federal and state regulators. The difference in the 
interpretation of potentially conflicting standards can make it more difficult for internal and 
external stakeholders to understand the cybersecurity control requirements, to determine funding 
and other resource allocations for compliance programs, and to effectively share information on 
cyber risks because of the variances of the vocabulary and taxonomy in communications 
(Elnagdy, Qiu, & Gai, 2016). 
Research noted that a limited number of technology solutions are available for securely 
sharing cybersecurity risk information (Fulford, 2017). As the cybersecurity landscape becomes 
more complicated to both navigate and understand, such cyber risk collaboration and sharing 
solutions will be required. This claim is especially true where business partners, particularly 
those with interconnected third parties, need to share sensitive cybersecurity risk information that 
impacts all the related parties (Trope, 2012). 
The interventions with the cybersecurity SMEs were very revealing. Many questions and 
comments that arose during those sessions directly resulted from the Reprivata team’s lack of 
cybersecurity background and understanding of the terminology used by practitioners in the 
field. With the researcher’s assistance and by including the artifacts in the company’s product 
presentations and other collateral, the Reprivata cybersecurity message became clearer and more 
focused. After two artifact design and build cycles, the Reprivata management team gained a 
better understanding of the risk informing capabilities of their CoT solution, as well as the 
language of cybersecurity. The next step is to better educate potential customers on the benefits 
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of using the Reprivata CoT solution to help foster the same understanding in the customer 
organizations. 
Limitations of Current Research 
Several limitations to this research were noted. First, the members of the Reprivata 
management team lived all over the United States and overseas. This factor made scheduling of 
meetings for interviews, artifact design sessions, and subsequent evaluations very difficult. The 
researcher was able to meet with three of the Reprivata team in person on two different 
occasions, which did allow for very useful interchanges. More face-to-face meetings would have 
likely provided more insights into the informing capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solutions and 
the artifacts produced as a result of this research project. 
Another limitation of the research was the small number of potential Reprivata customers 
and cybersecurity SMEs that were able to review and comment on the artifacts through either 
presentations or intervention sessions. The researcher was involved in six such meetings, four 
with customers and two with SME groups, and was able to gather valuable comments from the 
participants. However, to better judge the informing capabilities of the artifacts to help improve 
understanding of cyber risks, more evaluation and intervention sessions would be required. 
A lack of cybersecurity-related literature on how to assist companies to better understand 
cyber risks was noted throughout this project. As noted in the Literature Review section, such 
research about informing stakeholders to enable their understanding of cybersecurity risks is very 
promising because of the rapid spread of cyber risks and threats and the urgent need to 
comprehend their effects more fully.  
The researcher could not complete all the planned build phases because of the timing of 
the external legal reviews of the Reprivata Master agreements. While the recommendations for 
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enhancing the agreements to map to the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards have been reviewed by 
Reprivata management team, they have not been submitted to the attorneys for updating the 
Master Agreements until later in 2018.  
Conclusions 
Assisting a startup cybersecurity company to productize its cyber risk management 
solution, particularly one like Reprivata where only one member of the Reprivata team has real-
world cybersecurity background and experience, can be challenging and rewarding. The 
differences in the use of cybersecurity terminology between the researcher and the Reprivata 
management team was one of the significant obstacles in the cyber risk informing objectives of 
this project. Through the analysis, design, and evaluation cycles that were part of creating the 
artifacts for this project, the overarching goal was increasing the Reprivata team’s understanding 
of the broader cybersecurity industry, its vocabulary, and the ways that practitioners in the field 
communicated with each other about cyber risks. While this objective was met, it was clear that a 
number of informing methods were required to effectively communicate the impacts of cyber 
risks. This finding was more related to the specific industry that the cyber risk information was 
being shared with than any other factor. Such differences, even small ones, impacted the success 
of informing potential clients about the cybersecurity risk management capabilities of the 
Reprivata solution during several presentations and also during the interventions.   
Even as the researcher and the Reprivata team would gain a common understanding of 
the current cyber issues facing the company, another set of risks would appear and the informing 
process would begin again. The ultimate success of this research project came down to the 
researcher and the Reprivata team reaching an agreement–sometimes on a daily basis–on which 
artifacts and other comprehension enablers actually helped both parties understand cyber risks in 
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the same way, especially the ones that might affect the Reprivata CoT solution and its 
implementation by customers. When this agreement was reached and the Reprivata team 
presented the artifacts to potential customers, the meetings were successful in helping the 
customers understand the Reprivata cybersecurity controls and functionality, and to identify how 
the solution would be useful in the customer’s technology environment to secure sensitive 
communications and data. The identification of such use cases led to the first client Proof of 
Concept (PoC) agreement with DHS, which was signed in August 2018. 
A number of findings were drawn from this ADR project on evaluating and enhancing 
the cyber risk informing capabilities of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. In 
this case, potential challenges to current cybersecurity research initiatives, such as how to deploy 
commercially available applications inside the Reprivata solution’s encrypted core and how to 
operationalize the threat intelligence functionality both inside and outside Reprivata’s closed 
network architecture, were overcome by the use of ADR techniques. Embedding this researcher 
in an organization improved team collaboration on creating operations documentation for the 
client PoC because sharing design information and improving client deliverables and other 
artifacts were seen as informing exercises that enhanced the quality of the communications 
between the Reprivata team and DHS. The collaboration that resulted allowed both parties to 
both understand and solve cyber risk issues related to the PoC quickly. 
This research showed that active involvement of company personnel, SMEs, and 
potential customers in ADR artifact evaluations and interventions was most effective when 
multiple parties, such as company stakeholder and external SMEs, participated in the sessions. 
As a result of this approach, the artifacts took fewer reviews to be accepted. This approach 
worked well with DHS as the PoC was defined. Multiple work sessions involving Reprivata and 
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DHS personnel used DSR techniques to analyze and design project artifacts. By having already 
created a common design approach and agreeing on the PoC functional and operational 
requirements, the project had fewer delays in getting formal service agreement approved and 
signed. 
In creating better ways to inform understanding of cybersecurity risks, cybersecurity 
practitioners and stakeholders are still struggling with the terminology required to enable better 
understanding of cyber risks. Researchers should continue to account for this when creating 
artifacts attempting to increase such comprehension in stakeholders. However, as demonstrated 
during this research project, continuously engaging with stakeholders to educate them on the 
vocabulary and taxonomy of cybersecurity communications is critical before any informing 
messages can be successfully created and then understood by the stakeholders. 
Conclusions from the literature review identified a lack of cybersecurity-related literature 
on how to assist companies to better understand cyber risks. Research on enabling stakeholders’ 
understanding of cybersecurity risks appears to be a very promising area of investigation. The 
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution, as a secure, robust, and extensible method of 
providing collaboration and data sharing to interconnected stakeholders, provides an interesting 
opportunity to evaluate how risk informing the solution would be across industry and corporate 
boundaries. 
Also, the implementations of cybersecurity risk management solutions to help raise the 
understanding of cyber risks with stakeholders face a number of challenges. In particular, the 
implementation of such solutions are not keeping pace with the rapid spread of cyber risks and 
threats and the urgent needs to determine their effects as accurately and quickly as possible. The 
Reprivata solution can be implemented on a number of technology platforms using open source 
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software. This ease of implementation could improve the successful deployment of other 
technology risk management methodologies if they follow Reprivata’s example for using DSR 
techniques to analyze and develop new cybersecurity risk management solutions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
USING A FITNESS-UTILITY MODEL TO ELABORATE THE IMPACTS OF 
ARTIFACTS CREATED TO ENHANCE THE RISK INFORMING CAPABILITIES OF 
A CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTION 
Abstract 
While assisting a startup cybersecurity company to productize its cyber risk management 
solution, the company’s management team stated that, as a group, they had very little real world 
working experience in the cybersecurity field. In an effort to become more cyber aware, the 
company’s management requested assistance in creating artifacts, such as solution 
documentation and other collateral. The artifacts would enable them to better communicate the 
risk informing capabilities of their cybersecurity risk management solution internally to their 
business partners and to potential customers. Once these artifacts were created, the Fitness-
Utility Model proposed by Dr. Grandon Gill and Dr. Alan Hevner (Gill & Hevner, 2011) was 
used to evaluate how useful and impactful the artifacts were in increasing the solution’s risk 
informing capabilities and to help the company’s management team and other third parties, such 
as business partners and potential customers, to better understand cyber risks identified by the 
solution.  
Introduction 
In the academic journals that publish cybersecurity research, scholars are investigating 
how to advance a better understanding of cyber risks. However, few cybersecurity risk 
management solutions are available to practitioners that could help them both manage and 
comprehend the majority of those risks (Contreras, DeNardis, & Teplinsky, 2012). In this body 
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of literature, few studies of cybersecurity risk management methodologies have been done to 
determine how well they inform users about cyber risks to their particular technology 
environments. Additionally, these methods have not been formally evaluated to establish how 
well they enable compliance with cybersecurity program standards and maturity measures 
(Epstein, & Brown, 2008). With the lack of scholarly articles that have measured the usefulness 
and fitness of cybersecurity risk management solutions using research methods, more work is 
required. That situation gave rise to this research project, which was an investigation into what 
types of artifacts could be created for the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution that 
could be useful and effective in informing its users about cyber risks.  
The creation of the first artifacts began with two requests from the Reprivata 
management team in January 2018. First, they asked for a way to pictorially illustrate the 
technology security controls and capabilities in the solution that would make the types of 
controls clearer and easier to describe to potential customers. Because the management team did 
not have a strong background in cybersecurity controls, such as encryption, access control, and 
vulnerability and threat mitigation, a way to clearly and concisely inform potential customers on 
the solution’s technical security functionality was needed. 
Second, they inquired on better ways to assess and then communicate that the company’s 
cybersecurity risk management solution complied with the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). In 2014, the company had based the 
original design of their cybersecurity risk management solution on the newly released NIST 
CSF. However, the company had never performed a detailed security control assessment on the 
solution against the NIST CSF standards. With business partners and potential customers 
requesting validation that the company had performed NIST CSF and other security standards 
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reviews on the solution, this became a requirement to increase customer understanding of and 
confidence in the solution’s security compliance posture. 
The objective of this research project was to research the types of artifacts that could 
assist the company in meeting its stated needs and requirements, and use the Action Design 
Research (ADR) process to create and evaluate the effectiveness of the artifacts developed. In 
this phase of research, the artifact interventions performed as part of the ADR process will be 
described and how the fitness and utility of the artifacts can be assessed using the Fitness-Utility 
Model, which was proposed by Dr. Grandon Gill and Dr. Alan Hevner in their Association for 
Computing Machinery Transactions on Management Information Systems (ACM TMIS) journal 
article published in 2011. 
Motivation 
Determining how the design artifacts developed during this research project enabled the 
Reprivata management team to better communicate cyber risk internally, to potential customers, 
and to business partners, has been the main of objective of the study since it started. Reprivata is 
a four year old company that has struggled with effectively informing partners and potential 
users of the industry-leading capabilities of its cybersecurity risk management solution. To meet 
these challenges, the researcher created design artifacts to address specific information sharing 
requirements related to how the solution communicates cyber risks to users. 
This research article discusses the interventions and evaluations performed on the 
artifacts developed for enhancing the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. The 
estimates of the artifacts’ fitness and utility were based on the Fitness-Utility Model proposed by 
Dr. Gill and Dr. Hevner in 2011. This Model enabled the researcher to study the artifacts and to 
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estimate their usefulness as parts of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution’s 
overall design intent. 
Interviewing Approach for Artifact Evaluation 
During the evaluation of the design artifacts created by utilizing the Design Science 
Research (DSR) methodology, participant feedback on the utility of the artifacts gathered direct 
observations, such as in-person meetings, Webinars, and conference calls with the participants, 
in‐depth, open‐ended interviews performed with Reprivata’s management team, and written 
solution and company documentations including design documents, client presentations, and 
legal agreements. Every interaction was focused on engaging the participants to capture their 
real-world interpretations of the process of designing the artifacts and in the usefulness of the 
artifacts in practice. Realistic scenarios were used frequently to identify patterns of response and 
common themes by the participants (Patton, 2002). 
Of concern with research where the participants provide estimates in response to 
questions and other inquiries, the validity of those responses is an important factor. For the 
purpose of this investigation, validity is defined as “how accurately the account represents 
participants’ realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them” (Cresswell & Miller, 
2000). The research assumes the validity refers to the interpretations that can be made from the 
data gathered and not to the data itself (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983). 
Two of the particular techniques used to determine the validity of participant responses 
was by looking at the language and vocabulary used in participant replies and by making use of 
participants’ life experiences expressed during the evaluation sessions. This approach was drawn 
from the recommended qualitative data analysis strategies recommended by Juliet Corbin and 
Anselm Strauss in their book Basics of Qualitative Research (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). Corbin 
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and Strauss stated that unstructured interviews and observations are recommended in this type of 
research because the approach allows the participants to focus on those issues that are most 
meaningful to them and go into such topics in great detail (Corbin & Strauss, 2014). This 
approach is very advantageous when developing analyzing design requirements and evaluating 
the results of the design build iteration for its utility and applicability to practice.  
Personal observations were an important part of this study, as suggested by qualitative 
research literature (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). From a researcher’s perspective, these in-person 
discussions and collaborations were critically important for capturing the company’s information 
for the case study, and for documenting the design requirements for the artifacts during the DSR 
iterations.  These observations offered opportunities to develop more context around both the 
interview responses and the recommendations for enhancing the design artifacts.  
Description of the Fitness-Utility Model Utilized  
The Fitness-Utility Model was developed as a way to capture and evaluate how design 
artifacts change and improve over time. This Model also assists in determining the fitness of a 
particular design across a fitness landscape, which is defined by the authors as “a mapping 
between attributes and fitness that exists in the real world, but which is not observable” (Gill & 
Hevner, 2011). 
This particular method has several advantages that make it suited for this research. As 
proposed by Drs. Gill and Hevner, determining the usefulness for design artifacts is in alignment 
with Design Research concepts. The use of fitness and utility models is understood by both 
academics and practitioners, and has been found to communicate how well artifacts can 
demonstrate fitness in attributes of their designs (Gill & Hevner, 2011). 
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The Fitness-Utility Model applied to this research (see Figure 3) is used to help 
demonstrate that a design artifact has an associated fitness, based on specific attributes that the 
artifact’s creator uses to make estimates of the artifact’s usefulness within the system it is being 
designed for. Once evaluated, artifacts can provide more concrete evidence that a particular 
design has intrinsic value within that system and can otherwise evolve over time and improve the 
artifact’s abilities to describe the fitness of the particular design system (Gill and Hevner, 2011). 
Important in the case of this research project, the Fitness-Utility Model provides a vehicle for 
communicating between the creators of the potential design system and other stakeholders, and 
for providing a way to keep and share pertinent information about the design of the artifacts that 
are indicators of its usefulness. 
Design Science strives to impact the design space that is being reviewed or used in such a 
way that design artifacts with a high level of fitness are continually introduced into the design 
system. This effect is realized in two ways: through the creation of artifacts that can show 
adaptability or the ability to evolve, and through the improvements in utility of the design 
artifacts that are shown through evaluations of those artifacts (Gill & Hevner, 2011). 
The evaluation of design artifacts should be based on a more extensive and detailed 
utility function, instead of just the artifact’s usefulness, that estimates the artifact’s ability to 
evolve to maintain or extend its fitness. Utility attributes support a design artifact and a design 
system to evolve on an incremental basis, inspire designers and users to test and experiment with 
artifacts and their related systems, and to communicate ideas and other information that will help 
the design system and artifacts to proliferate and to become new and interesting over time (Gill 
& Hevner, 2011). 
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Figure 3 – Fitness-Utility Model for Design Research (Figure from Gill & Hevner, 2011) 
 
Artifact Description – Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model 
The Conceptual Model for the Reprivata Community of Trust cybersecurity risk 
management solution describes the elements that are part of the solution and shows, in a pictorial 
way, how those elements can be affected and act together under the NISF CSF compliance 
requirements. In the Conceptual Model (see Figure 4), it seeks to articulate and explain the 
interactions of elements that influence successful Community of Trust (CoT) implementations. 
These elements help determine and, in some cases, manage the resources within these projects as 
part of the overarching corporate business strategy which determines the cyber risk posture, and 
how that posture can be managed and measured. These are two distinct groups of elements. One 
element is composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and contractual obligations, in the form of 
Master Agreement legal documents that provide structure to the CoT. The other element 
provides the rules of engagement and operational requirements for the Internal and External 
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Stakeholders of the CoT. These Stakeholders take the form of company management and 
governance as well as third parties that do business with or have influence on the company as 
oversight and compliance functions. 
The External Stakeholders in the Model are CoT oversight functions, known as the CoT 
Privacy Authority. The CoT Privacy Authority is charged with reviewing how the CoT users 
meet their obligations under the Master Agreements and their NIST CSF compliance 
requirements. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Proposed Conceptual Model – Reprivata Cybersecurity Community of Trust 
 
Artifact Evolution 
When the Conceptual Model was being designed and created, it was a new artifact that 
did not exist previously as part of Reprivata’s risk informing collateral. The Model went through 
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2 iterations before it was accepted by the Reprivata management team and published in its 
current version.  
The first version of the Model only mapped the Community of Trust Risk Management 
Strategy and Community of Trust Governance elements, which map very closely to the NIST 
CSF version 1.0 controls.  
The second version of the Model was mapped to NIST CSF version 1.1, which had been 
released in April 2018. The most important update to NIST CSF version 1.1 was the inclusion of 
Supply Chain Management (shown in the Model as Interconnected Third Parties) and the 
controls required by the updated framework. The revised model also included the Internal 
Stakeholders, which are shown as corporate management functions.  
Risk Informing Changes Made When the Artifact Was Implemented 
When the Conceptual Model was shared with Reprivata’s business partners and potential 
customers, these groups were able to better understand how security governance, compliance, 
and other controls in the NIST CSF could be enabled or enhanced by using the Reprivata 
cybersecurity risk management solution. Potential customers, including the Cyber Florida and 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), defined specific secure data sharing and 
collaboration use cases that could improve their understanding of cyber risks. C2, DHS, FS-
ISAC were able to define use cases based on the Conceptual Model that could improve 
understanding of cyber risks. Some of the use cases identified included: 
 The deployment of a CoT for the Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) in the 
State of Florida University System to use when they were required to collaborate and 
share data regarding security events that affected one or more of the state universities. 
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 The design of a Proof of Concept (PoC) that would enable DHS investigators to share 
information on investigations and interact securely with other government agencies like 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
 The Financial Services-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) requested a 
PoC to securely share sensitive security information about Internet threats and 
vulnerabilities with members of the ISAC. 
Specific Cases Where the Artifact Made the Company Make Changes in the Way They 
Communicated Cyber Risks 
 
Initially, Reprivata’s management believed that the Master Agreements, which set forth 
the terms and conditions for companies that deployed a CoT for itself and entities it desired to 
collaborate and share information with, were their primary product. At that time, Reprivata had 
decided to give away its CoT cybersecurity risk management solution if customers purchased the 
Master Agreements. This approach confused potential customers and devalued the company’s 
unique technology. Also, while the Master Agreements addressed the requirement for CoT users 
to comply with the NIST CSF standards, they did not show how the overall structure of the CoT 
solution complied with the security controls as part of its overall design. 
However, after sharing the Conceptual Model with potential customers, the company 
realized the integration of the CoT cybersecurity risk management solution and the Master 
Agreements was the approach that better informed customers of Reprivata’s product and its 
capabilities. The Conceptual Model made the company realize that the integrated solution was a 
unique cybersecurity risk management offering that had NIST CSF compliance designed into 
and implemented by the solution. 
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Quotes from Intervention Participants About the Artifact 
“The Conceptual Model enabled us to visualize how our solution, based on the NIST 
CSF, could enable collaboration between groups in an organization that needed to 
communicate and share data.” – Reprivata Management Team 
 
“The Model helped us understand the concepts and relationships of the Reprivata 
solution. We used it when creating our use case to determine if we had identified the 
related work groups that needed to collaborate on security investigations.” – Customer 
who engaged Reprivata for Proof of Concept 
 
“The Model helped us quickly understand how the Reprivata solution could be leverage 
the NIST CSF controls and help those controls be more widely implemented across an 
organization.” – Reprivata Business Partner 
 
Artifact Description – NIST CSF Assessment for the Reprivata CoT Cybersecurity Risk 
Management Solution (version 4) 
 
The NIST CSF Compliance Matrix was crested to assess the security controls and 
capabilities of the Reprivata CoT cybersecurity risk management solution (see Table 8). The 
Compliance Matrix provides information on how those controls are implemented and if they are 
compliant with the NIST CSF requirements. The Matrix categorizes the security controls as 
Technology controls, Enabling controls, or controls that should be considered for inclusion in 
Reprivata’s Master Agreements to inform users of their security responsibilities as members of 
the CoT.  
Technology controls are security functions that are part of the CoT solution’s design, 
architecture, and implementation. The Reprivata CoT cybersecurity risk management solution, in 
its initial design, was conceived to meet or exceed the security control requirements outlined in 
the NIST CSF. This Matrix provided the Reprivata management team and its potential customers 
with a very straightforward way to identify how its technology complied with the NIST CSF 
security requirements. 
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Enabling Controls, where the CoT security functionality supports or enhances the 
implementation of another control, were an important addition to the Matrix. This specific 
control review was added to the Matrix in order to inform potential customers on how the 
Technology-related controls in the CoT application and other controls which are based more on 
policies and procedures could be more easily managed and monitored through the use of the 
collaboration and data sharing functions of the solution. 
Process improvement, program management, and similar controls that, when implemented, 
would help users mature their risk management postures through exchanging threat and security 
information. These controls were recommended for inclusion in the Reprivata Master Agreement 
to add more structure and focus to the CoT rules of engagement on how users are required to 
manage and improve their interactions with other users while they are collaborating and sharing 
sensitive data in the CoT.  
Table 8 - NIST CSF Assessment and Findings for the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) 
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution 
 
NIST CSF  
Functional Area 
Reprivata CoT 
Solution 
Compliant with 
Key Controls 
Technology 
Controls 
Enabling  
Controls 
Master 
Agreement 
Controls 
Identify 15 out of 29 key 
controls 
5 14 10 
Protect 18 out of 39 key 
controls 
12 21 6 
Detect 15 out of 18 key 
controls 
11 3 4 
Respond 13 out of 15 key 
controls 
3 2 10 
Recover 4 out of 6 key  
controls 
0 2 4 
Total 65 out of 107 key 
controls 
31 42 34 
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Artifact Evolution 
When the Compliance Matrix was being designed and created, it was a new artifact that 
did not exist previously as part of Reprivata’s security documentation for the solution. The 
Matrix went through four iterations before it was accepted by the Reprivata management team 
and published in its current version.  
The first version of the Matrix mapped the solution compliance by high level Function 
and Category of the NIST CSF version 1.0 controls. It was originally created after a meeting 
with DHS in Washington, DC. The DHS security Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) asked if 
Reprivata had ever assessed its solution against the NIST CSF guidelines, and Reprivata 
answered that it had not. That afternoon, the researcher drafted the first assessment Matrix that 
covered the five Functional areas and 22 Categories of NIST CSF version 1.0. When the 
Reprivata solution was reviewed, it was determined that it could, at a high level, meet or exceed 
20 of the 22 requirements. The two Categories that the solution could not directly meet were 
Protection functional controls related to categories Awareness and Training and Maintenance.  
The second version of the Matrix was expanded to do a more detailed mapping of the 
Technology controls in NIST CSF version 1.0 to the solution. This version was a very revealing 
document to both the Reprivata management team and to potential customers. This Matrix 
demonstrated that, through the use of technology such as data encryption, security monitoring, 
and access management, the solution could meet 30 of the over 100 security controls in the NIST 
CSF version 1.0. 
After the second revision of the Matrix, the Reprivata management team asked if a 
demonstration could be performed to show that using the CoT could actually make it easier for 
customers to implement security controls like policies and procedures. After some discussion, 
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the researcher developed the idea of Enabling Controls, where technology controls would 
support or speed up the deployment of security processes based on policies and procedures. The 
third version of the Matrix was designed to evaluate how such Enabling controls might work in 
practice. While documenting the third iteration, some controls were identified that attempted to 
address the need for factors like security program maturity and process improvements. After 
reviewing these items with the Reprivata management team, a new control evaluation was 
identified for these factors and were captured separately. Because they are potentially useful to 
many other CoT users, the researcher decided to use the factors as recommendations for 
inclusion in the Reprivata Master Agreements, where they can influence how CoT users interact 
with each other over time.  
The fourth version of the Matrix was performed in July 2018 in response to the 
publication of NIST CSF version 1.1 in April 2018. This version was a relatively minor update, 
since the new NIST CSF guidelines added only one new category of controls for Supply Chain 
Management. In Table 8, the overall compliance with the NIST CSF version 1.1 controls 
reached 65 of 107 total controls, with 42 controls being enabled and supported because of the 
interaction with technology controls.   
Risk Informing Changes Made When the Artifact Was Implemented 
Using the Compliance Matrix for both internal solution design and implementation 
discussions, Reprivata management learned how to better communicate, at the individual 
security control level, how the solution complied with the NIST CSF. As the Matrix information 
was added to product presentations, customer interest in use cases and PoCs grew because 
Reprivata could now demonstrate the solution’s NIST CSF compliance in an easy-to-understand 
and risk informed way. 
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With the addition of the Enabling control assessment information in the Matrix, 
Reprivata’s management could better explain how the solution supported the more effective 
implementation of policy, process, and procedure controls. The CoT provided a secure 
communication, collaboration, and data sharing environment for security and risk management 
practitioners to utilize when they created and discussed these controls and any attendant risks. 
After reviewing the Matrix, Reprivata customers better understood how the CoT solution could 
improve their compliance postures by enabling them to more quickly create, deploy, and mature 
risk informed security programs, which are deemed to be at the Tier 2 level of maturity in the 
NIST CSF. The goal for security organizations that adopt the NIST CSF is aspiring to implement 
a security program with repeatable security controls using technologies, processes, and policies, 
described as the Tier 3 level of maturity. 
Specific Cases Where the Artifact Made the Company Make Changes in the Way They 
Communicated Cyber Risks 
 
After reviewing the Matrix with a key business partner, the Reprivata management team 
realized that the Technology control compliance achieved by the CoT solution met the 
requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which standardizes data 
protection laws across all 28 European Union (EU) countries and imposes strict new rules on 
controlling and processing Personally Identifiable Information (PII). This realization opened a 
potentially new market for Reprivata’s CoT solution for Europe and other areas of the world. 
The NIST CSF is primarily a United States security standard, so the CoT solution’s ability to 
readily comply with international standards like GDPR is a tremendous market advantage. 
Quotes from Intervention Participants About the Artifact 
“The Compliance Matrix provided us with an understanding of the solution’s overall 
compliance with NIST CSF as well as a way to explain to customer how the solution 
 70 
 
supports the implementation of policies and procedure through the use of its collaboration 
capabilities.” – Reprivata Management 
 
“Upon review of the Compliance Matrix, it was easy to see how the solution would also 
provide a way for a CoT to comply with GDPR, because the control guidelines are very 
similar and the controls are already implemented in the solution.” – Reprivata Business 
Partner 
 
Evaluation of the Artifacts’ Usefulness Based on the Fitness-Utility Model 
Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model (version 2) 
The final intervention on the CoT Conceptual Model artifact was held at the Cyber 
Florida offices at the University of South Florida on August 22, 2018. This meeting was the 
follow up from the intervention performed with the Cyber Florida team on March 9, 2018, where 
the Reprivata team discussed the first version of the Conceptual Model with the Cyber Florida 
SMEs.  
The purpose of this intervention was for the Cyber Florida team to provide their 
professional evaluations and observations on how well the Model informed them on the potential 
interactions of the CoT solution with its internal and external stakeholders as they worked to 
become more compliant with the NIST CSF. 
This table shows how the intervention participants rated the Model’s usefulness, based on 
the fitness attributes that make up the Fitness-Utility model (see Table 9). 
Table 9 – Estimates of Artifact Usefulness for the Proposed Conceptual Model for the Reprivata 
Cybersecurity Community of Trust 
 
 
 
Artifact Fitness  
Attribute 
Estimate of 
Artifact’s 
Usefulness 
Observations from  
Intervention Participants 
Decomposable 
 
The ability of a design to evolve 
incrementally. 
  New conceptual elements could be easily 
added to the Model when required. 
 Interactions of conceptual elements could be 
readily identified. 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
Elegant 
 
Artifacts which have design 
characteristics, such as compactness, 
simplicity, transparency of use, 
transparency of behavior, clarity of 
representation, that can invite 
surprise about, delight in, imitation 
of, and enhancement of the artifact. 
  The Model is straightforward and 
communicates compliance interactions 
between internal and external stakeholders. 
 
Legend: 
Artifact Attribute 
Meets Definition 
 
 
Artifact Attribute Meets 
Part of Definition 
 
 
Artifact Attribute Does 
Not Meet Definition 
 
 
 
Malleable 
 
The degree to which artifacts can be 
adapted by its users and respond to 
changing use/market environments. 
  The Model could be used by both government 
agencies and commercial firms. 
 Use cases where internal and external 
stakeholders needed to collaborate could be 
created. 
Open 
 
The degree to which artifacts are 
open to inspection, modification, 
and reuse. 
  The Model was modified to address customer-
specific conceptual elements and showed how 
they interacted with other elements. 
 
Embedded in Design 
System  
 
Artifacts created are part of a 
sustainable design system 
environment rather than one that is 
produced in a context where design 
is an unusual activity. 
  Conceptual elements in the Model are part of 
the CoT solution’s overall design. 
 The Model could be adapted to new design  
criteria in the CoT solution. 
Novel 
 
A design that originates from an 
unexplored region of the design 
fitness landscape. 
  The Model is a common design artifact so it is 
easy to understand by stakeholders. 
Interesting  
 
Artifacts that demonstrate 
unexpected emergent behaviors that 
are worthy of subsequent 
investigation and the creation of 
subsequent artifacts or artifacts that 
can be constructed in an unexpected 
way that intrigue other designers or 
design researchers. 
 
 
  The Model helps to identify unique 
interactions between the organization and the 
capabilities of the CoT solution. 
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From review of the estimates of the Model’s Fitness-Utility attributes, the Reprivata 
Community of Trust Conceptual Model improved communication about the cybersecurity risk 
management capabilities of the CoT solution and how groups that used or were planning to use 
the CoT solution could interact based in its internal security functionality. Improvement to its 
informing capabilities could have been made as subsequent versions of the artifacts were 
designed and implemented. 
NIST CSF Assessment for the Reprivata CoT Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution (version 
4) 
 
The final intervention on the NIST CSF Assessment Matrix for the Reprivata CoT 
solution artifact was held at the University of South Florida on August 10, 2018. This meeting 
was held between the Reprivata management team and one of the company’s key business 
partners. That partner had developed an online Web site that enabled customers to perform an 
assessment of various security frameworks, including the NIST CSF.  
The purpose of this intervention was for a group of SMEs with a key Reprivata business 
partner to provide their professional evaluations and observations on how well the Matrix 
informed them on the overall compliance of the CoT solution with the NISF CSF standards. This 
assessment identified the ways the CoT solution’s technology controls and their potential 
enabling abilities supported the implementation of other non-technology controls, such as 
policies and procedures. The CoT solution was determined, based on the discussions with its 
internal and external stakeholders as they worked to become more compliant with the NIST CSF 
standards, to provide a significant level of compliance with the security control requirements.  
This table shows how the intervention participants rated the Matrix’s usefulness based on 
the fitness attributes that make up the Fitness-Utility model (see Table 10). 
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Table 10 – Estimates of Artifact Usefulness for the NIST CSF Assessment for the Reprivata 
Cybersecurity Community of Trust 
 
 
 
Artifact Fitness  
Attribute 
Estimate of 
Artifact’s 
Usefulness 
Observations from  
Intervention Participants 
Decomposable 
 
The ability of a design to evolve 
incrementally. 
  The Matrix was straightforward and 
communicated control interactions. 
 The effects of Enabling Controls on overall 
compliance was communicated clearly.  
Malleable 
 
The degree to which artifacts can be 
adapted by its users and respond to 
changing use/market environments. 
  Individual control requirements could be 
compared with each other and with those of 
other security standards to evaluate their  
similarities and differences. 
Open 
 
The degree to which artifacts are 
open to inspection, modification, 
and reuse. 
  The Matrix could be restructured to map 
controls of specific types, implementation, or 
governance. 
 The Matrix could be readily adapted to other 
security standards. 
Embedded in Design 
System 
 
Artifacts created are part of a 
sustainable design system 
environment rather than one that is 
produced in a context where design 
is an unusual activity. 
  The Matrix demonstrated that compliance to 
NIST CSF security standard was integral to the 
CoT solution design intent. 
Novel 
 
A design that originates from an 
unexplored region of the design 
fitness landscape. 
  The inclusion of Enabling Controls and Master 
Agreement Control recommendations showed 
that the CoT solution is integrated to enable 
compliance at each part. 
Interesting  
 
Artifacts that demonstrate 
unexpected emergent behaviors that 
are worthy of subsequent 
investigation and the creation of 
subsequent artifacts or artifacts that 
can be constructed in an unexpected 
way that intrigue other designers or 
design researchers. 
  Significant interest has been expressed in 
determining how the CoT solution can be 
utilized in other areas, such as Legal, Human 
Resources, and Mergers and Acquisitions, 
where the need to secure collaboration and 
data sharing are required. 
 Further investigation on how Enabling 
Controls lead to cyber maturity was 
recommended. 
Elegant 
 
Artifacts that have design 
characteristics, such as compactness, 
simplicity, transparency of use, 
transparency of behavior, clarity of 
representation, that can invite 
surprise about, delight in, imitation 
of, and enhancement of the artifact. 
  The Matrix was very comprehensive but could 
have been easier to work with. 
 Automating the compliance assessment and 
evaluation was recommended. 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
Legend: 
Artifact Attribute 
Meets Definition 
 
 
Artifact Attribute Meets 
Part of Definition 
 
 
Artifact Attribute Does 
Not Meet Definition 
 
 
 
From a review of the Model’s Fitness-Utility attributes estimates, the NIST CSF 
Assessment for the Reprivata CoT solution improved communication about how well the CoT 
solution complied with the NIST CSF standards. Of particular interest was how the assessment 
of Enabling Controls enhanced the CoT solution’s overall compliance potential for 
organizations. By supporting the implementation of non-technology controls through the use of 
collaboration and data sharing functionalities designed into the CoT solution, achieving, 
maintaining, and maturing future compliance to the NIST CSF and other cybersecurity standards 
could be easier. 
Discussion and Interpretation of Results 
The impacts from the interventions were significant to the Reprivata management team 
and the intervention participants. For both design artifacts, the Reprivata team and the 
intervention participants agreed that they were better informed about cyber risk compliance and 
how various groups could collaborate together to achieve NIST CSF compliance. Additionally, 
the groups stated that their understanding of the vocabulary used in cybersecurity increased with 
the reviews of the design artifacts as they were about to gain more context about cybersecurity 
concepts in relation to their organizations and how they managed their security programs. 
In the discussion with potential clients and the intervention participants about the 
versions of the Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model, the most interesting impact of 
the Model was the way that various compliance requirements between internal and external 
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stakeholders could be easily identified and discussed. Demonstrating, initially at a high level, the 
various types of potential activities that an organization’s internal and external stakeholder must 
evaluate as they worked to comply with the NIST CSF implementation and maturity 
requirements led to some rich conversations. These communications began to articulate the 
usefulness of the CoT solution’s capabilities as an important enabling part of a maturing 
cybersecurity program.  
In the case of the NIST CSF Assessment Matrix for the Reprivata CoT Solution, the 
interesting impact of the design artifact was the introduction and acceptance of Enabling 
Controls as a way to increase the adoption of critical security controls and measure their 
compliance with the NIST CSF. The intervention participants agreed that the Enabling Controls 
helped them easily identify and show the interrelationships of various types of controls and how 
technology controls can influence the effectiveness of controls based on policies and procedures. 
While this research did not propose a quantitative method for measuring the influences of 
Enabling Controls on an organization’s compliance program, such research would be an 
interesting area of future investigation. 
Using a Fitness-Utility Model, such as the one proposed by Drs. Gill and Hevner, helped 
both the researcher and the intervention participants to break down the various impacts of the 
design artifacts and to estimate which fitness attributes were important in showing the usefulness 
of the artifacts. As stated above, additional study into finding more quantitative ways to evaluate 
the fitness attributes to show improvements in the evolution of design artifacts would be a 
stimulating project. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 
CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
Conclusions 
Based on the literature review performed, a number of cybersecurity gaps were noted, 
especially related to the effective communication and measurement of cybersecurity risks. The 
differences in the use of cybersecurity terminology between the participants in this project were 
significant obstacles in the cyber risk informing objectives of this research. Additionally, the 
literature review identified a lack of cybersecurity-related literature on how to assist companies 
to better understand cyber risks. 
The Reprivata CoT cybersecurity risk management solution is an industry-leading 
application with the capability to help disseminate a wide variety of cybersecurity information to 
the internal and external stakeholders of an organization. By developing an understanding of the 
security control types that were part of the solution’s design requirements, useful design artifacts 
were created that improved the ways that Reprivata, its business partners, and potential 
customers could discuss the solution’s security controls and their ability to comply with the 
NIST CSF more easily and in more detail, with a better understanding between the parties. 
Helping cybersecurity practitioners as well as other people who are impacted by cyber 
risks to better understand those risks is a daunting task. It is becoming more difficult as the 
number and types of cyber risks grow over time. Taking up this challenge, this research project 
was able to appraise the usefulness of design artifacts that, according to cybersecurity 
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practitioners, improved the understanding of these risks when evaluated using a Fitness-Utility 
Model. While the findings are estimates, the increase in communication and information sharing 
by internal and external stakeholders of the solution were strong indicators that improvements 
did occur, though they could not be quantitatively measured at this time. 
The interventions performed on the design artifacts identified the ways that cybersecurity 
practitioners communicate with each other and how they do so with people with less 
cybersecurity experience. This realization was very important to the Reprivata management team 
because it radically changed the way they communicated how their solution informed its users 
about cyber risks. The artifacts designed to assist in this informing process were not unique, but 
they did include new concepts, such as demonstrating the interactions of Enabling Controls on 
other controls and providing important context on how the Reprivata CoT solution was able to 
take advantage of these Enabling Controls because of the design intent where the NIST CSF 
cybersecurity framework was integrated into the technology. 
The differences in the use of cybersecurity terminology used by the research participants 
was a significant obstacle in meeting the cyber risk informing objectives of this project. Through 
the DSR analysis, design, and evaluation cycles that were part of creating the artifacts for this 
project, the overarching goal was increasing the participants’ understanding of the vocabulary of 
cybersecurity risks and improving the ways cyber risks are communicated. While this objective 
was met, it was clear that a number of informing methods were required to effectively 
communicate the impacts of cyber risks. This finding was more related to the specific industry 
that cyber risk information was being shared with than any other factor. Such differences, even 
small ones, impacted the success of informing potential clients about the cybersecurity risk 
 79 
 
management capabilities of the Reprivata solution during several presentations and also during 
the interventions.   
Even as the study participants would gain a common understanding of the current cyber 
issues facing the company, another set of risks would appear and the informing process would 
begin again. The ultimate success of this research project came down to the participants reaching 
an agreement – sometimes on a daily basis – on which artifacts and other comprehension aids 
actually helped both parties understand cyber risks in the same way, especially the ones that 
might affect the Reprivata CoT solution and its implementation by customers. When this 
agreement was reached and the Reprivata team presented the artifacts to potential customers, the 
meetings were successful in helping the customers understand the Reprivata cybersecurity 
controls and functionality, and to identify how the solution would be useful in the customer’s 
technology environment to secure sensitive communications and data. The identification of such 
use cases led to the first client Proof of Concept (PoC) agreement with DHS, which was signed 
in August 2018. 
A number of conclusions were drawn from this ADR project on evaluating and 
enhancing the cyber risk informing capabilities of the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management 
solution. In this case, potential challenges to current cybersecurity research initiatives, such as 
how to deploy commercially available applications inside the Reprivata solution’s encrypted 
core and how to operationalize the threat intelligence functionality both inside and outside 
Reprivata’s closed network architecture, were overcome by the use of ADR techniques. 
Embedding this researcher in an organization improved team collaboration on creating 
operations documentation for the client PoC because sharing of design information and 
improving client deliverables and other artifacts were seen as informing exercises that enhanced 
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the quality of the communications between the Reprivata team and DHS. The collaboration that 
resulted allowed both parties to understand and solve cyber risk issues related to the PoC 
quickly. 
This research showed that active involvement of company personnel, SMEs, and 
potential customers in ADR artifact evaluations and interventions was most effective when 
multiple parties, such as company stakeholder and external SMEs, participated in the sessions. 
As a result of this approach, the artifacts took fewer reviews to be accepted. This approach 
worked well with DHS as the PoC was defined. Multiple work sessions involving Reprivata and 
DHS personnel used DSR techniques to analyze and design project artifacts. By having already 
created a common design approach and agreeing on the PoC functional and operational 
requirements, the project had fewer delays in getting formal service agreement approved and 
signed. 
In creating better ways to inform understanding of cybersecurity risks, cybersecurity 
practitioners and stakeholders are still struggling with the terminology required to enable better 
understanding of cyber risks. Researchers should continue to account for this when creating 
artifacts attempting to increase such comprehension in stakeholders. However, as demonstrated 
during this research project, continuously engaging with stakeholders to educate them on the 
vocabulary and taxonomy of cybersecurity communications is critical before any informing 
messages can be successfully created and then understood by the stakeholders. 
 Also, the implementations of cybersecurity risk management solutions to help raise the 
understanding cyber risks with stakeholders face a number of challenges. In particular, the 
implementation of such solutions are not keeping pace with the rapid spread of cyber risks and 
threats and the urgent needs to determine their effects as accurately and quickly as possible. The 
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Reprivata solution can be implemented on a number of technology platforms using open source 
software. This ease of implementation could improve the successful deployment of other 
technology risk management methodologies is they follow Reprivata’s example for using DSR 
techniques to analyze and develop new cybersecurity risk management solutions. 
Contributions 
Research Contributions 
 Contributions from the Case Study Paper 
In this paper, “Implementing a Cybersecurity Community of Trust: Reprivata Seeks an 
“Early Adopter”” (Fulford, 2018), a new and promising cybersecurity risk management solution 
was identified and the management team was interviewed to determine some of the challenges it 
faced while attempting to get its first client. The case study identified several challenges the 
company faced, both with the design of its solution as well as with the messaging and 
communications about the solution’s cybersecurity risk management capabilities. These gaps 
served as the initial topics of discussion for analyzing the solution design for creating the 
requirements for the artifacts. The case study will inform both academics and practitioners on 
how differences in vocabulary and taxonomy can negatively impact both the design and ultimate 
customer acceptance of a new cybersecurity risk management solution. 
 Contributions from the Technical Note Paper 
This paper, “A Note on the Cybersecurity Problem Spaces in 2018” (Fulford, 2018), was 
a supplement to the case study. It identified challenges that are facing governments, industries, 
and individuals related to cybersecurity. Informing gaps and cybersecurity control 
implementation issues were identified from the discussions of the numerous cybersecurity 
problem spaces. This gap analysis was used to help determine what type of artifacts would be 
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required and what types of information they would need to convey to internal and external 
stakeholders of cybersecurity risk management solutions. 
 Contributions from the Design Science Research Paper 
This paper, “Evaluating and Enhancing the Risk Informing Capabilities of a 
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution Using Action Design Research” (Fulford, 2018), was 
authored while the researcher was embedded with the target company, Reprivata. This ability to 
review all design documentation of the company’s cybersecurity risk management solution, 
interact with company management, and participate in meeting with business partners and 
potential clients offered advantages for this research. It made understanding the solution’s design 
much easier and facilitated the analysis, creation, and evaluation of the design artifacts. A key 
contribution of this paper was the identification of Enabling Controls and being able to perform 
an initial assessment of control interrelationships as they were implemented in the solution. 
 Contributions from the Enhance Action Design Research Paper 
This paper, “Using a Fitness-Utility Model to Elaborate the Impacts of Artifacts Created 
to Enhance the Risk Informing Capabilities of a Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution” 
(Fulford, 2018), demonstrated the use of a proposed fitness-utility model during the evaluations 
of the design artifacts created and reviewed in Paper 3. By informing on expert estimates of 
design utility, this model provides practitioners with a way to facilitate discussions on the 
usefulness of future artifacts. This paper also showed the design research contribution types (see 
Table 11) for each of the artifacts. By estimating design artifacts for usefulness and then 
determining what types of contribution is being made to the overall design, practitioners now 
have a better way to inform their stakeholders on the risk informing capabilities of cybersecurity 
control and risk management solutions.  
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Overall, in evaluating the results from the interventions, improvements were noted on 
how the intervention participants moved toward a more consistent use of cybersecurity 
vocabulary over the course of those meetings. Such an improvement of the communication of 
cybersecurity risks and controls was the primary objective of this research. As the first design 
artifact was created, the Conceptual Model helped set a starting point for discussing how 
compliance to the NIST CSF could impact an organization at multiple levels, which was very 
useful in showing how the Reprivata CoT solution could enable a compliance program’s 
implementation and maturity.  
However, the iterations of the Model did not include enough operational elements of an 
organization to show where the intersection of control definition and control management meet 
and where the compliance requirements of a cybersecurity program are actually measured. A 
deeper operational analysis of control deployment and compliance measures should be 
performed so the conceptual elements and their interactions with other elements can be included 
in the future iterations of the Model. 
Because more interventions were performed on the NIST CSF Assessment Matrix for the 
Reprivata CoT Solution than on the Conceptual Model, the intervention participants stated that it 
was easier to understand and communicate its findings. Also, the participants found it to have 
more flexibility in examining controls, especially how the Technology Controls and the Enabling 
Controls worked in concert to support overall compliance with the NIST CSF.  
The participants also stated that the Matrix was cumbersome and more difficult to use in 
its current form, especially when automated compliance assessment tools are available. While 
the automated compliance tools reviewed to not include Enabling Controls, adding that type of 
control analysis to such a tool would not be difficult. At this time, Reprivata is speaking with one 
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of its business partners that offers a control analysis application about updating it with a section 
that measures the potential impacts of Enabling Controls on the broader compliance 
cybersecurity program.    
The design intent and characteristics of the two artifacts were reviewed against the 
Design Science Contribution Types table, which was included in the MIS Quarterly article by 
Drs. Gregor and Hevner published in 2013 (see Table 11) (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). From that 
evaluation, the Conceptual Model would be considered a Level 2 contribution to research. The 
Model’s use of key conceptual organizational elements to describe and communicate how those 
elements interact to influence compliance with the NIST CSF is key because of its potential 
impact on better understanding how cybersecurity risks and compliance to cybersecurity 
standards are useful in the ways an organization works with internal and external stakeholders. 
The NIST CSF Assessment Matrix would be considered a Level 1 contribution to 
research because it focuses on implemented or established processes. Designed to be a more 
comprehensive cyber risk communicator than the Conceptual Model, the Matrix can be used to 
quickly analyze control compliance and comment upon the ways some controls can support and 
enable the implementation and maturity of other ones. Such matrices are often developed when 
cybersecurity researchers are studying how organizations comply with security and risk 
management guidelines. This Matrix, through its design intent and subsequent enhancements 
through interventions, begins to assess the impact of Enabling Controls on organizational 
compliance with cybersecurity standards, and suggests avenues of future research on the 
measurement of Enabling Control impacts on other security and operational controls.  
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Table 11 – Design Science Research Contributions by Artifact Type (from Gregor & Hevner, 2013) 
 
Design Science Research Contributions by Artifact Type 
 
 Contribution Types Example Artifacts 
 
 
More abstract, complete, and 
mature knowledge 
 
 
More specific, limited, and less 
mature knowledge 
Level 3. Well-developed design 
theory about embedded 
phenomena 
Design theories (mid-range and 
grand theories) 
Level 2. Nascent design 
theory—knowledge as  
operational 
principles/architecture 
Constructs, methods, models, 
design principles, technological 
rules. 
Level 1. Situated 
implementation of artifact 
Instantiations (software products 
or implemented processes) 
 
Perhaps the most significant outcome from the uses of the design artifacts created during 
this research project is that Reprivata has acquired several customers since the project began. 
Reprivata’s management team has stated that including these design artifacts in Reprivata’s sales 
and product presentations has helped improve internal understanding of cybersecurity risks and 
increased customer interest in the CoT solution. 
Contributions to Practice 
Both of the design artifacts are useful in a broader context for cybersecurity and 
compliance practitioners. For example, the Conceptual Model was created so the various 
elements could be compared, individually, in groups, or all together, in order to investigate how 
the elements influence NIST CSF compliance. The same type of Model would work when 
comparing other compliance frameworks beyond cybersecurity, since the implementation 
processes for compliance programs have many of the same requirements, regardless of the type 
of standard or guideline to be deployed. 
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The Compliance Matrix could be very helpful in situations where compliance 
professionals are attempting to understand how specific types of cybersecurity controls work in 
different compliance environments. While the Matrix is designed to help evaluate the NIST CSF 
standard, it could be used to map other security control frameworks, such as the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001 and GDPR.  
By adding the analysis of Enabling Controls into the assessment evaluation process 
presented in this research, practitioners will be able to get a much broader view of their 
organization’s compliance environment and potentially find areas of non-compliance of controls 
before any control weakness can be exploited. 
Limitations of Current Research  
Limitations of this research were related to the challenges with setting up interventions 
and getting feedback from participants. In particular, non-disclosure agreements with potential 
customers limited the researcher’s ability to hold group meetings to discuss the design artifacts, 
which could have led to more enhancements to the design artifacts. 
One issue in the research was the proximity of the participants. They lived all over the 
United States and overseas. This factor made scheduling of meetings for interviews, artifact 
design sessions, and subsequent evaluations very difficult. Interventions were held with three of 
the Reprivata team in person on two different occasions, which did allow for very useful 
interchanges. More face-to-face meetings would have likely provided additional and better 
insights into the informing capabilities of the Reprivata CoT solutions and the artifacts produced. 
The small number of potential Reprivata customers and cybersecurity SMEs that were 
able to review and comment on the artifacts through either presentations or intervention sessions 
meant there were fewer estimates of the utility of the design artifacts. A total of six intervention 
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meetings, four with customers and two with SME groups, were held and the feedback from those 
sessions provided valuable comments and recommendations for improving the artifacts. 
However, to better judge the informing capabilities of the artifacts to help improve understanding 
of cyber risks, more such evaluation and intervention sessions would be required. 
Another limitation is that the artifacts ability to improve in communicating cybersecurity 
risks was only estimated during the evaluation discussions. The participants stated that their 
understanding of cybersecurity risks increased during the interventions and they were better able 
to communicate the implications of those risks afterwards. Even with that advance in informing 
capabilities, the research did not include any comprehension or content testing in order to get 
more accurate measurements of those improvement. 
Also, the Master Agreement control recommendations, while reviewed, were not 
implemented in the legal documents so they could be reviewed by the intervention participants. 
The participants discussed how the Master Agreements could be used to establish rules of 
engagement for collaborating on cyber risk, but they could not comment on how the 
recommendations actually increased the usefulness of the Master Agreements. 
A lack of cybersecurity-related literature on how to assist companies to better understand 
cyber risks was noted throughout this project. As noted above, such research about informing 
stakeholders to enable their understanding of cybersecurity risks is very promising because of the 
rapid spread of cyber risks and threats, and the urgent need to comprehend their effects more 
fully.  
All the planned build phases related to the Master Agreements could not be completed 
because of the timing of the external legal reviews of those contracts. While the 
recommendations for enhancing the agreements to map to the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards 
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have been reviewed by Reprivata management team, they have not been submitted to the 
attorneys for updating the Master Agreements until later in 2018. 
The maturity assessment mechanism for the cybersecurity risk management solution 
could not be completed during this research project. The compliance matrix that was created 
provides a way to measure the effective implementation of cybersecurity controls, but it does not 
provide the repeatability measures that the maturity assessment could provide. 
Areas Requiring More Research 
Research into data analytic techniques that help determine how particular cybersecurity 
controls can be exploited shows a great deal of promise. In particular, the Reprivata Global 
Threat Intelligence (GTI) module captures a significant amount of network security data. 
Research methods that were examined as part of the Literature Review, such as utilizing the 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation algorithm to perform topic modeling of cybersecurity-related data 
sources, would be very useful artifacts for inclusion in cybersecurity risk management solutions 
(Kolini & Janczewski, 2017). 
Investigating the interaction of Enabling Controls within a cybersecurity control 
framework implementation holds a great deal of potential. At present, no academic literature 
exists on this subject and current cybersecurity standards and control frameworks do not discuss 
how particular controls can enhance or speed the implementation of other similar or related 
controls. A research project on Enabling Controls is being performed by a team that includes Dr. 
Carol Saunders. Dr. Saunders is working to determine if there are any relevant management or 
social science theories, such as agency theory, that contribute to the implementation of 
cybersecurity controls. This study is assessing how cybersecurity controls interact with each 
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other and how some cybersecurity controls influence the deployment of complementary or 
related controls.   
Further work on creating a quantitative method for measuring the influences of Enabling 
Controls on an organization’s compliance program could be a valuable contribution on the 
understanding and communicating of how cybersecurity risks can be mitigated and to what 
extent they can be eliminated or remediated. Understanding how and when those Enabling 
Controls impact other controls will be a necessity for practitioners as the risk and threat 
environment expands. Creating a measure or maturity metric that can demonstrate such things as 
funding, personnel, equipment, and other requirements and what their impacts would be in 
financial terms would be one goal of this research project. 
Additional research into finding more quantitative ways to evaluate the fitness attributes 
of the design artifacts to show improvements in their evolution would help to better measure how 
useful the artifacts are. By helping practitioners to evaluate the level of understanding (measured 
as comprehension) that stakeholders have on the usefulness of design artifacts and how those 
artifacts can inform the stakeholders in practice, better solutions can be designed and the 
subsequent artifacts can be more effectively measured in use. 
Research into cybersecurity risk management and compliance holds many opportunities 
to advance knowledge in the field. The estimation of the usefulness of artifacts in 
communicating cyber risk issues and analysis is a good start, but studies into quantifying the 
effectiveness of cybersecurity risk management solutions to inform their users can provide new 
insights on how cybersecurity solutions should approach the next generation of tools for cyber 
risk collaboration and information sharing. 
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Another topic for study would be expanding the mapping of other security control 
standards to include Enabling Controls and then determining what generalizable ways exist to 
implement these Enabling Controls that can improve compliance across multiple security 
standards. In today’s compliance-driven business environment, organizations are often required 
to implement more than one cybersecurity standard. A generalizable way of deploying such 
Enabling Controls could streamline the implementation of cybersecurity standards, meet the 
majority of the security requirements, and lessen the compliance assessment and management 
process by decreasing the number of security controls that must be regularly reviewed or 
classified as exceptions for closer management oversight and governance.   
Performing interventions with groups of participants with less cybersecurity background 
and experience would be a valuable project to undertake. Evaluating how these groups improve 
in their understanding and communication of cybersecurity risk concepts and then comparing 
these results with those of practitioners or people with more cyber experience to find which 
topics are most easy to assimilate and which ones required focused design artifacts to improve 
cyber risk understanding and communication. 
As discussed above, future directions in cybersecurity risk management should address 
how security controls interact with each other so that such relationships can be measured. In 
particular, the usefulness of future artifacts for the Reprivata cybersecurity risk management 
solution will require the inclusion of such measures in order to show its maturity against the 
NIST CSF and other cybersecurity standards, and how well it can maintain and monitor its 
compliance with those frameworks. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Artifact 1 – Proposed Conceptual Model for the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) 
Cybersecurity Risk Management Solution  
 
 
Figure A1 - Proposed Conceptual Model and Description – Reprivata Cybersecurity Community of 
Trust 
In the Proposed Conceptual Model above (also shown as Figure 2 in Section 5 above), the research will 
seek to articulate the interactions of elements that influence successful Cybersecurity Community of Trust 
(CoT) implementations. These elements help determine and, in some cases, manage the resources within 
these projects as the part of the overarching corporate business strategy which determines the cyber risk 
posture, and how that posture can be managed and measured. These are two distinct groups of elements: 
one that is composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and legal documents that provide structure to the 
CoT, and one that constitutes the Internal and External Stakeholders of the CoT.  
 
In the Proposed Conceptual Model, the CoT Risk Management Strategy element (see Figure 2 in Section 
5 above) defines the cybersecurity control requirements that the CoT members follow. In the case of 
Reprivata, the company selected the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) that was developed by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2014. The CSF was selected for two reasons. The CSF is 
a comprehensive set of cybersecurity control requirements based on 23 control categories across five 
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cybersecurity functional areas (see Table 4 in Section 5 above). As such, the CSF offers a comprehensive 
framework on which companies can build their cybersecurity programs. Also, the CSF includes a 
maturity model (see Table 5 in Section 5 above) that gives companies ways to determine how they are 
performing as they implement the CSF security controls. 
 
The CoT Governance element (see Figure 2 in Section 5 above) is based on the Master Agreements that 
are executed between the overall Community of Trust’s Internal Stakeholders and its External 
Stakeholders. The Master Agreements provide the legal guidance over its governance functions that the 
CoT members will utilize in interactions between themselves, and are the basis for the on-going 
collaboration activities in the CoT. The IT risk assessment processes are defined, outlining the risk 
management requirements for each member, such as purchasing cyber insurance and the how the 
cybersecurity program maturity of the members will be evaluated against the CSF security controls 
framework. The contractual obligations of each member with regard to its IT compliance and how the 
technical and business interconnections are to be managed are also specified by this element. Finally, the 
risk metrics are defined, outlining what risk measurements and the frequency of reporting those measure 
are stipulated. 
 
These two elements (CoT Risk Management Strategy and CoT Governance) augment each other as 
required to implement the selected Cyber Risk Management methodology (see Figure 2 in Section 5 
above). The provisions of COT Governance empower the company’s ability to measure risk and show the 
company’s overall risk posture is being managed effectively. If risk management requirements are 
changed, the company will reassess its risk posture and determine how such changes impact its 
operational stance within the CoT and under the conditions of the Master Agreement. In this way, the 
Proposed Conceptual Model would demonstrate that any change in by one or both of these elements will 
typically require a business to re-assess its cyber risk posture with respect to the overall change in its 
technology footprint it uses to support the CoT and its strategic and operational decisions and initiatives. 
The effects on the corporation’s internal technology environment are ways that these elements influence 
the direction and scope of the cyber-related management program. These influencers provide both an 
internal and external context on how the CoT Risk Management Strategy is implemented, how its success 
is measured, and how it is evaluated against CoT Governance requirements, such as internal or external 
audits, external risk assessments, or regulatory reviews. These evaluations influence the CoT Risk 
Management Strategy implementation by providing the legal and cybersecurity orientation for enhancing 
cyber risk management, as well as the key performance metrics and reporting required by management. 
 
The CoT Internal Stakeholders (see Figure 2 in Section 5 above) are the leaders of the company that is 
engaged in starting and maintaining the CoT. Boards of Directors Stakeholders assign the strategic and 
tactical responsibilities for implementing and maintaining effective cybersecurity and cyber risk 
management programs to the Management Stakeholders. These Stakeholders also provide oversight, 
advice, and review on Management’s performance on maturing these cyber-related programs, based on 
their fiduciary responsibilities to the company. The Management Stakeholders include the executives of 
the organization that are charged with resourcing, staffing, and monitoring the cyber-related programs in 
order to better secure and manage the risks prevalent in its interconnections with business partners. The 
executives are supported by the Cyber Security and Cyber Risk teams in this effort. The Cyber Security 
team is responsible for implementing and maintaining the requisite security controls required under the 
CSF framework, as well as performing regular “health checks” on those controls through the use of 
security management tools and techniques. The Cyber Risk team works closely with the Cyber Security 
group. They are charged with identifying, researching, and providing ways to measure the potential 
likelihood of threats that could impact the company and the CoT as a whole, the degree to which the 
applicable security controls are implemented, and the potential impact to the company and the CoT as a 
whole if a specific security control was not implemented effectively. The Cyber Risk also provides risk 
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reporting, as required under the CoT Governance element, on the relationships between the required 
security controls and the potential impacts where those controls are exposed by cyber-related threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
 
The CoT External Stakeholders (see Figure 2 in Section 5 above) are those companies and other entities 
that are the third-party business interconnections connected to the overarching Cybersecurity CoT and the 
CoT Privacy Authority, which provides assessment and oversight of the privacy compliance of the COT. 
The CoT External Stakeholders are required under the Master Service agreements to implement, manage, 
and maintain robust cybersecurity and cyber risk programs in support of their organizations as well as the 
Cot, and strive to mature those programs over time. These Stakeholders have internal teams that ensure 
that risk analysis and measurement capabilities are in place and providing effective feedback on how the 
organization is managing to the CSF security framework and the executed CoT Master Agreement. They 
are making sure that continuous collaboration with the other members of the CoT takes place to share any 
real and potential security issues that do or could affect the CoT as a whole. These Stakeholders also 
assess the compliance of the company to all appropriate security controls required under the CSF and the 
maturity of the cyber-related programs. They then report on the security and risk management processes 
and practices for both the implementation of the applicable security controls as well as the maturation of 
those internal management control structures. 
 
Other entities, such as the CoT Internal Stakeholders and the CoT External Stakeholders (see Figure 2 in 
Section 5 above), have a very different effect on the success of the implementation of the CoT Risk 
Management Strategy as required under the CoT Master Agreement. They can influence many of the 
business and cultural factors that will aid in both the success of the implementation of the cyber-related 
management programs and their long-term acceptance and maturation. The CoT Risk Management 
Strategy provides the enterprise-level structure of the security controls environment as well as the 
mechanism for the security and risk collaboration within the CoT. Each of these Stakeholder groups 
carries on the risk and compliance assessments of the CoT risk posture and how it impacts their 
organizations. As the CoT Internal Stakeholders and CoT External Stakeholders cooperate to support the 
business interconnections between them, they provide other important feedback on how the cyber-risk 
management programs are operating within the corporation and report on its effectiveness. This 
interchange between the Stakeholder groups is critical to the success of both companies’ cyber risk 
management programs within the CoT. When this collaboration is done well, these Stakeholder groups 
have created a cyber risk management reporting vehicle risk analysis and reporting that will provide 
significant benefits for all members of the CoT. 
 
Key Terms for the Forces Used in the Proposed Conceptual Model Include: 
 
 Cybersecurity Community of Trust: A group or entity (usually led by one entity that 
establishes the community and is considered its owner) that contract together to collaborate and 
create secure business interconnections. This Community’s cybersecurity posture is based on a 
robust set of cybersecurity controls that assist the companies in developing and maturing their 
enterprise cybersecurity and cyber risk programs.  
 Community of Trust Risk Management Strategy: Those cybersecurity and cyber risk practices 
and processes, based on a robust and standard set of cybersecurity controls, that entities must 
implement (as required by legal agreements) in order to participate in the Cybersecurity 
Community of Trust. This Strategy must be applied by all entities to assess, categorize, prioritize, 
and assist in the remediation of cyber risks within the entity as part of strong and mature 
cybersecurity and cyber risk programs. 
 Community of Trust Governance: The contractual management control and risk management 
processes requirements that the members of the Cybersecurity Community of Trust utilize to as 
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part of building, managing, assessing, and reporting on the security and risk postures of the 
Community.   
 Community of Trust Internal Stakeholders: Those functional groups inside the entity 
establishing the Cybersecurity Community of Trust that support, assess, or are the recipients of 
outputs from the cybersecurity and cyber risk programs within the entity and the broader 
Community. 
 Community of Trust External Stakeholders: Those functional groups inside the entity joining 
the Cybersecurity Community of Trust that support, assess, or are the recipients of outputs from 
the cybersecurity and cyber risk programs within the entity and the broader. 
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Artifact 2 – Assessment of the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) Cybersecurity Risk 
Management Solution Compliance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) version 1.1 
As part of the original design intent, the capabilities of the Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) 
cybersecurity risk management solution controls were based on and implemented to comply with the 
initial version of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework 
(CSF), which was published in 2014.  
This control mapping analysis reviews the Reprivata solution’s compliance to the NIST CSF version 1.1, 
which was released in April 2018. This analysis expands on the initial NIST CSF version 1.0 control 
mapping performed on the Reprivata solution in March 2018. 
The NIST CSF Functional Areas are documented in Table 4 of Section 5 of this document. The primary 
change in the NIST CSF Functional Areas from version 1.0 to version 1.1 is the inclusion of controls for 
Supply Chain Management that address security controls related to suppliers, vendors, and other 
interconnected business partners. 
The color code used in the control’s assessment is as follows: 
 Bold Black – Controls that are compliant with the NIST CSF version 1.1 standards.  
 Bold Blue – Controls that, once implemented, can enable the implementation of other related 
controls (such as Access Controls, Physical Security, etc.). 
 Bold Red – Controls that are recommended for inclusion in the Reprivata Master Agreements 
that would enable their implementation by the CoT users. 
The Reprivata cybersecurity risk management control details and descriptions were provided by the 
Reprivata application design and supporting documentation as of April 2018 and from interviews with 
Reprivata’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Technology Officer from January 2018 to August 2018. 
Overview of Reprivata CoT NIST CSF Compliance Assessment 
NIST CSF  
Functional Area 
Reprivata CoT 
Solution 
Compliant with 
Key Controls 
Technology 
Controls 
Enabling  
Controls 
Master 
Agreement 
Controls 
Identify 15 out of 29 key 
controls 
5 14 10 
Protect 18 out of 39 key 
controls 
12 21 6 
Detect 15 out of 18 key 
controls 
11 3 4 
Respond 13 out of 15 key 
controls 
3 2 10 
Recover 4 out of 6 key  
controls 
0 2 4 
Total 65 out of 107 key 
controls 
31 42 34 
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NIST CSF Key Controls Key NIST 
CSF 
Controls for 
Program 
Implementat
ion 
Reprivata 
CoT 
Compliance 
with NIST 
CSF Key 
Controls 
Reprivata 
CoT 
Support for 
NIST CSF 
Key 
Controls  
Areas where 
other 
solutions 
could 
support 
Reprivata 
CoT 
1. Identify – Develop an 
organizational understanding to 
manage cybersecurity risk to 
systems, people, assets, data, and 
capabilities. The activities in the 
Identify Function are 
foundational for effective use of 
the Framework. Understanding 
the business context, the 
resources that support critical 
functions, and the related 
cybersecurity risks enables an 
organization to focus and 
prioritize its efforts, consistent 
with its risk management strategy 
and business needs. (28 key 
controls) 
    
a. Asset Management 
(ID.AM): The data, 
personnel, devices, 
systems, and facilities 
that enable the 
organization to achieve 
business purposes are 
identified and managed 
consistent with their 
relative importance to 
organizational objectives 
and the organization’s 
risk strategy. 
    
i. ID.AM-1: 
Physical 
devices and 
systems within 
the organization 
are inventoried 
Asset 
management 
application or 
capabilities are 
in place for 
network, 
desktop, server, 
and mobile 
devices. 
Reprivata CoT 
identifies end 
users and 
attached devices 
through the use 
of certificates 
during 
provisioning of 
devices and for 
access control 
for end users 
and devices. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Configuration 
management 
databases can 
provide this type 
of device 
information. 
ii. ID.AM-2: 
Software 
platforms and 
applications 
within the 
organization are 
inventoried 
Software 
management 
application or 
capabilities are 
in place for 
enterprise and 
workgroup 
applications for 
network, 
Reprivata’s 
software 
components are 
documented in 
the 
Underwriter’s 
Laboratory 
certification 
report. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Software 
licensing and 
management 
databases can 
provide this type 
of device 
information. 
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desktop, server, 
and mobile 
devices. 
 
iii. ID.AM-3: 
Organization
al 
communicati
on and data 
flows are 
mapped 
Data flows and 
communication 
paths have been 
mapped for 
critical business 
functions. 
 
Data flows are 
included in all 
business process 
documentation. 
 
Data flows are 
included in all 
business 
continuity plans. 
Reprivata’s CoT 
data flows are 
captured in the 
software 
documentation 
prepared for the 
UL certification 
process. 
 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Enterprise 
network 
management 
systems have the 
capability to 
create network 
communication 
maps. 
iv. ID.AM-4: 
External 
information 
systems are 
catalogued 
Asset and 
software 
management 
applications or 
capabilities are 
in place for 
external 
information 
systems not 
directly managed 
by internal 
company 
personnel 
External 
software 
requirements 
for the 
Reprivata CoT 
solution are 
captured in the 
software 
documentation 
prepared for the 
UL certification 
process. 
 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Configuration 
management 
databases can 
provide this type 
of device 
information. 
 
Software 
licensing and 
management 
databases can 
provide this type 
of device 
information. 
 
v. ID.AM-5: 
Resources 
(e.g., 
hardware, 
devices, data, 
time, 
personnel, 
and software) 
are 
prioritized 
based on 
their 
classification
, criticality, 
and business 
value  
Hardware and 
software 
resources are 
prioritized by 
function and 
included in 
business 
continuity plans. 
 
A data 
classification 
program is in 
place and 
regularly 
reviewed. 
 
Technology and 
operational risk 
assessments are 
performed 
regularly. 
 
Resource 
classification 
policies and 
procedures are 
implemented as 
part of the 
organization’s 
cybersecurity 
risk 
management 
program. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
these policies 
and procedures 
and provides 
information that 
can be used to 
determine data 
classification, 
criticality, and 
business value. 
Cybersecurity 
policies and 
procedures can 
be created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer 
cybersecurity 
awareness and 
training software 
as well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
 
Training for 
creating 
cybersecurity 
policies and 
procedures is 
available with a 
variety of online 
and in-person 
sessions. 
 
vi. ID.AM-6: 
Cybersecurit
y roles and 
Security 
responsibilities 
for internal 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Cybersecurity 
roles and 
responsibilities 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
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responsibiliti
es for the 
entire 
workforce 
and third-
party 
stakeholders 
(e.g., 
suppliers, 
customers, 
partners) are 
established 
personnel, 
external 
partners, and 
other stakeholder 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and regularly 
reviewed. 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
are defined in 
corporate 
policy. The 
Reprivata 
solution enables 
these 
cybersecurity 
roles and 
responsibilities 
to be used 
effectively to 
protect 
sensitive data 
and 
collaborations 
with business 
partners. 
 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
b. Business Environment 
(ID.BE): The 
organization’s mission, 
objectives, stakeholders, 
and activities are 
understood and 
prioritized; this 
information is used to 
inform cybersecurity 
roles, responsibilities, and 
risk management 
decisions. 
    
i. ID.BE-1: The 
organization’s 
role in the 
supply chain is 
identified and 
communicated 
Senior 
management has 
created 
appropriate 
tactical and 
strategic 
responsibilities 
for the supply 
chain 
management 
program and 
communicated 
that information 
to the 
appropriate 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
the enterprise’s 
cybersecurity 
responsibilities 
related to 
supply chain 
management by 
providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities for 
the CoT users. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
ii. ID.BE-2: The 
organization’s 
place in critical 
infrastructure 
and its industry 
sector is 
identified and 
communicated 
Senior 
management has 
created 
appropriate 
tactical and 
strategic 
responsibilities 
for the supply 
chain 
management 
The assignment 
and 
communication 
of supply chain 
management 
responsibilities 
require senior 
management 
input and 
approval. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of supply chain 
management 
responsibilities 
to stakeholders 
by providing 
encrypted data 
Supply chain 
management 
strategies and 
tactical 
procedures can 
be created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer supply 
chain 
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program and 
communicated 
that information 
to the 
appropriate 
stakeholders. 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
management 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
iii. ID.BE-3: 
Priorities for 
organizational 
mission, 
objectives, and 
activities are 
established and 
communicated 
Senior 
management has 
created 
appropriate 
tactical and 
strategic 
responsibilities 
for the supply 
chain 
management 
program and 
communicated 
that information 
to the 
appropriate 
stakeholders. 
The 
prioritization 
and 
communication 
of supply chain 
management 
goals and 
objectives 
require senior 
management 
input and 
approval. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of supply chain 
management 
goals and 
objectives to 
stakeholders by 
providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
Supply chain 
management 
strategies and 
tactical 
procedures can 
be created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer supply 
chain 
management 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
iv. ID.BE-4: 
Dependencies 
and critical 
functions for 
delivery of 
critical services 
are established 
Critical services 
have been 
identified and 
the dependencies 
on those services 
are documented. 
 
Critical service 
dependencies are 
documented by 
function and 
included in 
business 
continuity plans. 
The critical 
service delivery 
requirements 
must be created 
and approved 
by key 
management 
stakeholders. 
These 
requirements 
must be 
included in 
business 
resiliency and 
recovery plans.  
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholder 
when 
discussing 
mission-critical 
service delivery 
requirements. 
Service delivery 
strategies and 
business 
resiliency 
procedures can 
be created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer business 
resilience 
management 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
v. ID.BE-5: 
Resilience 
requirements to 
support 
delivery of 
critical services 
are established 
for all operating 
states (e.g. 
under 
duress/attack, 
during 
recovery, 
normal 
operations) 
Critical service 
dependencies are 
documented by 
function and 
included in 
business 
continuity plans. 
The critical 
service delivery 
requirements 
must be created 
and approved 
by key 
management 
stakeholders. 
These 
requirements 
must be 
included in 
business 
resiliency and 
recovery plans.  
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholder 
when 
discussing 
mission-critical 
service delivery 
requirements. 
Service delivery 
strategies and 
business 
resiliency 
procedures can 
be created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer business 
resilience 
management 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
c. Governance (ID.GV): 
The policies, procedures, 
and processes to manage 
and monitor the 
organization’s regulatory, 
legal, risk, environmental, 
and operational 
requirements are 
understood and inform 
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the management of 
cybersecurity risk. 
i. ID.GV-1: 
Organizational 
cybersecurity 
policy is 
established and 
communicated 
Senior 
management has 
established a 
cybersecurity 
program and 
assigned 
leadership for 
the function. 
 
Cybersecurity 
program 
information is 
regularly 
communicated to 
the appropriate 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholder 
when 
discussing the 
governance of 
the 
cybersecurity 
organization 
and its 
operation. 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
ii. ID.GV-2: 
Cybersecurity 
roles and 
responsibilities 
are coordinated 
and aligned 
with internal 
roles and 
external 
partners 
Senior 
management has 
established a 
cybersecurity 
program and 
assigned 
leadership for 
the function. 
 
Cybersecurity 
program 
requirements 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
internal and 
external 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
governance of 
the 
cybersecurity 
requirements 
for all CoT 
users. 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iii. ID.GV-3: Legal 
and regulatory 
requirements 
regarding 
cybersecurity, 
including 
privacy and 
civil liberties 
obligations, are 
understood and 
managed 
Cybersecurity 
program 
compliance and 
legal 
requirements 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement is a 
legal document 
that can be 
customized as 
required by the 
CoT owner so 
the appropriate 
security, 
operational, and 
policy 
requirements 
are in place for 
all CoT users. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
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collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iv. ID.GV-4: 
Governance 
and risk 
management 
processes 
address 
cybersecurity 
risks 
Cybersecurity 
governance risk 
management and 
review processes 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
risk 
management 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
governance and 
measurement of 
the 
cybersecurity 
risk 
management 
program. 
 
Cybersecurity 
risk management 
programs and 
measurements 
can be created 
and evaluated by 
companies that 
offer 
Governance, 
Risk, and 
Compliance 
(GRC) 
management 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
d. Risk Assessment 
(ID.RA): The 
organization understands 
the cybersecurity risk to 
organizational operations 
(including mission, 
functions, image, or 
reputation), 
organizational assets, and 
individuals. 
    
i. ID.RA-1: Asset 
vulnerabilities 
are identified 
and 
documented 
A vulnerability 
management, 
assessment, and 
remediation 
process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
implemented. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
vulnerability 
management 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the 
vulnerability 
management 
program. 
 
Cybersecurity 
risk management 
programs and 
measurements 
can be created 
and evaluated by 
companies that 
offer 
vulnerability 
management 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
ii. ID.RA-2: Cyber 
threat 
intelligence is 
received from 
information 
sharing forums 
and sources 
A threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
External threat 
intelligence and 
vulnerability 
databases can 
provide this type 
of threat and 
vulnerability 
information. 
 
Security 
Information and 
Event 
Monitoring 
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(SIEM) software 
and analytics 
tools can 
provide this type 
of device 
information. 
 
iii. ID.RA-3: 
Threats, both 
internal and 
external, are 
identified and 
documented 
A threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
program. 
 
 
Cybersecurity 
threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
iv. ID.RA-4: 
Potential 
business 
impacts and 
likelihoods are 
identified 
A threat and 
vulnerability 
research and 
evaluation 
process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
program. 
 
Cybersecurity 
threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
v. ID.RA-5: 
Threats, 
vulnerabilities, 
likelihoods, and 
impacts are 
used to 
determine risk 
A threat and 
vulnerability 
research and 
evaluation 
process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
program. 
 
Cybersecurity 
threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer threat 
assessment and 
intelligence 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
vi. ID.RA-6: Risk 
responses are 
identified and 
prioritized 
A risk 
management and 
communication 
program is 
documented, 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
The Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement is a 
legal document 
that can be 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
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implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
customized as 
required by the 
CoT owner so 
the appropriate 
risk 
management 
response and 
communication 
requirements 
are in place for 
all CoT users. 
 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
e. Risk Management 
Strategy (ID.RM): The 
organization’s priorities, 
constraints, risk 
tolerances, and 
assumptions are 
established and used to 
support operational risk 
decisions. 
    
i. ID.RM-1: Risk 
management 
processes are 
established, 
managed, and 
agreed to by 
organizational 
stakeholders 
Senior 
management has 
established a risk 
management and 
communication 
program and 
assigned 
leadership for 
the function. 
 
A risk 
management and 
communication 
program is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
risk 
management 
strategy and 
assign 
appropriate 
leadership that 
is consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
risk 
management 
cybersecurity 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the 
cybersecurity 
risk 
management 
strategy. 
 
Cybersecurity 
risk management 
strategies can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms. 
ii. ID.RM-2: 
Organizational 
risk tolerance is 
determined and 
clearly 
expressed 
An operational 
risk management 
and 
communication 
program is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement an 
operational risk 
management 
strategy and 
assign 
appropriate 
leadership that 
is consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
operational risk 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the 
operational risk 
Cybersecurity 
risk management 
strategies can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms. 
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management 
strategy. 
 
iii. ID.RM-3: The 
organization’s 
determination 
of risk tolerance 
is informed by 
its role in 
critical 
infrastructure 
and sector 
specific risk 
analysis 
Senior 
management has 
established a risk 
tolerance and 
posture based on 
the analysis of 
its technology 
footprint, 
industry 
position, and 
other critical 
business 
indicators. 
 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
risk posture that 
is consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
overall risk 
appetite. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
risk 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
corporate risk 
posture. 
 
Cybersecurity 
risk management 
postures can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms. 
f. Supply Chain Risk 
Management (ID.SC): 
The organization’s 
priorities, constraints, risk 
tolerances, and 
assumptions are 
established and used to 
support risk decisions 
associated with managing 
supply chain risk. The 
organization has 
established and 
implemented the 
processes to identify, 
assess and manage supply 
chain risks. 
    
i. ID.SC-1: Cyber 
supply chain 
risk 
management 
processes are 
identified, 
established, 
assessed, 
managed, and 
agreed to by 
organizational 
stakeholders 
Senior 
management has 
established a 
supply chain 
management 
program and 
assigned 
leadership for 
the function. 
 
A risk 
management and 
communication 
program is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
The 
establishment, 
agreement, and 
communication 
of supply chain 
cybersecurity 
risk 
management 
responsibilities 
require senior 
management 
and key 
stakeholders 
input and 
approval. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of supply chain 
management 
cybersecurity 
risk 
management 
responsibilities 
to stakeholders 
by providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
Supply chain 
management 
strategies and 
tactical 
procedures can 
be created and 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer supply 
chain 
management 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms. 
 
ii. ID.SC-2: 
Suppliers and 
third party 
partners of 
information 
systems, 
components, 
Cybersecurity 
risk management 
and review 
processes for 
critical suppliers 
have been 
documented, 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of supply chain 
management 
cybersecurity 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
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and services are 
identified, 
prioritized, and 
assessed using a 
cyber supply 
chain risk 
assessment 
process  
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
risk assessment 
responsibilities 
to third parties 
by providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iii. ID.SC-3: 
Contracts with 
suppliers and 
third-party 
partners are 
used to 
implement 
appropriate 
measures 
designed to 
meet the 
objectives of an 
organization’s 
cybersecurity 
program and 
Cyber Supply 
Chain Risk 
Management 
Plan 
Cybersecurity 
legal 
requirements for 
suppliers have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of contractual 
obligations 
related to 
supply chain 
management 
cybersecurity 
responsibilities 
by providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iv. ID.SC-4: 
Suppliers and 
third-party 
partners are 
routinely 
assessed using 
audits, test 
results, or other 
forms of 
evaluations to 
confirm they 
are meeting 
their 
contractual 
obligations 
Cybersecurity 
legal and 
regulatory 
compliance 
requirements for 
suppliers have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of contractual 
obligations 
related to 
supply chain 
management 
cybersecurity 
audit and 
assessments 
responsibilities 
and reporting 
by providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
v. ID.SC-5: 
Response and 
recovery 
planning and 
testing are 
Incident 
response, 
recovery, and 
management 
requirements for 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of contractual 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
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conducted with 
suppliers and 
third-party 
providers 
suppliers have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
obligations 
related to 
supply chain 
management 
business 
resiliency 
testing and 
reporting 
responsibilities 
by providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
2. Protect – Develop and implement 
appropriate safeguards to ensure 
delivery of critical services. The 
Protect Function supports the 
ability to limit or contain the 
impact of a potential 
cybersecurity event. (39 key 
controls) 
    
a. Identity Management, 
Authentication and 
Access Control (PR.AC): 
Access to physical and 
logical assets and 
associated facilities is 
limited to authorized 
users, processes, and 
devices, and is managed 
consistent with the 
assessed risk of 
unauthorized access to 
authorized activities and 
transactions. 
    
i. PR.AC-1: 
Identities and 
credentials are 
issued, 
managed, 
verified, 
revoked, and 
audited for 
authorized 
devices, users 
and processes 
An identity and 
access 
management, 
review, and 
assessment 
program has 
been have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
identifies end 
users and 
attached devices 
through the use 
of certificates 
during 
provisioning of 
devices and for 
access control 
for end users 
and devices. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Identity and 
access 
management 
systems can 
provide this type 
of user and 
device access 
information. 
 
Security log 
management 
software and 
analytics tools 
can provide this 
type of user and 
device access 
information. 
 
ii. PR.AC-2: 
Physical access 
to assets is 
managed and 
protected 
Physical access 
requirements for 
facilities where 
information and 
technology 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
Physical security 
access 
management 
programs can be 
created and 
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assets are stored 
and managed 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
physical security 
access 
management 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with physical 
security access 
management 
program. 
 
evaluated by 
companies that 
offer physical 
assess control 
software as well 
as by external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
physical 
security. 
 
iii. PR.AC-3: 
Remote access 
is managed 
User and service 
remote access to 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
requires end 
users and 
attached devices 
to connect 
through the use 
of encrypted 
virtual private 
network tunnels. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Remote access 
software can 
provide this type 
of functionality. 
 
Next-generation 
firewalls can 
provide this type 
of functionality. 
iv. PR.AC-4: 
Access 
permissions and 
authorizations 
are managed, 
incorporating 
the principles of 
least privilege 
and separation 
of duties 
User identities, 
roles, 
permissions, and 
access 
requirements 
that ensure that 
the only 
minimum 
necessary access 
to technology 
assets is granted 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
enables access 
control 
permissions for 
end users and 
attached devices 
through the use 
of certificates. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Identity and 
access 
management 
systems can 
provide this type 
user and device 
access 
information. 
 
 
v. PR.AC-5: 
Network 
integrity is 
protected (e.g., 
network 
segregation, 
network 
segmentation) 
Network 
architecture 
requirements to 
implement 
secure network 
design and 
connectivity 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
includes 
network 
segregation and 
segmentation 
capabilities as 
part of the 
implemented 
cybersecurity 
trusted and 
closed network 
control 
structure. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network device 
configuration 
controls and 
device 
management 
software 
provides this 
type of 
functionality. 
vi. PR.AC-6: 
Identities are 
proofed and 
bound to 
credentials and 
User identities, 
permissions, and 
access 
requirements 
that ensure that 
Reprivata CoT 
identifies end 
users and 
attached devices 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
Identity and 
access 
management 
systems can 
provide this type 
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asserted in 
interactions 
only authorized 
users have 
access to 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
through the use 
of certificates. 
the Reprivata 
solution 
user and device 
access 
information. 
 
vii. R.AC-7: Users, 
devices, and 
other assets are 
authenticated 
(e.g., single-
factor, multi-
factor) 
commensurate 
with the risk of 
the transaction 
(e.g., 
individuals’ 
security and 
privacy risks 
and other 
organizational 
risks) 
The use of user 
authentication 
mechanisms for 
user access to 
technology 
assets is based 
on the risks 
inherent to the 
specific user role 
and technology 
asset type has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
enables access 
control 
permissions for 
end users and 
attached devices 
through the use 
of certificates. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Identity and 
access 
management 
systems can 
provide this type 
user and device 
access 
information. 
 
Multi-factor 
authentication 
systems provide 
this type of user 
and device 
functionality. 
 
b. Awareness and Training 
(PR.AT): The 
organization’s personnel 
and partners are provided 
cybersecurity awareness 
education and are trained 
to perform their 
cybersecurity-related 
duties and responsibilities 
consistent with related 
policies, procedures, and 
agreements. 
    
i. PR.AT-1: All 
users are 
informed and 
trained  
A cybersecurity 
awareness 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
cybersecurity 
awareness 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
internal and 
external 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
cybersecurity 
risks. 
 
Cybersecurity 
awareness 
training can be 
obtained from 
companies that 
offer 
cybersecurity 
awareness and 
training software 
as well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
 
Cybersecurity 
awareness 
training is 
available with a 
variety of online 
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and in-person 
sessions. 
 
ii. PR.AT-2: 
Privileged users 
understand their 
roles and 
responsibilities  
Privileged and 
administrative 
user identities, 
roles, 
permissions, 
responsibilities, 
and access 
requirements for 
information and 
technology 
assets is granted 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Cybersecurity 
management is 
required to 
create the roles 
and 
responsibilities 
for privileged 
users such as 
system 
administrators 
and network 
analysts. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by 
privileged uses 
when 
discussing their 
roles and 
responsibilities 
related to 
cybersecurity. 
 
Privileged user 
responsibilities 
can be created 
and evaluated by 
device and 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
iii. PR.AT-3: 
Third-party 
stakeholders 
(e.g., suppliers, 
customers, 
partners) 
understand their 
roles and 
responsibilities  
Supplier and 
other third party 
identities, roles, 
permissions, 
responsibilities, 
and access 
requirements for 
information and 
technology 
assets is granted 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
communication 
of third party 
contractual 
obligations 
related to data 
and system 
protection 
responsibilities 
by providing 
encrypted data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iv. PR.AT-4: 
Senior 
executives 
understand their 
roles and 
responsibilities  
Senior executive 
identities, roles, 
permissions, 
responsibilities, 
and access 
requirements for 
information and 
technology 
assets is granted 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create, 
document, and 
implement an 
executive-level 
cybersecurity 
responsibilities 
management 
and reporting 
system that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by 
senior 
executives and 
upper 
management 
when 
discussing their 
cybersecurity 
responsibilities. 
 
Executive-level 
cybersecurity 
responsibilities 
training can be 
obtained from 
companies that 
offer 
cybersecurity 
training software 
as well as from 
external 
consulting firms. 
 
Cybersecurity 
awareness 
training is 
available with a 
variety of online 
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and in-person 
sessions. 
 
v. PR.AT-5: 
Physical and 
cybersecurity 
personnel 
understand their 
roles and 
responsibilities  
Physical security 
personnel 
identities, roles, 
permissions, 
responsibilities, 
and access 
requirements for 
information and 
technology 
assets is granted 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
physical security 
management 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with physical 
security 
management 
program. 
 
Physical security 
management 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
physical 
security. 
 
c. Data Security (PR.DS): 
Information and records 
(data) are managed 
consistent with the 
organization’s risk 
strategy to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of 
information. 
    
i. PR.DS-1: Data-
at-rest is 
protected 
Data encryption 
requirements for 
all electronic 
information 
assets residing 
on technology 
platforms and 
other devices 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
implements 
multi-level 
encryption for 
data at rest. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
No applicable 
external 
solutions are 
available since 
the Reprivata 
CoT implements 
government-
level encryption 
in the software 
solution. 
ii. PR.DS-2: Data-
in-transit is 
protected 
Data encryption 
requirements for 
all electronic 
information 
assets being 
transmitted over 
insecure 
networks or 
where such 
encryption is 
specified by 
legal agreements 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
Reprivata CoT 
requires end 
users and 
attached devices 
to connect 
through the use 
of encrypted 
virtual private 
network tunnels. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF. 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
No applicable 
external 
solutions are 
available since 
the Reprivata 
CoT implements 
government-
level encryption 
in the software 
solution. 
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and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
iii. PR.DS-3: 
Assets are 
formally 
managed 
throughout 
removal, 
transfers, and 
disposition 
An information 
and technology 
asset refresh, 
removal, and 
replacement 
management 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
computer and 
technology asset 
management 
program. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
management of 
critical 
technology 
assets that are 
members of the 
CoT by 
ensuring 
security 
management 
and tracking of 
those assets. 
 
Configuration 
management 
databases can 
provide device 
inventory 
reporting. 
 
Asset tracking 
and reporting 
software can 
enhance 
technology asset 
management and 
replacement. 
 
iv. PR.DS-4: 
Adequate 
capacity to 
ensure 
availability is 
maintained 
A technology 
capacity 
assessment and 
management 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
computer and 
technology asset 
capacity 
management 
program. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
visibility of the 
technology 
assets that are 
members of the 
CoT by 
ensuring 
security 
tracking of 
those assets 
while they are 
logged into the 
CoT. 
 
Network and 
system capacity 
planning 
software can 
enhance 
technology 
availability and 
integrity by 
ensure the 
devices are sized 
appropriately for 
the functions 
they perform. 
 
v. PR.DS-5: 
Protections 
against data 
leaks are 
implemented 
A data leakage 
assessment and 
protection 
management 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
implements 
multi-level 
encryption for 
data at rest. 
 
Reprivata CoT 
requires end 
users and 
attached devices 
to connect 
through the use 
of encrypted 
virtual private 
network tunnels. 
 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Data Loss 
Prevention 
(DLP) software 
can provide this 
type of 
functionality. 
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Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
vi. PR.DS-6: 
Integrity 
checking 
mechanisms are 
used to verify 
software, 
firmware, and 
information 
integrity 
A file and 
system integrity 
assessment and 
protection 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
Management is 
required to 
create and 
implement file 
and information 
integrity 
monitoring 
capabilities for 
securing critical 
data and 
systems. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
visibility of the 
technology 
assets that are 
members of the 
CoT by 
ensuring 
security 
tracking of 
those assets 
while they are 
logged into the 
CoT. 
 
File Integrity 
Monitoring 
(FIM) software 
can provide this 
type of 
functionality. 
vii. PR.DS-7: The 
development 
and testing 
environment(s) 
are separate 
from the 
production 
environment 
Separate 
production, 
quality 
assurance, and 
testing 
environments 
have been 
implemented and 
their usage 
requirements 
have been 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
management is 
required to 
implement 
separate 
development 
and production 
and 
environments 
for applications. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
the ability to 
segregate 
development 
and production 
environments. 
Separate 
development and 
production 
environments 
can be provided 
by external 
hosting or cloud 
service 
providers. 
viii. PR.DS-8: 
Integrity 
checking 
mechanisms are 
used to verify 
hardware 
integrity 
A file and 
system integrity 
assessment and 
protection 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
Management is 
required to 
create and 
implement 
hardware 
integrity 
monitoring 
capabilities for 
securing critical 
data and 
systems. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
visibility of the 
technology 
assets that are 
members of the 
CoT by 
ensuring 
security 
tracking of 
those assets 
while they are 
logged into the 
CoT. 
 
Hardware 
integrity 
monitoring 
(HIM) software 
can provide this 
type of 
functionality. 
d. Information Protection 
Processes and Procedures 
(PR.IP): Security policies 
(that address purpose, 
scope, roles, 
responsibilities, 
management 
commitment, and 
coordination among 
organizational entities), 
processes, and procedures 
are maintained and used 
to manage protection of 
    
 114 
 
information systems and 
assets. 
i. PR.IP-1: A 
baseline 
configuration of 
information 
technology/indu
strial control 
systems is 
created and 
maintained 
incorporating 
security 
principles (e.g. 
concept of least 
functionality) 
A minimum 
baseline 
configuration 
program for all 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Base 
configuration of 
Reprivata CoT 
solution are 
included in the 
software 
documentation 
prepared for the 
UL certification 
process. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Configuration 
management 
databases can 
provide device 
configuration 
reporting on 
compliance with 
internal and 
external 
configuration 
standards. 
 
ii. PR.IP-2: A 
System 
Development 
Life Cycle to 
manage 
systems is 
implemented 
A systems 
development, 
assessment, and 
management life 
cycle for all 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
Management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
Systems 
Development 
Life Cycle for 
the software 
design, creation, 
and 
implementation 
functions. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
the segregation 
and 
segmentation of 
application 
systems under 
development to 
support a 
Systems 
Development 
Life Cycle 
(SDLC). 
 
Companies can 
get assistance in 
creating and 
implementing a 
SDLC from 
software 
programming 
and development 
training 
companies as 
well as from 
external 
consulting firms. 
 
iii. PR.IP-3: 
Configuration 
change control 
processes are in 
place 
A change control 
management 
program for all 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
Management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
change 
management 
and control 
function for 
tracking 
changes to 
applications, 
devices, and 
other technology 
assets. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
changes made 
to applications 
and other 
technologies 
managed by the 
company. 
Change 
management 
software can 
provide this type 
of functionality. 
iv. PR.IP-4: 
Backups of 
information are 
conducted, 
maintained, and 
tested  
A backup and 
data archival 
management 
program for all 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
data backup and 
archival 
program to 
ensure the 
security of 
critical business 
data. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
critical data 
protection 
within the CoT 
so it can be 
archived and 
secured by the 
backup 
program. 
Backup and data 
archival 
software can 
provide this type 
of functionality. 
v. PR.IP-5: Policy 
and regulations 
Physical security 
policies and 
Senior 
management is 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
Physical security 
management 
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regarding the 
physical 
operating 
environment for 
organizational 
assets are met 
procedures for 
ensuring security 
of facilities have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
physical security 
management 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the 
physical 
security 
management 
program. 
 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
physical 
security. 
 
vi. PR.IP-6: Data 
is destroyed 
according to 
policy 
A data 
destruction 
policy and 
supporting 
program have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
data destruction 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with data 
destruction. 
 
Data destruction 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
data 
management and 
archival firms as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
data 
management. 
 
vii. PR.IP-7: 
Protection 
processes are 
improved 
Information and 
technology asset 
protection 
policies and 
procedures are 
regularly 
reviewed to 
determine what 
enhancements 
are required to 
meet 
cybersecurity 
risk management 
requirements and 
any 
enhancements 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement is a 
legal document 
that can be 
customized as 
required by the 
CoT owner so 
the appropriate 
security, 
operational, and 
policy 
requirements 
are in place for 
all CoT users. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
viii. PR.IP-8: 
Effectiveness of 
protection 
technologies is 
shared  
The use and 
management of 
information and 
technology 
protection 
controls have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
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and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
responsibilities 
for improving 
cybersecurity 
protection 
processes over 
time. 
 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
ix. PR.IP-9: 
Response plans 
(Incident 
Response and 
Business 
Continuity) and 
recovery plans 
(Incident 
Recovery and 
Disaster 
Recovery) are 
in place and 
managed 
Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for 
implementing 
and managing 
business 
resiliency and 
incident 
response plans. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
x. PR.IP-10: 
Response and 
recovery plans 
are tested 
Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
tested and the 
results of those 
tests have been 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for testing and 
reporting test 
results for 
business 
resiliency and 
incident 
response plans. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
xi. PR.IP-11: 
Cybersecurity 
is included in 
human 
resources 
practices (e.g., 
deprovisioning, 
Personnel 
screening 
policies and 
procedures have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
personnel 
screening 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
Personnel 
screening 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
personnel 
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personnel 
screening) 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the 
company’s 
personnel. 
 
screening and 
consulting firms. 
 
xii. PR.IP-12: A 
vulnerability 
management 
plan is 
developed and 
implemented 
A cybersecurity 
vulnerability risk 
assessment, 
testing, and 
management 
program for 
information and 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
system and 
application 
vulnerability 
management 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with system 
and application 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Vulnerability 
management 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
vulnerability 
management 
software firms 
as well as by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
data 
management. 
 
e. Maintenance (PR.MA): 
Maintenance and repairs 
of industrial control and 
information system 
components are 
performed consistent with 
policies and procedures. 
    
i. PR.MA-1: 
Maintenance 
and repair of 
organizational 
assets are 
performed and 
logged, with 
approved and 
controlled tools 
A maintenance 
and management 
program for 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
device 
maintenance 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with device 
maintenance 
and repair. 
 
Device 
maintenance and 
repair programs 
can be created 
and evaluated by 
equipment 
management 
companies that 
maintain and 
repair equipment 
for other firms. 
ii. PR.MA-2: 
Remote 
maintenance of 
organizational 
assets is 
approved, 
logged, and 
performed in a 
manner that 
prevents 
unauthorized 
access 
User and service 
remote access to 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
device 
maintenance 
program, to 
include remote 
access to those 
devices where 
applicable, that 
is consistent 
with the 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with remote 
device 
maintenance 
and repair. 
Device 
maintenance and 
repair programs 
can be created 
and evaluated by 
equipment 
management 
companies that 
maintain and 
repair equipment 
for other firms. 
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organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
 
f. Protective Technology 
(PR.PT): Technical 
security solutions are 
managed to ensure the 
security and resilience of 
systems and assets, 
consistent with related 
policies, procedures, and 
agreements. 
    
i. PR.PT-1: 
Audit/log 
records are 
determined, 
documented, 
implemented, 
and reviewed in 
accordance 
with policy 
Audit logs and 
records related 
to access and 
management of 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and reviewed on 
a regular basis to 
help detect and 
prevent 
cybersecurity 
events. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for reviewing 
audit logs 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
ii. PR.PT-2: 
Removable 
media is 
protected and 
its use restricted 
according to 
policy 
A data leakage 
assessment and 
protection 
management 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
data leakage 
and loss 
prevention 
program, to 
include control 
over removable 
media, where 
applicable, that 
is consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with data 
leakage and 
loss prevention. 
 
Data leakage 
and loss 
prevention 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
data leakage 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
iii. PR.PT-3: The 
principle of 
least 
functionality is 
incorporated by 
configuring 
systems to 
provide only 
essential 
capabilities 
Technology 
asset roles and 
service 
requirements 
that ensure that 
the only 
minimum 
necessary 
configuration of 
technology 
Base 
configuration of 
Reprivata CoT 
solution are 
included in the 
software 
documentation 
prepared for the 
UL certification 
process. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Definition of 
user roles and 
responsibilities 
and the 
application of 
the concept of 
least privilege 
for system 
credentials can 
be created and 
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assets is in place 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms. 
iv. PR.PT-4: 
Communication
s and control 
networks are 
protected 
Network 
architecture 
requirements to 
implement 
secure network 
design and 
connectivity 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Security reviews 
of network 
communication 
and control 
networks for can 
be performed 
and evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms. 
v. PR.PT-5: 
Mechanisms 
(e.g., failsafe, 
load balancing, 
hot swap) are 
implemented to 
achieve 
resilience 
requirements in 
normal and 
adverse 
situations 
Network 
architecture 
requirements to 
implement 
secure network 
design and 
connectivity 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement 
network 
resiliency 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with network 
resiliency. 
 
Network 
resiliency 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
network 
equipment as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
3. Detect – Develop and implement 
appropriate activities to identify 
the occurrence of a cybersecurity 
event. The Detect Function 
enables timely discovery of 
cybersecurity events. (18 key 
controls) 
    
a. Anomalies and Events 
(DE.AE): Anomalous 
activity is detected and 
the potential impact of 
events is understood. 
    
i. DE.AE-1: A 
baseline of 
network 
operations and 
expected data 
flows for users 
and systems is 
established and 
managed 
Network data 
flows and 
communication 
paths have been 
mapped for 
critical business 
functions. 
 
Data flows are 
included in all 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and 
operations 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network 
management 
software 
companies as 
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business process 
documentation. 
 
Data flows are 
included in all 
business 
continuity plans. 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
ii. DE.AE-2: 
Detected events 
are analyzed to 
understand 
attack targets 
and methods 
A threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
information 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network threat 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
iii. DE.AE-3: 
Event data are 
collected and 
correlated from 
multiple 
sources and 
sensors 
A threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
information 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network threat 
and incident 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
iv. DE.AE-4: 
Impact of 
events is 
determined 
A threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
information 
impact 
assessments can 
be performed 
and evaluated by 
network threat 
and incident 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
v. DE.AE-5: 
Incident alert 
thresholds are 
established 
A threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
information 
alerts and 
assessments can 
be performed 
and evaluated by 
network threat 
and incident 
management 
software 
companies as 
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Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
b. Security Continuous 
Monitoring (DE.CM): 
The information system 
and assets are monitored 
to identify cybersecurity 
events and verify the 
effectiveness of 
protective measures. 
    
i. DE.CM-1: The 
network is 
monitored to 
detect potential 
cybersecurity 
events 
A network 
monitoring 
program for 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
monitoring 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network threat 
and incident 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
ii. DE.CM-2: The 
physical 
environment is 
monitored to 
detect potential 
cybersecurity 
events 
A physical 
security 
monitoring 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
physical security 
monitoring 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with physical 
security 
monitoring. 
 
Physical security 
monitoring 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
physical 
security. 
 
iii. DE.CM-3: 
Personnel 
activity is 
monitored to 
detect potential 
cybersecurity 
events 
A personnel 
monitoring 
program for the 
use of 
information and 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Personnel 
activity and 
security 
monitoring 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms. 
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communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
iv. DE.CM-4: 
Malicious code 
is detected 
A secure coding 
and testing 
program for 
systems 
development has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
An anti-virus 
and malware 
protection 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
malicious code 
detection and 
prevention 
program, to 
include secure 
coding training, 
where 
applicable, that 
is consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks malicious 
code detection 
and prevention. 
 
Malicious code 
detection and 
prevention and 
secure coding 
training 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
security 
application 
testing software 
companies, as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
v. DE.CM-5: 
Unauthorized 
mobile code is 
detected 
A secure coding 
and testing 
program for 
systems 
development has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
An anti-virus 
and malware 
protection 
program has 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Technology 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
malicious code 
detection and 
prevention 
program, to 
include secure 
coding training, 
where 
applicable, that 
is consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks malicious 
code detection 
and prevention. 
 
Malicious code 
detection and 
prevention and 
secure coding 
training 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
security 
application 
testing software 
companies, as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
vi. DE.CM-6: 
External service 
provider 
activity is 
monitored to 
An external 
support and 
service provider 
monitoring 
program for the 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
Network data 
flow and event 
monitoring alerts 
and assessments 
can be 
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detect potential 
cybersecurity 
events 
use of 
information and 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
the Reprivata 
solution 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network threat 
and incident 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
vii. DE.CM-7: 
Monitoring for 
unauthorized 
personnel, 
connections, 
devices, and 
software is 
performed 
A personnel 
monitoring 
program for the 
use of 
information and 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
An external 
support and 
service provider 
monitoring 
program for the 
use of 
information and 
technology 
assets has been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
 
Reprivata CoT 
enables access 
control 
permissions for 
end users and 
attached devices 
through the use 
of certificates. 
 
Reprivata CoT 
requires end 
users and 
attached devices 
to connect 
through the use 
of encrypted 
virtual private 
network tunnels. 
 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
monitoring alerts 
and assessments 
can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network threat 
and incident 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms 
viii. DE.CM-8: 
Vulnerability 
scans are 
performed 
A vulnerability 
management, 
assessment, and 
remediation 
process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
implemented. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement a 
system and 
application 
vulnerability 
management 
program that is 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with system 
and application 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Vulnerability 
management 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
vulnerability 
management 
software firms 
as well as by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
data 
management. 
 
c. Detection Processes 
(DE.DP): Detection 
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processes and procedures 
are maintained and tested 
to ensure awareness of 
anomalous events. 
i. DE.DP-1: Roles 
and 
responsibilities 
for detection 
are well defined 
to ensure 
accountability 
User identities, 
roles, 
permissions, and 
access 
requirements for 
personnel 
monitoring 
access and 
security events 
related to 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for reviewing 
audit logs 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
ii. DE.DP-2: 
Detection 
activities 
comply with all 
applicable 
requirements 
A threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
Reprivata CoT 
technology 
designed and 
implemented to 
comply with 
NIST CSF. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
information 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network threat 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
iii. DE.DP-3: 
Detection 
processes are 
tested 
The threat 
intelligence 
assessment and 
review process is 
tested regularly 
and the results of 
such tests are 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Network data 
flow and event 
information 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
network threat 
management 
software 
companies as 
well as by 
external 
consulting firms. 
iv. DE.DP-4: 
Event detection 
A threat 
intelligence 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
The Master 
Agreements are 
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information is 
communicated 
assessment and 
review process is 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for improving 
security event 
detection 
processes 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
v. DE.DP-5: 
Detection 
processes are 
continuously 
improved 
Cybersecurity 
event detection 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
regularly 
reviewed to 
determine what 
enhancements 
are required to 
meet 
cybersecurity 
risk management 
requirements and 
any 
enhancements 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for improving 
security event 
detection 
processes 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
4. Respond – Develop and 
implement appropriate activities 
to take action regarding a 
detected cybersecurity incident. 
The Respond Function supports 
the ability to contain the impact 
of a potential cybersecurity 
incident. (19 key controls) 
    
a. Communications 
(RS.CO): Response 
activities are coordinated 
with internal and external 
stakeholders (e.g. external 
support from law 
enforcement agencies). 
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i. RS.CO-1: 
Personnel know 
their roles and 
order of 
operations 
when a 
response is 
needed 
Tactical and 
strategic 
responsibilities 
for responding to 
cybersecurity 
incidents have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to the 
appropriate 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement an 
incident 
response plan 
that outlines the 
personnel roles 
and 
responsibilities 
and is consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with security 
incidents and 
events. 
 
Incident 
response 
programs can be 
created and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
incident 
response. 
 
ii. RS.CO-2: 
Incidents are 
reported 
consistent with 
established 
criteria 
Incident 
reporting 
procedures and 
personnel 
assignments 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to the 
appropriate 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for security 
event detection 
and reporting 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iii. RS.CO-3: 
Information is 
shared 
consistent with 
response plans 
Incident 
reporting 
procedures and 
personnel 
assignments 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for security 
event detection 
and information 
sharing related 
to activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iv. RS.CO-4: 
Coordination 
with 
Incident 
reporting 
procedures and 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
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stakeholders 
occurs 
consistent with 
response plans 
personnel 
assignments 
have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for improving 
security event 
detection 
processes 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
v. RS.CO-5: 
Voluntary 
information 
sharing occurs 
with external 
stakeholders to 
achieve broader 
cybersecurity 
situational 
awareness  
Incident 
reporting 
procedures with 
suppliers and 
other third 
parties have 
been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for security 
event detection 
and information 
sharing related 
to activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
b. Analysis (RS.AN): 
Analysis is conducted to 
ensure effective response 
and support recovery 
activities. 
    
i. RS.AN-1: 
Notifications 
from detection 
systems are 
investigated  
Cybersecurity 
event detection 
and investigation 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for notifying 
relevant parties 
about security 
event detection 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
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 collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
ii. RS.AN-2: The 
impact of the 
incident is 
understood 
Cybersecurity 
event evaluation 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement 
incident 
response impact 
analyses that 
determine how 
incidents affect 
the organization 
and are 
consistent with 
the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with the 
impacts of 
security 
incidents and 
events. 
 
Incident 
response impact 
analyses can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
incident 
response 
metrics. 
 
iii. RS.AN-3: 
Forensics are 
performed 
Cybersecurity 
event 
investigation 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for analyzing 
the numbers, 
types, impacts, 
and response 
results of 
security events 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
iv. RS.AN-4: 
Incidents are 
categorized 
consistent with 
response plans 
Cybersecurity 
event evaluation 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
consistent with 
technology and 
operational risk 
management 
requirement and 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for analyzing 
the numbers, 
types, impacts, 
and response 
results of 
security events 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
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and external 
stakeholders. 
 capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
v. RS.AN-5: 
Processes are 
established to 
receive, analyze 
and respond to 
vulnerabilities 
disclosed to the 
organization 
from internal 
and external 
sources (e.g. 
internal testing, 
security 
bulletins, or 
security 
researchers) 
Processes for 
utilizing 
externally-
sourced 
vulnerability 
information to 
improve the 
vulnerability 
management 
program are 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for analyzing 
the numbers, 
types, impacts, 
and response 
results of 
security 
vulnerabilities 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
c. Mitigation (RS.MI): 
Activities are performed 
to prevent expansion of 
an event, mitigate its 
effects, and resolve the 
incident. 
    
i. RS.MI-1: 
Incidents are 
contained 
Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Incident 
response 
containment and 
mitigation 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
incident 
response 
management. 
 
ii. RS.MI-2: 
Incidents are 
mitigated 
Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
Incident 
response 
containment and 
mitigation 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
incident 
response 
management. 
 
iii. RS.MI-3: 
Newly 
identified 
Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
Reprivata CoT 
can integrate 
active network 
Compliant with 
NIST CSF 
 
Vulnerability 
containment and 
mitigation 
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vulnerabilities 
are mitigated or 
documented as 
accepted risks 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
Cybersecurity 
event evaluation 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
consistent with 
technology and 
operational risk 
management 
requirement and 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated 
that information 
to both internal 
and external 
stakeholders. 
threat 
monitoring, 
identification, 
and mitigation 
both inside and 
outside the CoT 
through its 
Global Threat 
Intelligence 
capabilities. 
Control 
implemented in 
the Reprivata 
solution 
reviews can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
vulnerability 
management. 
 
d. Improvements (RS.IM): 
Organizational response 
activities are improved by 
incorporating lessons 
learned from current and 
previous 
detection/response 
activities. 
    
i. RS.IM-1: 
Response plans 
incorporate 
lessons learned 
Outcomes from 
cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
exercises and 
incidents for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for analyzing 
the numbers, 
types, impacts, 
and response 
results of 
security 
incidents 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
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ii. RS.IM-2: 
Response 
strategies are 
updated 
Cybersecurity 
event detection 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
regularly 
reviewed to 
determine what 
enhancements 
are required to 
meet 
cybersecurity 
risk management 
requirements and 
any 
enhancements 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for updating 
incident 
response plans 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
5. Recover – Develop and 
implement appropriate activities 
to maintain plans for resilience 
and to restore any capabilities or 
services that were impaired due 
to a cybersecurity incident. The 
Recover Function supports timely 
recovery to normal operations to 
reduce the impact from a 
cybersecurity incident. (6 key 
controls) 
    
a. Recovery Planning 
(RC.RP): Recovery 
processes and procedures 
are executed and 
maintained to ensure 
restoration of systems or 
assets affected by 
cybersecurity incidents. 
    
i. RC.RP-1: 
Recovery plan 
is executed 
during or after a 
cybersecurity 
incident  
Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for updating 
incident 
recovery plans 
related to 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
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activities of 
CoT members. 
 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
b. Improvements (RC.IM): 
Recovery planning and 
processes are improved 
by incorporating lessons 
learned into future 
activities. 
    
i. RC.IM-1: 
Recovery plans 
incorporate 
lessons learned 
Cybersecurity 
event detection 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
regularly 
reviewed to 
determine what 
enhancements 
are required to 
meet 
cybersecurity 
risk management 
requirements and 
any 
enhancements 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for updating 
incident 
recovery plans 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
 
ii. RC.IM-2: 
Recovery 
strategies are 
updated 
Cybersecurity 
event detection 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring 
Information and 
technology 
assets are 
regularly 
reviewed to 
determine what 
enhancements 
are required to 
meet 
cybersecurity 
risk management 
requirements and 
any 
enhancements 
are documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for updating 
incident 
recovery 
strategies 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
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both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
c. Communications 
(RC.CO): Restoration 
activities are coordinated 
with internal and external 
parties (e.g. coordinating 
centers, Internet Service 
Providers, owners of 
attacking systems, 
victims, other CSIRTs, 
and vendors). 
    
i. RC.CO-1: 
Public relations 
are managed 
Responsibilities 
for managing 
messaging and 
other 
communications 
during a 
cybersecurity 
event to ensure 
all appropriate 
parties are 
updated on a 
timely basis are 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders. 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement 
public relations 
and reputation 
management 
programs that 
are consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
public relations. 
 
Public relation 
communication 
and impact 
analyses can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
corporate public 
relations 
management. 
 
ii. RC.CO-2: 
Reputation is 
repaired after 
an incident  
Procedures for 
managing 
reputational risks 
related to 
cybersecurity 
events for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
external 
stakeholders 
Senior 
management is 
required to 
create and 
implement 
public relations 
and reputation 
management 
programs that 
are consistent 
with the 
organization’s 
risk posture. 
 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and data 
sharing by key 
management 
stakeholders 
when 
discussing the 
risks associated 
with managing 
the corporate 
reputation. 
 
Reputational 
impact reviews 
can be 
performed and 
evaluated by 
external 
consulting firms 
that specialize in 
corporate 
reputation 
management. 
 
iii. RC.CO-3: 
Recovery 
activities are 
communicated 
to internal and 
external 
stakeholders as 
well as 
executive and 
management 
teams 
Cybersecurity 
event response 
and recovery 
programs for 
information and 
technology 
assets have been 
documented, 
implemented, 
and 
communicated to 
both internal and 
When included 
in the Reprivata 
Master 
Agreement, this 
enables 
compliance with 
NIST CSF. 
The Reprivata 
solution enables 
secure 
collaboration 
and 
communication 
of internal and 
external parties 
and their 
responsibilities 
for discussing 
recovery 
activities 
The Master 
Agreements are 
designed to be 
easily updated 
by internal 
and/or external 
legal counsel as 
required by the 
CoT owner. 
 
All CoT users 
are required to 
sign the Master 
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Artifact 3 – Recommendations for Enhancement of Reprivata Master Agreements for 
Implementing Community of Trust (CoT) Risk Management Solution 
The Reprivata Master Agreements were created to provide a Community of Trust (CoT) owner with the 
ability to create business rules of engagement to govern the relationships and collaboration with those 
internal and external stakeholders that are part of the CoT network solution.  
While the current Master agreements provide a good starting point for setting up these business rules and 
relationships, the researcher evaluated specific key controls in the National Institue of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) version 1.1. After reviewing the key controls in the 
five Functional security areas covered by the NIST CSF, the following controls were identified as 
potential enhancements to the Master Agreements that would help enable cybersecurity maturity and 
improvement programs for all the CoT participants. 
1. NIST CSF Functional Area – Identify (ID) Controls Language to Include: 
 
NIST CSF Key Controls Rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements 
 ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities for the entire workforce and third-
party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, 
partners) are established. 
 Documenting the cybersecurity roles 
and responsibilities of internal stakeholders and 
third parties, such as suppliers and business 
partners, enables the CoT owner establish 
access control, incident response reporting, user 
collaboration, and data sharing processes to 
meet the needs of the CoT as a whole. 
 ID.BE-1: The organization’s role in the 
supply chain is identified and communicated 
 The cybersecurity roles for event 
identification for the organization and its third 
parties like suppliers and partners that are CoT 
users should be legally defined in writing to 
make sure all obligations are understood. 
 ID.GV-1: Organizational cybersecurity 
policy is established and communicated 
 Compliance to cybersecurity policies by 
stakeholders should be specific and with 
assessment and reporting requirements for all 
CoT users.  
 ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with 
internal roles and external partners 
 Documentation of cybersecurity roles 
for all internal and external stakeholders should 
be documented and mutual collaboration and 
data sharing responsibilities outlined in writing 
for all CoT users. 
 ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory 
requirements regarding cybersecurity, including 
privacy and civil liberties obligations, are 
understood and managed 
 Legal and regulatory compliance 
cybersecurity requirements should be clearly 
documented for all CoT users. 
external 
stakeholders. 
 
related to 
activities of 
CoT members. 
 
Agreement 
before they can 
utilize the data 
sharing and 
collaboration 
capabilities of 
the CoT. 
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 ID.RA-6: Risk responses are identified and 
prioritized. 
 Risk management collaboration 
requirements for all CoT users should be clearly 
defined and stakeholder obligations for risk 
review are documented. 
 ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third party partners 
of information systems, components, and services 
are identified, prioritized, and assessed using a 
cyber supply chain risk assessment process 
 Risk management and review 
obligations for third parties should be legally 
binding when collaborating in the CoT. 
 ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers and third-
party partners are used to implement appropriate 
measures designed to meet the objectives of an 
organization’s cybersecurity program and Cyber 
Supply Chain Risk Management Plan. 
 Third party contracts should include 
provisions for measuring and managing 
cybersecurity risks and implementing 
cybersecurity controls for controlling related 
risks.  
 ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party partners 
are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or 
other forms of evaluations to confirm they are 
meeting their contractual obligations. 
 Cybersecurity audit and assessment 
provisions should be clearly documented and 
assessment reporting requirements specified. 
 ID.SC-5: Response and recovery planning 
and testing are conducted with suppliers and third-
party providers 
 Cybersecurity recovery and response 
plans should be required of all CoT users. 
 
2. NIST CSF Functional Area – Protect (PR) Controls Language to Include: 
 
NIST CSF Key Controls Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements 
 PR.AT-3: Third-party stakeholders (e.g., 
suppliers, customers, partners) understand their 
roles and responsibilities 
 See ID.AM-6 and ID.GV-2, which 
outline the rationale for inclusion in Master 
Agreements. 
 PR.IP-7: Protection processes are improved  Cybersecurity protection management 
process improvement and maturity requirements 
are documented for all CoT users. 
 PR.IP-8: Effectiveness of protection 
technologies is shared 
 Collaboration requirements for assisting 
CoT users to enhance their cybersecurity 
protection technologies and processes are 
documented. 
 PR.IP-9: Response plans (Incident 
Response and Business Continuity) and recovery 
plans (Incident Recovery and Disaster Recovery) 
are in place and managed 
 Requirements for CoT users to 
implement cybersecurity response plans are 
documented. 
 PR.IP-10: Response and recovery plans are 
tested 
 Requirements for CoT users to share the 
results of cybersecurity response plan tests are 
documented. 
 PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, 
documented, implemented, and reviewed in 
accordance with policy 
 Requirements for CoT users to 
implement technology logs on all networks, 
servers, and other devices and that the logs are 
handled and reviewed as part of a log 
management process are documented. 
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3. NIST CSF Functional Area – Detect (DE) Controls Language to Include: 
 
NIST CSF Key Controls Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements 
 DE.DP-1: Roles and responsibilities for 
detection are well defined to ensure accountability 
 The cybersecurity roles for event 
detection for the organization and its third 
parties like suppliers and partners that are CoT 
users should be legally defined in writing to 
make sure all obligations are understood. 
 DE.DP-3: Detection processes are tested  Requirements for CoT users to share the 
results of detection process and procedure tests 
are documented. 
 DE.DP-4: Event detection information is 
communicated 
 Documenting the cybersecurity event 
detection responsibilities of internal 
stakeholders and third parties, such as suppliers 
and business partners, enables the CoT owner to 
establish access control, incident response 
reporting, user collaboration, and data sharing 
processes to meet the needs of the CoT as a 
whole. 
 DE.DP-5: Detection processes are 
continuously improved 
 Cybersecurity detection process 
improvement and maturity requirements are 
documented for all CoT users. 
 
4. NIST CSF Functional Area – Respond (RS) Controls Language to Include: 
 
NIST CSF Key Controls Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements 
 RS.CO-2: Incidents are reported consistent 
with established criteria 
 Requirements for CoT users to share the 
results of cybersecurity incidents and under 
what situations are documented. 
 RS.CO-3: Information is shared consistent 
with response plans 
 Collabotation requirements between 
CoT users on cybersecurity incidents are 
documented. 
 RS.CO-4: Coordination with stakeholders 
occurs consistent with response plans 
 How and when CoT users are required 
to work together on cybersecurity incidents are 
documented. 
 RS.CO-5: Voluntary information sharing 
occurs with external stakeholders to achieve broader 
cybersecurity situational awareness 
 How the CoT will be used by users to 
share critial response and remediation data 
related to cybersecurity events is documented. 
 RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection 
systems are investigated  
 Responsibilities for CoT users to 
investigate and report cybersecurity events are 
documented. 
 RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed  Requirements for CoT users to utilize 
forensic tools and share the results of those 
investigations are documented. 
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 RS.AN-4: Incidents are categorized 
consistent with response plans 
 How cybersecurity events are classified 
and what responses are required by specific 
event classes are documented. 
 RS.AN-5: Processes are established to 
receive, analyze and respond to vulnerabilities 
disclosed to the organization from internal and 
external sources (e.g. internal testing, security 
bulletins, or security researchers) 
 Requirements for CoT users to utilize 
cybersecurity threat and vulnerability resources, 
such as research organizations or vendors, as 
part of their vulnerability management 
programs are documented. 
 RS.IM-1: Response plans incorporate 
lessons learned 
 Requirements to CoT users to share 
post mortem analyses of the results from 
cybersecurity response exercises or tests are 
documented. 
 RS.IM-2: Response strategies are updated  Requirements for CoT users to keep 
their cybersecurity response plans up-to-date are 
documented. 
 
5. NIST CSF Functional Area – Recover (RC) Controls Language to Include: 
 
NIST CSF Key Controls Rationale for Inclusion in Master Agreements 
 RC.RP-1: Recovery plan is executed during 
or after a cybersecurity incident 
 The requirements for CoT users to 
utilize cybersecurity incident response plans 
when events are detected are documented. 
 RC.IM-1: Recovery plans incorporate 
lessons learned 
 See RS.IM-1, which outlines the 
rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements. 
 RC.IM-2: Recovery strategies are updated  See RS.IM-2, which outlines the 
rationale for inclusion in Master Agreements. 
 RC.CO-3: Recovery activities are 
communicated to internal and external stakeholders 
as well as executive and management teams 
 Documenting the cybersecurity event 
response responsibilities and activities of 
internal stakeholders and third parties, such as 
suppliers and business partners, enables the CoT 
owner to establish access control, incident 
response reporting, user collaboration, and data 
sharing processes to meet the needs of the CoT 
as a whole. 
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Artifact 4 – Definitions, Acronyms, and Abbreviations [from Reprivata Community of Trust 
documentation and NIST Glossary of Information Security Terms, 2018] 
 
Access Control – The process of permitting or restricting access to applications at a granular level, such 
as per-user, per-group, and per-resources.  
CA – A certificate authority (CA) is a trusted entity that issues electronic documents that verify a digital 
entity's identity on the Internet. The electronic documents, which are called digital certificates, are an 
essential part of secure communication and play an important part in the Public Key Infrastructure. 
CoT – A Community of Trust (CoT) is a group of like-minded users and service providers that have 
created a private network using a combination of IPSec, TLS, and multiple encryption algorithms to 
protect the members of the Community of Trust. This can be accomplished by legally bounding a private 
network’s owner and members with a cyber demarcation point for end users, employees, and all 
interconnected third parties. 
Collective Defense – A security arrangement in which each entity in the system accepts that the security 
of one is the concern of all, and therefore commits to a collective response to threats and breaches of the 
system. 
Community Owner – Within a Community of Trust, the Community Owner is the entity that initiates the 
CoT with other third parties through the use of standardized service agreements and encrypted 
communications technologies that allows the members of the CoT to collaborate securely. 
Community Services -- Community Owner provides a suite of services to the End User. This allows an 
End User to establish a User Profile consisting of the End User’s PII and/or Non-PII, which is 
warehoused in the Central database for each Community. The End User determines what PII and/or Non-
PII it is willing to share (if any) with other Members, providers, third parties, or selected third parties 
when using IPES. In some instances, an End User may be able to receive payment for sharing PII and/or 
Non-PII with certain third parties or receive subsidies for third-party provided IPES. 
Defense in Depth – The coordinated use of multiple security controls and countermeasures to protect 
the integrity of a company’s information assets. 
ECDH – Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman is an anonymous key agreement protocol that allows two 
parties, each having an elliptic curve public–private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an 
insecure channel. This shared secret may be directly used as a key, or to derive another key which can 
then be used to encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher. 
FIPS 140-2 – The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2, (FIPS PUB 140-2), 
is a U.S. government computer security standard used to approve cryptographic modules. The title is 
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.  
End User – An individual that uses “Community provided IPES Services” delivered via a Community 
Owner.  
Interconnection Security Agreement – A document that regulates security-relevant aspects of an 
intended connection between an agency and an external system. It regulates the security interface between 
any two systems operating under two different distinct authorities. It includes a variety of descriptive, 
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technical, procedural, and planning information. It is usually preceded by a formal MOA/MOU that 
defines high-level roles and responsibilities in management of a cross-domain connection. 
IPES – Internet Protocol Enabled Services (IPES) means any services provided to the End User through a 
Community Inter-connected Network or the Internet. Examples include web browsing, online gaming, 
online educational games or instruction, Voice over Internet Protocol services, e-mail, texting or 
messaging, and any other service delivered through a web browser, mobile app or through the use of a 
personal computer, laptop, or a mobile device and the Internet. 
IPSec – Internet Protocol Security is a protocol suite for securing IP communications by 
authenticating and encrypting each IP packet of a communication session. IPSec includes protocols for 
establishing mutual authentication between agents at the beginning of the session and negotiation of 
cryptographic keys to be used during the session. IPSec can be used in protecting data flows between a 
pair of hosts (host-to-host), between a pair of security gateways (network-to-network), or between a 
security gateway and a host (network-to-host). IPSec uses cryptographic security services to protect 
communications over IP networks. IPSec supports network-level peer authentication, data origin 
authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality (encryption), and replay protection. IPSec is an end-
to-end security scheme operating in the Internet Layer of the Internet Protocol Suite, while some other 
Internet security systems in widespread use, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Shell 
(SSH), operate in the upper layers at Application layer. Hence, only IPSec protects any application 
traffic over an IP network. Applications can be automatically secured by IPSec at the IP layer. 
Master Agreement – These agreements require members of a Community of Trust (CoT) to organize 
and deploy their independent Communities of Trust using a process that will facilitate the reliable 
implementation of security policy and technical interoperability between independent Communities of 
Trusts and interconnected entities.  
Non-PII – Non-personally identifiable information (non-PII) is data associated with an End User that is 
not specific enough to identify an End User individually. Examples include: fist name, zip code, or 
birthday.  
NSA Suite B – A set of cryptographic algorithms promulgated by the National Security Agency as 
part of its Cryptographic Modernization Program. It is to serve as an interoperable cryptographic base 
for both unclassified information and most classified information. Suite B was announced on 16 
February 2005. Suite B can be used to protect foreign releasable information, US Only information, 
and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). 
PII – Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is defined as any information about an End User 
maintained by an agency, including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an End 
User’s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or 
biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an End User, such as 
medical, educational, financial, and employment information.  Examples include, but are not limited to 
full name, mother’s maiden name, government issued identification numbers like social security number, 
passport number, driver’s license number or financial account or credit card numbers, or biometric data 
like fingerprint, handwriting, etc. 
PKI – A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and 
procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. In 
cryptography, a PKI is an arrangement that binds public keys with respective user identities by means 
of a certificate authority (CA). 
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Private Communications CoT (PC CoT) Software CA – The Certificate Authority inside the 
IPSEC tunnel. This is to authenticate the keys used to initiate the IPSEC tunnel. TLS has another key 
and it uses the same Private Communications CoT (PC CoT) software CA inside the IPSEC tunnel. 
To encrypt packets, a ZRTP application layer for TwoFish encryption algorithm is implemented. 
RFC 1918 – The document that helped create the standards by which networking equipment assigns IP 
addresses in a private network. A private network can use a single public IP address. The RFC reserves 
the following ranges of IP addresses that cannot be routed on the Internet: 10.0.0.0 - 10.255.255.255 (10/8 
prefix). 
Risk – A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and 
typically a function of: (1) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and 
(2) the likelihood of occurrence.   
Risk Adaptive Access Control – Access privileges are granted based on the combination of a user’s 
identity, mission need, and the level of security risk that exists between the system being accessed and a 
user. Risk Adaptive Access Control will use security metrics, such as the strength of the authentication 
method, the level of assurance of the session connection between the system and a user, and the physical 
location of a user, to make its risk determination. 
Risk Analysis – The process of identifying the risks to system security and determining the likelihood of 
occurrence, the resulting impact, and the additional safeguards that mitigate this impact. Part of risk 
management is synonymous with risk assessment. 
Risk Assessment – The process of identifying the risks to system security and determining the likelihood 
of occurrence, the resulting impact, and the additional safeguards that mitigate this impact. Part of risk 
management is synonymous with risk assessment. 
SIP – The Session Initiation Protocol is a communications protocol for signaling and controlling 
multimedia communication sessions. The most common applications of SIP are in Internet telephony for 
voice and video calls, as well as instant messaging all over IP networks. 
SRTP – A Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) profile intended to provide encryption, message 
authentication and integrity, and replay attack protection to the RTP data in audio-visual applications. 
Threat – Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations 
(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an 
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, 
and/or denial of service. Also, the potential for a threat-source to successfully exploit a particular 
information system vulnerability. 
Threat Analysis – The examination of threat sources against system vulnerabilities to determine the 
threats for a particular system in a particular operational environment. 
 Threat Assessment – The process of formally evaluating the degree of threat to an information 
system or enterprise and describing the nature of the threat. 
Third Party Testing – Independent testing by an organization that was not involved in the design and 
implementation of the object being tested (e.g., a system or device) and is not intended as the eventual 
user of that object. 
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TLS – Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are 
cryptographic protocols designed to provide communications security over a computer network. 
Tunnel Mode – One of two modes of transport supported by IPSec. This mode encrypts the entire 
packet including the header, it then provides the packet with a new header. 
TwoFish – A symmetric key block cipher with a block size of 128 bits and key sizes up to 256 bits. 
User Profile – Means the End User’s PII that the End User populates in the Central Privacy Authority 
provided by a Community Owner database and the rules defining when certain subsets of PII may be 
disclosed to third party IPES providers, i.e., any IPES that is not a Community Owner.  
Vulnerability – A weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, 
or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source. 
Vulnerability Analysis – The systematic examination of an information system or product to 
determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which 
to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures 
after implementation. 
Vulnerability Assessment – The formal description and evaluation of the vulnerabilities in an 
information system. 
ZRTP – A cryptographic key-agreement protocol to negotiate the keys for encryption between two end 
points in a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone telephony call based on the Real-time Transport 
Protocol. It uses Diffie–Hellman key exchange and the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) for 
encryption. 
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Muma College of Business ● Doctor of Business Administration Program, BSN 3403  
4202 East Fowler Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33620 ●813-974-6755  
27 November 2018  
  
To whom it may concern:  
  
In my capacity as Editor-in-Chief of the Muma Business Review and Muma Case Review, I am writing this 
letter to confirm that both journals allow the authors to retain the copyright under a Creative Commons 
BY-NC license. As a result, authors can reprint their work wherever it is desired provided they 
acknowledge the source.  
  
In the case of Ed Fulford, he has two Muma Case review articles that have been accepted for 
publication, proofed and formatted accordingly. He can therefore include them as part of his 
dissertation.  
  
If you have further questions, feel free to contact me by email or at my home (813-994-4511).  
  
  
  
  
 
T. Gradon Gill, Professor and Academic Director 
Doctor of Business Administration program  
grandon@usf.edu  
 
  
Yours Sincerely,  
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ED FULFORD 
IMPLEMENTING A CYBERSECURITY COMMUNITY OF 
TRUST: REPRIVATA SEEKS AN “EARLY ADOPTER”1 
Reprivata developed a cybersecurity solution which could fundamentally change how companies 
create private, trust-based interconnections with their third-party business partners. Now, how 
do they attract the right “early adopter” to implement it? 
John “Tripp” Hardy, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Reprivata, sat in the San Francisco airport 
waiting for his flight to Washington, DC. Tripp, an investment banker by training, had been approached 
by one of Reprivata’s founders, Scott Yeager, to join the young company and help it to productize its 
cybersecurity solution.  
Tripp and Scott had known each other since 2014. Scott was a visionary in the networking field who had 
helped start Metropolitan Area Exchange - East (MAE-East), one of the first commercial and largest of 
the Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). By 2013, Scott, along with his partner David Cox (an expert in both 
networking and application development), had turned their talents to developing a cybersecurity solution 
to allow companies to build a Community of Trust (CoT). This CoT would enable the members to 
communicate and collaborate securely amongst themselves on business and cybersecurity issues. While 
addressing this problem, Scott and David had come to three conclusions. First, a technology was needed 
that would allow the businesses to securely communicate and collaborate over the Internet. Second, a 
generally-accepted cybersecurity standard was required to provide a methodology for businesses to 
mature their cybersecurity programs. Third, the business network connections between companies needed 
to be governed by legal language, similar to the Master Service Agreements that had been written in the 
1990s for IXPs and ISPs to link their networks. With those three design elements in his mind, Scott and 
David had set to work. 
After years in development, Scott had shown Tripp the initial solution. Excited about its potential and the 
opportunity to work with Scott to build Reprivata, Tripp decided it was the right time to join the company 
and help it take the CoT solution to market. As Tripp first began to present the Reprivata CoT solution to 
his Financial Services contacts, there was a significant amount of interest in the CoT concept. However, 
none of the organizations were willing to implement Reprivata’s solution and show its worth. As Tripp 
                                                          
1 Copyright © 2018, Ed Fulford. This case was prepared for the purpose of class discussion, and not to illustrate the 
effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Names and some information have been disguised. 
Permission is granted to copy and distribute this case for non-commercial purposes, in both printed and electronic 
formats. This template is based on a 2012 template originally developed for the Journal of IT Education: Discussion 
Cases. 
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reviewed his upcoming schedule of meetings in Washington, DC, he thought, “How do we overcome just 
one organization’s reluctance when they clearly see the value of our solution?” 
The Cybersecurity Problem Spaces 
Cybersecurity professionals had been diligently working to better understand the natures and impacts of 
the cyber risks. However, the funding and staffing of these efforts needed to change. The adoption of 
more pre-emptive and responsive global, national, and business cyber risk management behaviors lagged 
the number of cyber risks being identified by cyber risk managers--and being exploited by bad actors. 
Additionally, the number of effective cybersecurity solutions that could fix more than very specific 
technical vulnerabilities had not increased to a point that interrelated problem spaces could be addressed. 
The more aggressive implementation of effective risk measurement and mitigation programs, based on 
cybersecurity standards and methodologies, seemed likely to improve the management and assessment of 
cybersecurity problem and solution spaces. At this time, however, cybersecurity programs had not 
matured at a pace that could keep up with the numbers and varieties of cyber risks (Fulford, 2017). 
The problem spaces that cybersecurity practitioners had been required to address were very similar, 
regardless of the industry or location they worked in. These problem spaces included: 
• The Global Cybersecurity Problem Space 
• The Government Cybersecurity Problem Space 
• The Business Cybersecurity Problem Space 
• The Cybersecurity Standard Problem Space 
 
More details on the current and emerging issues related to these cybersecurity problem spaces can be 
found in “A Note on the Cybersecurity Problem Space in 2018”. 
The Drive Toward Broader Cybersecurity Collaboration and Maturity  
Cybersecurity practitioners had not been alone in working through the difficulties of achieving and 
protecting information sharing between diverse groups. A similar lack of communication had long 
plagued law enforcement.  
Building Communities of Trust Initiative 
As a means of addressing this, in 2010, the United States Department of Justice (U.S. Justice) launched 
The Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) Initiative, which focused on developing trust between law 
enforcement, fusion centers, and the communities they served, particularly immigrant and minority 
communities, so that crime and terrorism could be addressed. This initiative had been administered 
primarily by the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (abbreviated as NSI). The 
NSI program provided law enforcement with a capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, 
analyzing, and sharing suspicious activity reports about behaviors that had a potential nexus to terrorism. 
The NSI recognized that each community’s collaboration to gather and share this type of information was 
critically important in the prevention of crime and terrorism, since law enforcement agencies were 
dependent on community members to report suspicious activity information to state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) law enforcement officers. To help ensure that this reporting was taking place, it was 
essential that law enforcement and community members had strong, trusting relationships. As these 
relationships were developed and maintained, members of the community would be more likely to report 
crime and suspicious activities, which was the reason the NSI had worked with partners at the federal, 
state, and local levels--including United States Attorney’s Offices, public and privacy advocacy groups, 
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religious and faith leaders, and a diverse group of local community members--to implement the Building 
Communities of Trust initiative (Wasserman, 2010). 
Executive Order 13636: Improving National Cybersecurity Maturity 
On February of 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 13636: Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which was aimed at strengthening the cybersecurity of the critical national 
infrastructure. Later in 2013, Edward Snowden, a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor with high 
level security clearance, copied and leaked classified information from the NSA without authorization. 
Snowden’s disclosures revealed numerous global surveillance programs, many run by the NSA and other 
intelligence agencies with the cooperation of telecommunication companies and European governments. 
Soon after that event, there was significant pressure from the White House to create a cybersecurity 
framework to meet the directives in the Executive Order. This led to NIST and industry participants, 
beginning work on what was known as the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF).  
While the EO did not mandate the use of any particular cybersecurity standard, it did set in motion the 
joint government and industry collaboration that led to the development of the initial version of the CSF, 
which was released in 2014. As stated in the EO (House, 2013): 
It is the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and 
economic prosperity while promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil 
liberties. We can achieve these goals through a partnership with the owners and operators of 
critical infrastructure to improve cybersecurity information sharing and collaboratively develop 
and implement risk‐based standards.  
Selected Cybersecurity Management Standards 
While Reprivata was researching the various cybersecurity standards to determine which one to base their 
solution on, two serious issues were noted: first, there were many cybersecurity standards already 
published and second, no two industries agreed on which of the standards took precedence. Seeing the 
White House’s directions on improving cybersecurity maturity as an opportunity, Scott and David had set 
out in search of that overarching cybersecurity standard that would embrace the concepts of collaboration 
and cyber maturity as guiding principles. Some of their findings were instrumental in leading them to a 
most interesting conclusion (see Exhibit 1).  
Industry-Specific Standards 
There were also a number of industry-specific standards such as the Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS) for companies that process, transmit, and store credit card data, the North American 
Energy Reliability Corporation Critical Information Protection (NERC CIP) guidelines for the bulk power 
energy companies in North America, and the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) Security Rule, which established national security standards to protect individuals’ electronic 
personal health information that was created, received, used, or maintained by a covered Healthcare 
entity. Adopting one of the more general industry-specific security frameworks above could be 
complementary to other similar methodologies. However, many companies were required to be compliant 
with several of these standards and to submit themselves to regular compliance assessments, so it became 
increasingly difficult for them to be fully compliant with all of the specific standards or regulations at any 
one time. Also, none of these regulations or standards required companies to measure the maturity of 
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their cybersecurity program, nor did they require companies to collaborate on solving mutually-held 
security issues.  
International Standards Organization 27000 Standards 
As perhaps the most widely known family of information security standards, the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) 27000 framework was a very mature one that focused on creating and enhancing an 
organization’s Information Security Management System (ISMS). The framework also provided 
requirements under which an ISMS could be audited and certified by an ISO registrar. At the time of this 
case study, the ISO 27000 series of standards included 45 individual guidelines across the functional areas 
that made up a company’s security program. As a very comprehensive set of standards, the ISO 27000 
guidelines could be used across a wide range of industries and types of business environments. ISO 27000 
was the security equivalent of the ISO 9000 quality management standards used by manufacturers to 
demonstrate operational excellence. Because ISO 27000 was very established with cybersecurity 
practitioners compared to other standards, countries had used it as a basis to create regulatory compliance 
requirements and related guidance about security as well as directions to organizations on how extend the 
use of the ISO standards in their enterprise risk management practices and programs. Because of the 
expanding scope of the ISO 27000 series of guidelines, an ISMS could be difficult to measure and 
challenging to get certified. As such, many smaller companies were reluctant to expend the necessary 
resources required to achieve accreditation, so there was a widely-held perception that ISO 27000 could 
be difficult to deploy and maintain. As with industry-specific standards, ISO 27000 did not require 
companies to measure the maturity of their cybersecurity programs, nor did it dictate that companies 
collaborated to work on the security challenges they faced. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF) had much in 
common with the NIST 800 series information security guidelines, which were created about 20 years ago 
and had evolved over that time. The original NIST 800 series of guidelines provided a starting point for 
other information security guidelines and methodologies. The CSF, as an extension of the original NIST 
800 series, leveraged a wide range of information security standards and leading practices. While the 
NIST CSF was created recently relative to other information security standards, it was designed to be 
very comprehensive and was targeted for use by large enterprises, as well as those companies with 
business connections in the United States. It was found to be easily aligned to the ISO standards, such as 
ISO 27000 and ISO 9000. It was the only information security framework that defined specific 
measurements whereby companies could demonstrate their cybersecurity maturity. It also required 
companies to collaborate with their third-party business partners in cybersecurity issues that affected their 
business relationships. Because the NIST CSF contained a lot of very practical guidance, it could be 
adapted to smaller and non-US organizations without a great deal of effort and expense. 
General Data Protection Regulation 
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was adopted in 2016 as a personal data protection and 
privacy regulation in European Union (EU) law. GDPR was created as a new set of data security and 
management guidelines and was designed to give EU citizens more control over their personal data and to 
hold businesses that manage and process this personal data accountable for implementing and 
strengthening the security and privacy controls over this data. GDPR was aimed at simplifying the 
regulatory environment for businesses, so both citizens and businesses in the EU could benefit from the 
products and services offered by the growth of the digital economy. GDPR also addressed the movement, 
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export, and exfiltration of personally identifiable data outside of the EU and the European Economic Area 
(EEA). The EEA covered the EU countries of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and 
Sweden. The EEA also included Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, which allowed these countries to be 
part of the EU’s single market for trade and economic development. While Switzerland was neither an 
EU nor EEA member, it was part of the single EEA market. The United Kingdom, as part of its plans to 
leave the EU in 2019, implemented the Data Protection Act of 2018, which contained equivalent data 
security and privacy protection language to GDPR. As of 2019, the United Kingdom would become a 
third country for the purposes of the transfer of personal data outside the EU, which could require the EU 
to review the United Kingdom’s data protection framework to determine if the data security and privacy 
controls were equivalent to those required by GDPR. 
Reprivata 
David, I was there at MAE-East when we made up the rules for how companies interconnect to 
others on the Internet. Why don’t we just make up the rules now around how businesses 
collaborate privately and securely to meet our own needs? – Scott Yeager to David Cox (2013) 
David Cox was a talented technologist who saw an increasingly serious security problem facing 
companies that did business over the Internet: there were few, if any, applications that were flexible and 
secure enough to enable interconnected businesses to communicate and collaborate together. In 2012, 
David began to build the first version of an encrypted collaboration and communication application. 
David’s solution was based on open source software and included the highest level of encryption 
available at the time. 
The cybersecurity communication and collaboration application that David developed utilized a multi-
layered encryption software approach. This created a secure encrypted connection while cloaking the 
accessibility of the edge devices connected to a defined set of network end points that required the ability 
to pass secured traffic through those interconnections. Traffic from all the edge devices inside the secured 
connections were policed, and anomalous or suspicious traffic flows were captured and stored in the 
Central Privacy Authority Intrusion Database (CPAID), which was a key component of the functionality 
of the application. 
In 2013, David contacted Scott Yeager, who he had known from Scott’s work on MAE-East. After some 
discussion, David and Scott formed Reprivata to productize David’s application. Reprivata’s name was 
based on the Latin phrase “Res privata” which means private business. One of Reprivata’s strategic goals 
was to “re-privatize” how companies did business over the Internet.  
David originally funded the start-up through his company MiMTiD, and Scott provided additional capital 
to begin work on creating the Reprivata CoT solution. Once Scott understood that the solution David had 
developed allowed a company to build secure private networks using the software, Scott realized that the 
problem of enabling secure communication and collaboration between connected business partners could 
be solved one private network at a time. He discussed this with David and they decided to create new 
rules around how a private network could become cyber secure and have interconnected entities play by 
the same set of rules.  
One of the ideas for this new cybersecurity solution was to bound the edges of a private network, as built 
out of the software, with a new set of interconnection contracts, similar to those used in the early days of 
 148 
 
the internet between IXPs, ISPs, and CDNs. Scott believed that creating these new legal demarcation 
points for a private network and bounding those demarcations for the network’s end users, employees and 
interconnected third parties would be the most prudent and successful approach. 
Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model 
The Reprivata Community of Trust (CoT) Conceptual Model (see Exhibit 2) was developed to articulate 
the interactions of elements that influence successful cybersecurity CoT implementations using the 
Reprivata cybersecurity risk management solution. These elements helped determine and, in some cases, 
manage the resources within these projects as part of the overarching corporate business strategy which 
determined the cyber risk posture, and how that posture could be managed and measured. These were two 
distinct groups of elements: one composed of the cybersecurity frameworks and legal documents that 
provide structure to the CoT, and one that constituted the Internal and External Stakeholders of the CoT.  
The CoT Governance element (see Exhibit 2) was based on the Master Agreements that are executed 
between the overall Community of Trust’s Internal Stakeholders and its External Stakeholders. The 
Master Agreements provided the legal guidance over its governance functions that the CoT members 
would utilize in interactions between themselves and were the basis for the on-going collaboration 
activities in the CoT. The IT risk assessment processes were defined, outlining the risk management 
requirements for each member, such as purchasing cyber insurance and the how the cybersecurity 
program maturity of the members would be evaluated against the CSF security controls framework. The 
contractual obligations of each member regarding their IT compliance, and how the technical and 
business interconnections were to be managed were also specified by this element. Finally, the risk 
metrics were defined, outlining the risk measurements and the frequency of reporting those measurements 
were stipulated. 
The CoT Risk Management Strategy and the CoT Governance elements of the model augmented each 
other as required to implement the selected Cyber Risk Management methodology (see Exhibit 2). The 
provisions of CoT Governance empowered the company’s ability to measure risk and show the 
company’s overall risk posture was being managed effectively. If risk management requirements were 
changed, the company typically would reassess its risk posture and determine how any such changes 
would impact its operational stance within the CoT and under the conditions of the Master Agreement. In 
this way, the Proposed Conceptual Model would demonstrate that any changes in one or both of these 
elements would typically require a business to re-assess its cyber risk posture with respect to the overall 
change in its technology footprint it used to support the CoT and its strategic and operational decisions 
and initiatives. The effects on the corporation’s internal technology environment were ways that these 
elements influenced the direction and scope of the cyber-related management programs. These 
influencers provided both an internal and external context on how the CoT Risk Management Strategy 
was implemented, how its success would be measured, and how it would be evaluated against CoT 
Governance requirements (such as internal or external audits, external risk assessments, or regulatory 
reviews). These evaluations would influence the CoT Risk Management Strategy implementation by 
providing the legal and cybersecurity orientation for enhancing cyber risk management, as well as the key 
performance metrics and reporting required by management. 
Defining the CoT Rules of Engagement  
During his days in networking, Scott had worked on these types of legal and regulatory issues with Andy 
Lipman, a partner at the law firm of Morgan Lewis and one of the leading attorneys in the area of 
Telecommunications law. Earlier in his career, Andy had heavily influenced the interconnection language 
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that was incorporated in the Telecommunication Act of 1996. Scott and David went to Andy and 
discussed their proposed business model with him. Scott had been part of developing some of the original 
commercial rules of the Internet connectivity with Rick Adams, the founder of UUNET, and several other 
Internet pioneers. Scott thought that Reprivata could make up new rules for a private network and these 
new rules could be enforced by the owner of the private network without asking permission of any 
jurisdictional entity.  
Andy found Scott’s approach to be unique and forward-thinking, and strongly encouraged David and 
Scott to continue maturing their solution. In addition, Andy confirmed to Scott and David that they could 
make up new rules for a private network and those rules could also be used to enforce cybersecurity 
maturity requirements via Master Agreements, using the notion of a demarcation point in the Master 
Agreement to create and enforce those rules across all interconnected users, employees and third parties.    
Andy then reviewed Reprivata’s concepts and software design and was impressed by the ways the 
company was solving for some of the more impactful security issues facing interconnected companies 
doing business over the Internet. On his recommendation, Reprivata filed for two patents. The first one 
was for an Encrypted Community of Trust (CoT) using the Central Privacy Authority to warehouse data 
owned by End Users and to facilitate management of encryption keys controlled by the CoT owner. The 
second patent was for an Advertising Compliance Authority (ACA), based on functionality created 
through the use of Reprivata’s software. 
Reprivata’s Cybersecurity Community of Trust 
As Reprivata performed its early research into the key functionality required by its cyber risk 
management solution, Scott and David found that the Community of Trust (CoT) model, similar to one 
implemented by the U.S. Justice’s BCOT initiative (even though they had no knowledge of the U.S. 
Justice’s efforts at the time Reprivata was developing its strategy), was key to the broad-based adoption 
and success of the solution with clients. They then designed Reprivata’s CoT approach around several 
core concepts: 
 The CoT members were required to meet a minimum cybersecurity standard that was uniform, 
repeatable, easy-to-understand, and measure. 
 The CoT was implemented as a private network between its members with demarcation points 
documented both technically and legally through Master Agreements (standardized contracts) at 
the employee, end-user and independent third party (I3P) levels. 
 The CoT agreements were required its members to obtain cyber insurance as a form of risk 
management and third-party monitoring control. 
 The CoT agreements were defining the limits on liability for its members in case of a data breach 
or other major cybersecurity event. 
 The CoT agreements were both defining and enabling secure information sharing and 
collaboration between the members on cybersecurity issues that impacted the community as a 
whole. 
 The CoT should be able to provide members with the ability to monitor cybersecurity events 
related to the members’ business activities across servers, applications, devices, and data flows 
from all interconnected third parties. This notion was called a Community of Trust Privacy 
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Authority (CoTPA) and was defined and described in all the CoT Master Agreements, so 
information could be legally collected and agreed to by all parties in the private network. It 
allowed Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and other sensitive business data to be stored by 
the CoT owner as the custodian of the data, and also to be held privately in the CoTPA Privacy 
Authority and managed on behalf of all the members of the CoT in a secure and legal manner. 
 The CoTPA also helped the CoT owner to collect data about the activities of members inside the 
private CoT and use it as needed to protect the overall cybersecurity posture and maturity of the 
CoT in a manner that protected all parties. This enabled the CoT owner to share data between 
themselves and the interconnected third parties, so that they could collaborate about cyber 
maturity matters across the demarcation set out in the Master Agreement.  
Selecting the Right Cybersecurity Standard 
With these guiding principles established and the initial technology platform designed, the Reprivata team 
began to review the different cybersecurity standards and frameworks that were used in various 
industries. One of the first things they learned was that there were actually many cybersecurity 
methodologies to choose from. After reviewing a number of the most widely used ones, the team realized 
that none of the standards met their needs. There seemed to be no good way to proceed at this point. The 
other standards, though comprehensive, did not facilitate collaboration between companies to solve 
mutually-held cybersecurity issues--a key part of the Reprivata’s technology and process-oriented 
solution. Then, Scott and David evaluated the NIST CSF and they recognized that they had found the 
right cybersecurity standard for their needs.  
This decision was also influenced by David’s personal experiences. After returning from a trip abroad as 
part of a cybersecurity project team he initiated, David told Scott they should use the NIST CSF. The 
NIST CSF was a comprehensive set of cybersecurity requirements based on 23 control categories across 5 
cybersecurity functional areas (see Exhibit 3). As such, the cybersecurity requirements offered a 
comprehensive framework on which companies could construct their cybersecurity programs. Also, the 
NIST CSF included a cybersecurity program maturity model that gave companies several ways to 
determine how they were performing as they implemented the framework’s security controls (see Exhibit 
4). 
To David’s way of thinking, a standard with cybersecurity and risk management control guidelines 
developed by industry, NIST, and other government agencies charged with protecting the U.S. critical 
national infrastructure was a match to Reprivata’s guiding principles. When Scott heard David’s 
reasoning, he agreed that the NIST CFF was the standard to use in the Master Agreements to help ensure 
consistent cybersecurity maturity across the clients’ private networks. Now, with the NIST CSF providing 
direction on how to implement and mature a cybersecurity program, the team incorporated these security 
controls and maturity requirements into the Master Agreements. 
Illustrating the Reprivata CoT Solution Space 
A shared framework such as the NIST CSF focused on the rapid identification and remediation of security 
control gaps relative to a generally accepted cybersecurity standard, as opposed to having to regularly re-
certify their cybersecurity posture to multiple information infrastructure protection guidelines or, at worst, 
against ad hoc security requirements. Reprivata realized that this approach to closing security control 
weaknesses required not only collaboration between the members of a CoT, but a very robust 
cybersecurity program as well.  
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Of particular interest for Reprivata and its CoT solution was NIST CSF Tier 3 (see Exhibit 4). NIST CSF 
Tier 3 required the organizations that adopted the framework as part of building a trusted commercial 
relationship with their interconnected business partners to implement cyber risk initiatives as part of an 
on-going cybersecurity process improvement program. Each organization in the CoT was required to 
incorporate cyber risk into its enterprise risk management policies and program. This enterprise approach 
to cyber risk meant that an organization-wide approach to managing cybersecurity risk could be adopted 
and applied to both internal and external stakeholders. By including stakeholders in the cybersecurity 
program, the company then began to recognize and document the interdependencies on third parties and 
the increased need for collaboration between all key stakeholders. 
Another benefit of NIST CSF Tier 3 to the organization was that it could be readily mapped to 
government, international, and industry-specific standards, such as the ISO 27000 security requirements 
and others that are applicable to Financial Services, Healthcare, and other industries that needed to 
evaluate the cyber risks in their business and technology strategies. 
In practice, NIST CSF Tier 3 could be implemented as a private network with demarcation points defined 
both technically and legally through the adoption of standardized Master Agreements or similar contracts 
at the employee, end-user and information and infrastructure protection levels. Such contracts defined 
limits of liability for all parties, in accordance to their technology footprint, interconnections, and 
identified risks. Another advantage of the standardized contracts was that risk mitigation measures such 
as cyber insurance were more easily integrated into the business partners’ overall cybersecurity posture as 
a form of mutually-approved risk management and third-party monitoring. By having such defined risk 
mechanisms, secure information sharing and broader collaboration between the partners was facilitated. 
There were other advantages for the company that was the leader or “owner” of the CoT. The 
organization's cyber risk management practices had to be formally approved and expressed as policy, with 
appropriate NIST CSF key performance indicators included in enterprise risk management reporting. 
Under the framework, organizational cybersecurity practices were required to be regularly updated, based 
on the application of risk treatments. These treatments were defined in response to changes in internal and 
external strategic and tactical requirements as well as the changing threat and technology landscapes the 
business faced. 
The proposed cyber risk evaluation solution artifacts were designed to be easily integrated into a 
company’s enterprise risk management program. The artifacts allowed the rapid application of tools and 
techniques such as gap analyses, compliance testing, threat surveillance, and incident response 
postmortems that were critical to the success of understanding cyber risks as they were discovered and 
assessed. These methods were consistent to the NIST CSF framework and could be shared with business 
partners to support their cybersecurity postures as well as to enable more thorough government and 
industry compliance reviews of security controls, which increased collaboration and cooperation between 
the partners. 
In 2015, Scott had briefed the United States Department of the Treasury (U.S. Treasury) about the 
business interconnection issue. At the same time, he had started educating the American Bankers 
Association (ABA) about the NISF CSF and cyber insurance approach to enterprise risk management and 
cybersecurity maturity which were incorporated in the Master Agreements. Scott also contacted the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) as an organization as well as each state 
insurance commissioner and met with them about the Reprivata CoT Master Agreements and related 
Reprivata’s decision to seek Underwriter’s Laboratory’s new cybersecurity certification on the Reprivata 
software suite. This was a major effort and took until the end of 2016. 
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The First Independently Certified Cybersecurity Software 
In 2016, Reprivata decided to take a bold step. It approached the UL to certify the CoT solution under 
UL’s recently created Cybersecurity Assurance Program (UL CAP). Scott and David met members of the 
UL CAP program at a trade show and, after that meeting, Scott decided to engage UL CAP to perform a 
certification assessment on the Reprivata software. If the assessment was successful, Reprivata’s solution 
would be the first cybersecurity software to be certified under the UL CAP program. Reprivata knew that 
the UL certification could be a marketing advantage for them with potential clients, especially as a new 
company. Also, because UL certifications were well-respected in the insurance industry, a UL 
endorsement like this potentially helped clients get cyber insurance to cover losses from cyberattacks and 
to assist with getting the appropriate levels of coverage required to remediate from these events. Pursuing 
the UL CAP certification was truly an opportunity for Reprivata to distinguish itself as a leader in the 
development of robust cybersecurity solutions. 
UL CAP assessors applied the UL 2900 series of cybersecurity standards to the certification process. To 
ensure David met the demanding certification requirements, Scott reached out to Nathan Gregory, who 
Scott had known from the MAE-East days of the 1990s. Initially, Nathan worked on documenting the 
software according to the UL CAP guidelines. As the certification process went on, Nathan also assisted 
David and the UL security testers to make sure that all issues found by the cybersecurity testing and 
evaluations were cleared. Nathan provided the UL testers with guidance on the software’s architecture 
functionality as they assessed the solution’s potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to verify 
that its internal security capabilities and controls were implemented as designed.  
Over several months, UL’s security assessment team tested the CoT solution and tried to break its 
cryptographic security, but was not able to do so. The application testing protocol was extensive, covering 
such areas as malformed input testing, software composition and runtime analysis, malware analysis, and 
penetration testing.  
Finally, in July of 2016, the UL certification was awarded. Now, Reprivata had an innovative 
cybersecurity product that was the very first to be UL certified. Scott and David continued to look for an 
early adopter, but no company would commit to implement the product yet.  
More details on the Reprivata software and CoT solution are included in the Technical Note 
accompanying this case study. 
A Unique Opportunity to Test the Solution 
Then, Reprivata got its first big break. David's work on the early versions of the Reprivata software for 
the intelligence community made him more well-known in the cybersecurity field. As a result, David was 
approached by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to implement some technology and policy approaches in the 
Kingdom’s cybersecurity operations center. As David started his work, it became clear implementing a 
CoT based on Reprivata’s software suite would be extremely useful to the program he was leading. While 
this was a chance to implement the Reprivata software in a cyber environment where it would be severely 
tested because of the number of attacks it would likely face, the agreement with the Saudi government 
also required David to be onsite in Saudi Arabia to manage the system. After much debate, Scott and 
David agreed that this was a situation they could not pass up. However, it also meant that finding a client 
in the United States would take more time in light of David’s move to Saudi Arabia to run the project. 
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Searching for an Early Adopter  
In 2017, Scott and David discussed Reprivata’s future. They decided that it was time to find a hands-on 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who had deep connections with corporate executives and industry leaders 
and could help the company begin a more extensive marketing campaign to formally launch the CoT 
solution in the United States. Tripp Hardy was recruited to fill this role and the search for an “early 
adopter” in the United States accelerated. 
Tripp's first major act as CEO was to work with Scott and David on a white paper that addressed a U.S. 
Treasury request for comments on the cybersecurity issues related to business interconnections. This 
paper was the first time that Reprivata had presented anything in the public domain regarding the idea of a 
CoT with Master Agreements being a solution for companies that wanted to set boundaries on the risks 
inherent with third party business interconnections to their corporate networks. The paper, in addition to 
the awarding of the UL certification of their software, was a catalyst for Reprivata being asked to 
participate in meetings with several government agencies and also attracted the interest of companies in 
industries like Banking and Insurance. The pursuit of an early adopter was on in earnest. 
In March of 2018, Tripp, Scott, and other members of the Reprivata senior management team had been 
engaged by potential clients at several high profile Federal and state government agencies in an attempt to 
sign up the first adopter of their cybersecurity solution. As a result of these meetings, the company had 
been asked to come to Washington, DC to perform a technical demonstration of a client-provided use 
case. Part of this demonstration included the integration of Microsoft Office into the solution to facilitate 
workgroup collaboration. Of particular interest to this agency was the concept of a “micro CoT”, 
essentially a small (10 to 100 user) private collaboration group that helped their internal departments 
change security and risk management behaviors immediately. This CoT implementation strategy also had 
the ability to make those groups compliant with NIST CSF Tier 3 requirements, taking small careful steps 
to raise the cyber maturity of the entire agency. However, this demonstration was not without potential 
obstacles and risks. 
Challenges 
There was growing acknowledgement within the company that additional development would be required 
before a client would agree to implement their solution. After they reviewed the company’s finances, 
Tripp and Scott met with the other members of the Reprivata management team to discuss next steps. 
Reprivata was a self-funded company; Scott and David had originally funded the startup and Tripp had 
become an investor when he joined the company. When he joined Reprivata as Chief Technology Officer, 
Nathan Gregory had also self-funded his considerable participation in Reprivata, especially his earlier 
efforts in documenting the Reprivata software suite as part of the requirements to obtain the UL 
certification for the solution and assisting the UL security testers during the software’s certification 
assessment.  
Now, the company was at a crossroads and looking at potential funding options because of the number of 
organizations that had started taking interest in Reprivata and its solution. While all the management team 
had agreed that remaining self-funded was the direction they wanted to go, they also understood that they 
did not have sufficient funds to maintain the current capital burn rate. The management team had 
unanimously decided that the integration project for the upcoming product demonstration was critical to 
the future of the company, even though it would require them to spend most of the available cash. 
Without a real client yet, could Reprivata remain self-funded, complete the software integration, 
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successfully demonstrate the solution with a client use case, and close the deal--or would it need to pursue 
other funding options to execute its plans? 
The Reprivata CoT solution had been built using open source software, tools, and applications for voice, 
video, file transfer, and text communications. Initially, no development efforts had been focused on 
integrating collaborative and office support tools like Microsoft Office and SharePoint into the solution. 
All the clients the Reprivata team had spoken with had either asked about or required this type of 
integration to enhance the solution’s native collaborative capabilities. While the Reprivata team believed 
that this integration would be feasible, they had become more certain that this functionality was a 
requirement for the solution’s broader acceptance in the market. Would a client want to risk implementing 
the Reprivata CoT solution without these capabilities? 
Reprivata had not been able to pay sales people to reach out to potential clients. Scott, from his prior 
entrepreneurial experience, had a list of sales and marketing contacts that, after hearing about the 
Reprivata CoT solution, were eager to help set up meetings with potential clients. At this time, after 3 
years with no real successes in finding an early adopter for the solution, the number of people who were 
either still interested in or willing to help Reprivata gain entrée into the right cybersecurity executives and 
influencers in companies had shrunk. Without sales people who considered taking a risk and continued to 
assist Reprivata without a near-term opportunity for compensation, could Reprivata find the next adopter 
of its solution--and the one after that--if they successfully closed the deal with their current client after the 
upcoming demonstration? 
David Cox had been overseas for over a year. At a very critical time for Reprivata, with a software 
integration project and system demonstration in the offing for its first real U.S. client, David was 
supporting the cybersecurity operations center for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia was a major target for cyberattacks and other security events. David was tapped for this project 
because of the development of a security and threat intelligence system that was part of the Reprivata 
CoT solution. With the technical abilities to help complete the integration project on time, David’s 
assistance ensured the client demonstration would be successful. Unfortunately, the client demonstration 
would soon be held in Washington, DC. Would David be able to participate in the preparation of the 
client demonstration and then be able to attend the formal presentation with the client in Washington, 
DC? 
Decisions 
All of the members of the Reprivata management team had spent a great deal of time, effort, and money 
to meet with potential clients in order to get an early adopter in the United States. Now, Scott and Nathan 
had both spent a significant amount of their own personal funds and could not easily raise additional 
money. David was not wealthy and did not have a great deal of available cash to help prop up the 
company’s finances in the short term. Tripp, being an investment banker working in the Silicon Valley 
area, had funded some of the companies’ activities since he joined the company, but he was a widowed 
father with 5 children to care for and could not contribute much more money at this time. That left the 
management team with several alternatives to consider. 
Scott had always stated that his vision had already been to concentrate on the Master Agreements and let 
the clients define their own uses of a collaboration solution, even though they might not be the one 
Reprivata offered. Was the approach of allowing clients to determine how and if they wanted to 
implement a collaboration technology without using the Reprivata solution a prudent one?  
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There was quite a bit of discussion on how to fix the short-term money issues. Was it a good idea to go all 
in right now and spend most, if not all, of the remaining capital on the upcoming product demonstration, 
betting heavily on its success to secure the “early adopter” client the firm had been seeking?  
With his investment banking background, Tripp had a number of high-level contacts with some of the 
leading venture capital firms and individual investors in Silicon Valley and New York that might be 
interested in investing in Reprivata. With a large client win potentially in the offing now, was it prudent to 
make an attempt to raise funds now? Also, if the Reprivata management team did that, what would they 
have to give, either in participation in the company or in ownership of its proprietary technology, to make 
such a deal? 
Tripp and Scott had been attending security trade shows and conferences and had spoken with several 
cybersecurity vendors about the Reprivata solution. A number of the companies they met, including a few 
of the very large cybersecurity vendors, were interested in forming partnerships to bring a more 
comprehensive cybersecurity solution to market by integrating Reprivata’s technology. If they made such 
an arrangement, would Reprivata ultimately lose its identity and, more importantly, the potential for 
future earnings from its unique and innovative technology?  
Tripp, Scott, and David had a number of conversations about the best way to productize the Reprivata 
solution. One way they discussed was to spin off the proprietary technology solution suite to form a 
software company. In fact, the technology was perhaps the most valuable asset the company held. 
However, Scott was adamant that Reprivata would not become a software development firm, which 
would require the hiring of programming, support, and sales people. Tripp made the argument that 
spinning the technology off into a separate company could give Reprivata a great opportunity to further 
mature the product and could provide more opportunities to integrate the software with other 
cybersecurity technologies and make the proprietary technology even more valuable. Did Reprivata really 
need such a development capability? 
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Exhibit 1: Comparison of Selected Cybersecurity Management Standards  
 
Comparison  
Criteria 
Industry-Specific 
Cybersecurity 
Standards 
ISO 27000  
Standards 
NIST  
Cybersecurity 
Framework 
General Data 
Protection 
Regulation 
Includes 
Comprehensive 
Security Guidance 
and Leading 
Practices 
Differs between 
standards 
Yes Yes Yes 
Aligns with other 
Information Security 
and Business 
Standards  
Alignment is 
relatively easy, 
but takes time to 
do 
Yes Yes Yes 
Facilitates 
Compliance with 
other Information 
Security Standards 
No, but there are 
some frameworks 
that use other 
standards as 
models for 
technical controls 
Yes Yes Yes, but 
requires 
compliance 
assessment to 
determine 
Is Specific to a Single 
Country or Region 
Yes, in most cases No Yes, but useful 
for foreign 
companies 
doing business 
in the United 
States  
Yes 
Includes 
Cybersecurity 
Maturity Model 
No No Yes No 
Requires 
Collaboration 
between Business 
Partners 
No No Yes No 
 
Source: Developed by case writer 
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Exhibit 2: Reprivata Community of Trust Conceptual Model  
 
Source: Developed by case writer  
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Exhibit 3: NIST CSF Functions & Control Categories for Assessment  
 
Functions Categories 
  Asset Management (AM) 
  Business Environment (BE) 
Identify (ID) Governance (GV) 
  Risk Assessment (RA) 
  Risk Management Strategy (RM) 
 Supply Chain Risk Management (SC) 
  Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (AC) 
  Awareness and Training (AT) 
Protect (PR) Data Security (DS) 
  Information Protection Processes and Procedures (IP) 
  Maintenance (MA) 
  Protection Technologies (PT) 
  Anomalies and Events (AE) 
Detect (DT) Security Continuous Monitoring (CM) 
  Detection Processes 
  Response Planning (RP) 
 Communications (CO) 
Respond (RS) Analysis (AN) 
  Mitigation (MI) 
  Improvements (IM) 
  Recovery Planning (RP) 
Recover (RC) Improvements (IM) 
  Communications (CO) 
 
Source: Developed by case writer 
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Exhibit 4: NIST CSF Implementation Tiers  
 
Maturity Tier Definition and Characteristics 
1. Partial Risk Management Process – Organizational cybersecurity risk management 
practices are not formalized, and risk is managed in an ad hoc and sometimes 
reactive manner. Prioritization of cybersecurity activities may not be directly 
informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat environment, or 
business/mission requirements.  
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is limited awareness of 
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level. The organization implements 
cybersecurity risk management on an irregular, case-by-case basis due to 
varied experience or information gained from outside sources. The 
organization may not have processes that enable cybersecurity information to 
be shared within the organization. 
External Participation – The organization does not understand its role in the 
larger ecosystem with respect to either its dependencies or dependents. The 
organization does not collaborate with or receive information (e.g., threat 
intelligence, best practices, technologies) from other entities (e.g., buyers, 
suppliers, dependencies, dependents, ISAOs, researchers, governments), nor 
does it share information. The organization is generally unaware of the cyber 
supply chain risks of the products and services it provides and that it uses.  
2. Risk 
Informed 
Risk Management Process – Risk management practices are approved by 
management but may not be established as organizational-wide policy. 
Prioritization of cybersecurity activities and protection needs is directly 
informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat environment, or 
business/mission requirements.  
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is an awareness of 
cybersecurity risk at the organizational level, but an organization-wide 
approach to managing cybersecurity risk has not been established. 
Cybersecurity information is shared within the organization on an informal 
basis. Consideration of cybersecurity in organizational objectives and programs 
may occur at some but not all levels of the organization. Cyber risk assessment 
of organizational and external assets occurs, but is not typically repeatable or 
reoccurring.  
External Participation – Generally, the organization understands its role in the 
larger ecosystem with respect to either its own dependencies or dependents, but 
not both. The organization collaborates with and receives some information 
from other entities and generates some of its own information, but may not 
share information with others. Additionally, the organization is aware of the 
cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and services it provides 
and uses, but does not act consistently or formally upon those risks.  
3. Repeatable Risk Management Process – The organization’s risk management practices are 
formally approved and expressed as policy. Organizational cybersecurity 
practices are regularly updated based on the application of risk management 
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processes to changes in business/mission requirements and a changing threat 
and technology landscape.  
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is an organization-wide 
approach to manage cybersecurity risk. Risk-informed policies, processes, and 
procedures are defined, implemented as intended, and reviewed. Consistent 
methods are in place to respond effectively to changes in risk. Personnel 
possess the knowledge and skills to perform their appointed roles and 
responsibilities. The organization consistently and accurately monitors 
cybersecurity risk of organizational assets. Senior cybersecurity and non-
cybersecurity executives communicate regularly regarding cybersecurity risk. 
Senior executives ensure consideration of cybersecurity through all lines of 
operation in the organization.  
External Participation – The organization understands its role, dependencies, 
and dependents in the larger ecosystem and may contribute to the community’s 
broader understanding of risks. It collaborates with and receives information 
from other entities regularly that complements internally generated 
information, and shares information with other entities. The organization is 
aware of the cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and services 
it provides and that it uses. Additionally, it usually acts formally upon those 
risks, including mechanisms such as written agreements to communicate 
baseline requirements, governance structures (e.g., risk councils), and policy 
implementation and monitoring.  
 
4. Adaptive Risk Management Process – The organization adapts its cybersecurity 
practices based on previous and current cybersecurity activities, including 
lessons learned and predictive indicators. Through a process of continuous 
improvement incorporating advanced cybersecurity technologies and practices, 
the organization actively adapts to a changing threat and technology landscape 
and responds in a timely and effective manner to evolving, sophisticated 
threats.  
Integrated Risk Management Program – There is an organization-wide 
approach to managing cybersecurity risk that uses risk-informed policies, 
processes, and procedures to address potential cybersecurity events. The 
relationship between cybersecurity risk and organizational objectives is clearly 
understood and considered when making decisions. Senior executives monitor 
cybersecurity risk in the same context as financial risk and other organizational 
risks. The organizational budget is based on an understanding of the current 
and predicted risk environment and risk tolerance. Business units implement 
executive vision and analyze system-level risks in the context of the 
organizational risk tolerances. Cybersecurity risk management is part of the 
organizational culture and evolves from an awareness of previous activities and 
continuous awareness of activities on their systems and networks. The 
organization can quickly and efficiently account for changes to 
business/mission objectives in how risk is approached and communicated.  
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External Participation - The organization understands its role, dependencies, 
and dependents in the larger ecosystem and contributes to the community’s 
broader understanding of risks. It receives, generates, and reviews prioritized 
information that informs continuous analysis of its risks as the threat and 
technology landscapes evolve. The organization shares that information 
internally and externally with other collaborators. The organization uses real-
time or near real-time information to understand and consistently act upon 
cyber supply chain risks associated with the products and services it provides 
and that it uses. Additionally, it communicates proactively, using formal (e.g., 
agreements) and informal mechanisms to develop and maintain strong supply 
chain relationships. 
 
Source: Developed by case writer based on CSF version 1.1, 2018 
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ED FULFORD 
A NOTE ON THE CYBERSECURITY PROBLEM SPACE IN 
20182 
The Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) used for Internet communications was 
designed so that traffic from one device connected to the Internet was visible to all other connected 
devices. This one attribute made it possible for bad actors and hackers to attack any company, country, or 
person from anywhere on earth across the Internet. For the first time in recorded history, a disgruntled 
individual, terrorist group, or rogue country wreaked havoc on other people, companies, countries, and-- 
of even greater concern--the global economy. All that was required was a computer, an Internet 
connection, and one or more vulnerable endpoints attached to critical applications or networks also linked 
to the Internet.  
The cybersecurity industry had long acknowledged that the Internet was not originally designed for 
electronic business. Also, it was never intended for the transmission of critical information, nor for the 
support of mission critical networks and infrastructure. As quoted from a 2002 research report produced 
by the CERT Coordination Center in connection with the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at 
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU): “The Internet was not designed to resist highly untrustworthy users” 
(Lipson, 2002).  
Recognizing this problem, the cybersecurity industry’s mindset was focused on defending against 
untrustworthy users. After all, this approach worked in the physical world. If one knew the weapon that 
an attacker was using and the direction from which the attack was coming, an effective defense could 
often be planned and implemented. However, this had not been the case when defending against 
cyberattacks on the Internet. There usually were many ways to stage an attack without being detected. In 
addition, the technologies that were used for masking such attacks had become more sophisticated, as 
                                                          
2 Copyright © 2018, Ed Fulford. This technical note was developed to provide background information in support of 
one or more case studies published by the Muma Case Review. It may be freely copied and shared for non-
commercial purposes. 
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demonstrated by attackers’ abilities to anonymize themselves and their attack vectors, which made it 
much more difficult to isolate the sources of attacks. Also, remember that many of the recent 
cybersecurity solutions defended against an attack that had already occurred and offered no assurance that 
they could defend against the next attack.  
Cybersecurity and risk management professionals had been working diligently to improve information 
security and risk management practices in order to reduce overall cybersecurity risks. While these efforts 
had managed to improve information security practices, they had done so without showing any significant 
or maintainable reductions in the numbers and types of cybersecurity risks. This situation had identified a 
variety of challenges that cybersecurity experts needed to address in a number of key problem areas. 
The Cybersecurity Problem Space 
Ely Kahn from Sqrrl, one of responders to the 2017 Passcode (The Christian Science Monitor's section on 
security and privacy) poll of cybersecurity practitioners, stated (Sorcher, 2017): 
I think the most urgent cybersecurity challenge is the need for all organizations to fully 
understand the cyber risks they face, how those risks affect their mission, and what are the most 
cost-effective ways to mitigate those risks. 
The cybersecurity practitioners’ struggles to stem the tide of cyber risks came at the increasing expense of 
the resources--tools, personnel, and support--needed to change the nature of global, national, and business 
behaviors that helped create this situation in the first place. The focus on creating cybersecurity solutions 
to fix more than point problems had not gained significant mindshare with cybersecurity practitioners, so 
they tried to transform current information security and risk management approaches to address broader 
and increasing more interrelated problem spaces. As a method of dealing with cybersecurity risks, 
information security might ultimately have had an indirect impact on the successful implementation of 
effective cybersecurity control programs over time. However, the management and assessment practices 
related to information security problem and solution spaces were not encompassing enough and were too 
inwardly focused to enable wide-reaching strategic and tactical enhancements to take place. As such, 
cybersecurity programs were not maturing quickly enough to deal with these risks. One significant reason 
for this situation was the lack of collaboration between companies that did business together. In many 
cases, these business partners did not discuss their common cybersecurity issues because of the lack of 
defined rules of engagement and secure communication capabilities. 
For the purpose of this article, the following cybersecurity problem areas will be discussed: 
 Global Cybersecurity Problems 
 Government Cybersecurity Problems 
 Business Cybersecurity Problems 
 Cybersecurity Standards Problems 
Global Cybersecurity Problems 
Europol, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, recently assessed the global 
impact of cybersecurity events like the ransomware epidemic. In their study, they found that their efforts 
had some successes in disrupting criminal groups that primarily operated online. However, they also 
determined that the economic impact was far reaching with cross-border implications as multinational 
banks and international corporations were attacked. Commenting on this situation in an October 2017 
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interview published on HelpNetSecurity.com, Europol’s Executive Director Rob Wainwright stated (“The 
Global Impact,” 2017): 
The global impact of huge cyber security events such as the WannaCry ransomware epidemic (a 
cryptoworm attack in 2017 which targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating 
system by encrypting data and then demanding the owners to make payments in the Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency to release the computer has taken the threat from cybercrime to another level.  
Summing up the efforts of Europol and its law enforcement partners at the conclusion of the interview, 
Wainwright said that, even with the progress that had been made, “The collective response is still not 
good enough” (“The Global Impact,” 2017). 
Over time, cybersecurity threats and attacks like the WannaCry incidents had become ever-present news 
items. As terrorist groups and rogue governments sought new ways to economically damage or strike fear 
in their enemies, the number and sophistication of cybersecurity incidents grew. The 2017 Internet 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment cited several examples of cyber events with a global reach that 
included: 
 Ransomware eclipsed most other cyber-threats with global campaigns indiscriminately affecting 
victims across multiple industries in both the public and private sectors. Some attacks targeted 
and affected critical national infrastructures at levels that could have endangered lives. These 
attacks highlighted how network interconnectivity, poor digital hygiene standards and insufficient 
security practices allowed such threats to quickly spread and expand the attack vectors. 
 The first serious attacks by botnets using infected insecure Internet of Things (IoT) devices 
occurred. 
 Data breaches continued to result in the disclosure of vast amounts of data, with over 2 billion 
records related to European Union citizens reportedly being leaked over a 12-month period, often 
exacerbated by poor digital hygiene and security practices. 
 The Darknet remained a key cross-cutting enabler for a variety of crime areas. It provided access 
to among other things: 
o The supply of drugs such as Fentanyl and new psychoactive substances which directly 
led to many fatalities internationally 
o The supply of firearms that were used in terrorist acts 
o Compromised payment data which enabled bad actors to commit various types of 
payment fraud 
o Fraudulent documents which facilitated various types of fraud, trafficking in human 
beings, and illegal immigration activities 
 Offenders continued to abuse the Darknet and other online platforms, sharing and distributing 
child sexual abuse material, and engaging with potential victims, often coercing or sexually 
extorting vulnerable minors. 
 Payment fraud affected almost all industries, having the greatest impact on the Retail, Airline and 
Accommodation sectors. Several sectors had been targeted by these fraudsters as the services they 
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provided could be used for the facilitation of other crimes, including trafficking in human beings 
or drugs, and illegal immigration. 
 Direct attacks on bank networks manipulated card balances, took control of ATMs or directly 
transferred funds, known as payment process compromise, represented one of the serious 
emerging threats in this area. (“The Global Impact,” 2017). 
While governments began to allocate more money and personnel to defend their countries, many 
companies were not financially able to defend themselves, and affected individuals were even less able to 
do so. Even with the regulatory and industry requirements placed on them, neither companies nor 
individuals could adequately defend themselves from cyber-attacks and were not likely to have the 
training, competence, or capability to do so. The best that could be expected was that companies would 
continue to strive to maintain a heightened degree of operational resilience, business continuity, and 
disaster recovery in their strategic and tactical plans. 
As outlined in the cybersecurity industry report mentioned above, international and business boundaries 
had been all but eliminated by electronic commerce, which put more pressure on governments and 
companies to be more vigilant in their own cybersecurity controls to prevent or limit the impacts from 
cyber incidents. Practitioners in the cybersecurity field actively discussed if it was more prudent to 
implement, maintain, and monitor the effectiveness of security controls around their supply chains or their 
networks. Ultimately, however, these cybersecurity professionals determined that more work was 
required. In many cases, the international supply chains were intertwined with transnational computer 
networks, which made the deployment and monitoring of these security control mechanisms and systems 
much more difficult. As discussed previously, the lack of cybersecurity program maturity in governments 
and international companies, in addition to the absence of consistent collaboration between these groups 
based on prescribed rules for doing so, limited their abilities to coordinate actions to deal with 
cybersecurity issues that arose on a seemingly daily basis.  
The consequences from the set of circumstances outlined above were far-reaching. For example, the 
rising hostility of threat actors was often misunderstood and not foreseen before attacks took place, which 
lessened the time and ability for governments or companies to respond, thus costing them financially and 
operationally as well as negatively impacting their reputations. The other effects from such events 
included critical systems and services not being available or functioning as designed during emergencies 
and the civil conflicts that resulted from prolonged service outages. 
Government Cybersecurity Problems 
Government agencies had helped safeguard very sensitive information on their country’s citizens as well 
as data about their actions and programs that affected the public welfare. This had made them particularly 
attractive targets for cyberattacks. Unfortunately, governments had often lagged behind businesses in the 
implementation of cybersecurity controls and protection systems. This became a serious concern as the 
cyberattacks and the terrorists who launched them became more sophisticated. The Heritage Foundation, 
in its January, 2018 report on Federal cyber breaches, found that there were over 30,000 cybersecurity 
incidents that affected the United States government in 2016, with 16 rising to the level of a being a major 
incident (Walters, 2018). Both the Obama and Trump Administrations issued Executive Orders 
mandating the United States government to implement modern, focused, responsive, and proactive 
cybersecurity programs that had the ability to adapt to the threat environment and to provide better 
measurements of the cyber risks faced. At this point, it was not readily apparent that the government had 
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begun to dedicate the appropriate resources to do this and to meet these cyber challenges in an aggressive 
way. 
Cybersecurity practitioners both inside and outside the government questioned what intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies had done to deploy effective cyber defense technologies. Of particular concern 
were the abilities of agencies charged with cybersecurity monitoring as well as identifying and 
remediating security breaches. For example, when Wikileaks released what it believed to be a list of CIA 
hacking tools in March, 2017, these abilities were seriously questioned. This incident exposed a list of 
cybersecurity hacking applications known as “Year Zero” or “Vault 7,” which were reportedly acquired 
by Wikileaks while the information passed between government employees and contractors in an 
“unauthorized manner.” A month later in April, 2017, a group known as the Shadow Brokers continued 
releasing what it claimed were NSA hacking tools. One of the tools included in this release, known as 
EternalBlue, was associated with a number of cyberattacks, including those involving WannaCry 
ransomware, which occurred throughout the summer of 2016 and into 2017. The Shadow Brokers 
claimed to have stolen these tools from a team, known as the “Equation Group,” which was reportedly 
associated with the NSA (Walters, 2018). 
Also, state and local governments had been even more at risk from such cyberattacks. Few had the money 
to invest in the technologies and the appropriately trained personnel to provide needed services in 
network security, threat intelligence, risk-based analytics, and data encryption. The ransomware attack 
that crippled the government support systems of the City of Atlanta, Georgia for over a week in March, 
2018 was further indication that local governments had been woefully underprepared from a technical 
capability perspective and a personnel standpoint to deal with these types of cyberattacks when they 
occurred (Hutcherson, 2018). 
Government agencies at all levels had not been able to effectively create cyber defense capabilities in 
their organizations, primarily due to the fact that their cybersecurity strategies had often been “siloed” in 
one functional area. As such, these agencies had not concentrated on bringing their entire organization up 
to a baseline level of compliance to cybersecurity standards such as those created by the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST). By assessing their current cybersecurity strategies and 
competencies against these standards, agencies determined what gaps existed in their processes and 
practices as well as in their technical capabilities. This began to help them determine how exposed their 
information assets were and the best ways to resolve those security control issues. 
From a functional standpoint, government agencies needed to build more robust security-focused cultures 
that monitor, measure, and manage cybersecurity behaviors. Once this had been initiated, agencies then 
concentrated on pushing out cyber risk management activities to the rest of their organizations. Providing 
the right visibility to, and understanding of, cyber risks to the broader organization was found to be 
critical to success in mitigating them quickly and minimizing their impacts.  
Collaboration and communication of potential and real cybersecurity events and attack scenarios showed 
that such activities facilitated agencies working better together. This information sharing assisted agencies 
in better understanding cyber incidents that had the potential to affect agencies and other public 
organizations. By identifying critical points of failures, decision criteria, and barriers to progress, 
government agencies had developed better cyber defense strategies that speeded remediation from 
breaches and prevented similar events from occurring in the future. In the Heritage Foundation’s report, 
one of the key takeaways was that the United States government should continue to focus on securing its 
own networks while collaborating with the private sector and international communities on better 
understanding cyber risks. (Walters, 2018). 
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In order to change the behaviors in government agencies, the numbers and types of cybersecurity threats 
and vulnerabilities had been evaluated in more detail, including the activities of foreign and domestic 
cyber threat actors and their attendant risks. This had shown the potential to speed up the implementation 
of cyber risk management technologies to defend against these actors. This had also assisted with better 
aligning cybersecurity strategies with those of the agencies’ operational missions. Government agencies 
had not consistently created and tested cyber defense readiness plans. When done proactively, these 
programs had success in ensuring that incident response and escalation procedures were widely 
communicated and tested for their effectiveness. Additionally, this facilitated collaboration between 
agencies to show how they jointly managed cyber incidents. In the law enforcement arena, programs like 
the Department of Justice’s Building Communities of Trust initiative improved how federal and local law 
enforcement groups worked together. (Wasserman, 2010). 
Finally, government agencies had not had the appropriate levels of internal expertise required to make 
better cybersecurity investment and program management decisions. Agencies needed to examine their 
cybersecurity investments against leading practices and benchmarks, but this had not been done 
consistently. In order to ensure agencies allocated their resources with a risk-based approach, they had 
utilized mission objectives, benchmarks, and cybersecurity directions as guides. Government agencies 
had approached their cybersecurity postures as an evolving landscape of increasing potential threats--one 
that had required the ability to adapt to those risks. Proactive and mature cybersecurity programs had 
needed the commitment from leaders to be able to invest wisely, create a culture of cyber innovation, and 
maintain relevant and continuous training and awareness programs. 
Business Cybersecurity Problems 
Cybersecurity had become one of the most important issues facing businesses today. According to the 
World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Risks Report, both large-scale cyberattacks and major data 
breaches or fraud were ranked among the top five most likely risks in the next decade (“The Global Risks 
Report,” 2018). At the time of the case, companies had been required to deal with cybersecurity problems 
head on because those issues have had significant impacts on the overall business operations as well as 
the Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. This had become even more critical for those businesses 
that were interconnected with third parties such as partners and suppliers. These interconnections exposed 
all the business partners to cyber threats that had become more severe and frequent. As the numbers of 
security risks had risen, businesses learned, to their dismay, that they faced more threats and more attacks 
than ever before, many of which required more and faster cyber response and remediation capabilities 
than were already in place. 
As businesses expanded their interconnections and shared more information, the number of networks and 
devices that required more comprehensive security controls increased as well. In recent years, 63 percent 
of breaches were traced to third-party vendors, according to the Soha System’s 2016 survey on third-party 
risk management (“Soha Systems' Survey,” 2016). The security of mobile telephones, tablet computers, 
and other networkable devices had lagged in the implementation of cybersecurity controls too. 
Additionally, new technology advances such as artificial intelligence and machine learning enabled threat 
actors to create more malicious and sophisticated tools to use in their attacks. 
If the statistics from recent global security breaches had been accurate indicators, the impacts of these 
incidents clearly affected businesses and their partners as a group as well as individually. In a November, 
2017 article on ComputerWeekly.com, incidents affecting infrastructure hosted by a third party cost small 
businesses £106K on average, while large enterprises lost nearly £1.5M as a result of breaches affecting 
suppliers they shared data with, and saw another £1.2M in expenditures because of insufficient levels of 
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protection from providers of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) (Ashford, 2017). The threat environments 
had changed, with hacking software and hackers themselves becoming much more advanced in both 
capability and reach. Cyber terrorists had progressed in more economically-focused directions including 
industrial espionage, corporate disinformation, market and financial manipulation, and disruption of 
critical public and private infrastructures. They had done so without slowing their previous activities such 
as data exfiltration, system ransom and extortion, and digital vandalism. Mitigating these threats had 
required businesses to re-think the cybersecurity and business risk postures. In many cases, organizations 
developed a more inclusive approach to enterprise risk management. Current thinking in business 
strategies had required companies to reconsider how cyber risks affected the company as a whole, 
including stakeholders like customers, partners, suppliers, industry groups, and regulators. The 
ComputerWeekly.com article quoted Alessio Aceti, head of the enterprise business division at Kaspersky 
Lab, a multinational Internet security and anti-virus provider, who stated (Ashford, 2017):  
While cyber security incidents involving third parties prove to be harmful to businesses of all 
sizes, their financial impact on a company had the potential to result in twice as much damage.  
Because cybersecurity had been considered a business risk as well as a technology risk, integrating 
monitoring for both of these risks into the company’s cybersecurity risk management program had 
become essential. Cyber risks had impacted entire businesses operationally and financially, and seriously 
damaged their reputations in the process. In such situations, businesses needed to continue evaluating, 
updating, and communicating their cybersecurity policies, practices, business rules, training programs, 
and other procedures to cause the requisite cultural changes required for better cybersecurity hygiene. 
When done in a holistic way, cyber risk management had become a strategic weapon for better protecting 
the company’s environment while maturing its cybersecurity capabilities at the same time. Companies 
had approached this challenge by creating better new rules of engagement with their interconnected 
business partners, such as contractual agreements in which both the company and its partners were 
required to improve their cybersecurity programs and provide ways to demonstrate the maturity of the 
programs. However, this change had not been adopted widely, and many businesses had not started to 
collaborate with their partners in this area. A key reason was that businesses had not had technologies that 
enabled them to communicate securely with their internal and external stakeholders to deal with mutual 
cybersecurity risks. 
In its 2016 Global 1000 survey, CGI, a leading independent information technology and business process 
services firm, found that organizations that viewed security not only as a mandatory part of operations, 
but also as an enabler to growth and change, maximized the benefits of digital transformation efforts. At 
the same time, only 14% of clients who responded to the Global 1000 survey stated that they were at a 
level of maturity where cybersecurity was a key part of their value propositions (CGI, 2016). In order to 
move forward, companies had begun to take input from regulatory, industry, consumer, and other 
stakeholder groups in order to mature their cybersecurity strategies and risk management systems. By 
approaching cybersecurity as a business problem first, companies had been better able to create more 
resilient operational frameworks that would improve their abilities to identify, respond to, and remediate 
cyberattacks and mitigate any business interruptions more quickly and cost effectively. 
Cybersecurity Standards Problems 
Cybersecurity practitioners had reviewed security and control-related guidelines and standards to 
determine which ones of the various government, industry, and independently developed guidelines 
would be the best ones for them to utilize as they continued development on their cybersecurity programs. 
Companies had been increasingly challenged by regulators, industry groups, and business partners to 
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become savvier in the areas of maturing their cybersecurity programs and understanding their cyber risks. 
However, as determined by a review of the academic literature (Fulford, 2017), there were a significant 
number of cybersecurity and risk management frameworks used by cybersecurity practitioners that ranged 
from rudimentary ones based on manual questionnaires using qualitative techniques to those that were 
very complex utilizing strong quantitative and statistical measures. In January, 2018 the IT Governance 
web site published a review of the most frequently adopted cybersecurity frameworks (Watson, 2018): 
 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) – 47% 
 International Standards Organization (ISO) 27001/27002 – 35% 
 Center for Internet Security (CIS) Critical Security Controls – 32% 
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Security – 29% 
 
While all of these frameworks had large numbers of adopters, the newer NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
(NIST CSF) successfully combined qualitative and quantitative methods in an easy-to-use and 
understandable format. This methodology, which was created in part from the older NIST 800 series 
security and risk management approach, was found to map directly to most of the control requirements 
and most of the other security frameworks, which would make it relatively easy to implement for many 
companies and government agencies. To many companies, the ability to measure and understand cyber 
risks on several levels internally and externally had become daunting challenges to companies’ enterprise 
risk management programs. A framework, like the NIST CSF, that enabled companies to assess each 
other’s cyber maturity and define collaboration in disseminating ways to better deal with risks across their 
business ecosystem, regardless of industries involved or the technologies they used to interconnect and 
exchange products, services, and--most importantly--information. 
Current directions in cyber risk evaluation had been seeking a way for companies to “get credit” for the 
work they were doing to mature their cybersecurity programs while simultaneously identifying cyber 
risks and related security control gaps. This type of approach had helped senior executives rationalize 
their investments in their technology footprints and attendant cybersecurity governance and management 
practices. An overarching cybersecurity implementation and risk management methodology which 
enabled companies in different industries and business practices to have common vocabulary and 
taxonomy for discussing and understanding their cyber risks would be extremely beneficial to a variety of 
industry and government organizations.  
Such a methodology had assisted companies in standardizing and streamlining the implementation of 
cyber risk management controls that were required by the establishment and operation of new business 
technology interconnections. This had helped businesses to eliminate redundancies in security controls 
and to increase the understanding of how effectiveness of those controls was measured. Companies had a 
duty to be more cyber mature, including improving understanding the cyber risks related to their internal 
and external technology interconnections, as well as their indirect interconnections (such as the 
interconnections of their business partners’ partners). 
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